scholarly journals VICTOR FRANKENSTEIN Y LA RACIONALIDAD INSTRUMENTAL = VICTOR FRANKENSTEIN AND THE INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY

Author(s):  
Ana Pinel Benayas

<p>En este artículo se pretende hacer una relectura de <em>Frankenstein o el moderno Prometeo</em> (1818) desde la tesis planteada en la <em>Dialéctica de la Ilustración</em> (1944) de los filósofos Adorno y Horkheimer, intentando mostrar que Victor Frankenstein es un esclavo de la racionalidad instrumental.  </p><p>This article is intended to make a rereading of Frankenstein; o, The Modern Prometheus (1818) from the thesis presented in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) and Eclipse of Reason (1947) of the philosophers Adorno and Horkheimer, trying to prove that Victor Frankenstein is an instrumental´s rationality slave.</p>

Author(s):  
Stephen Eric Bronner

‘Enlightened illusions’ examines Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment. The work shows how scientific (or instrumental) rationality expels freedom from historical process and enables reification to permeate society. The work connects the growth of instrumental rationality with a totally administered society, and calls for resistance against it. Scientific reason was originally intended to destroy superstitions, but it turned on all non-scientific precepts. This perversion of autonomy has been blamed for the rise of anti–Semitism and fascism. However, these phenomena were due to the conflict of real organizations, and to ignore that is to engage in the very reification processes that the Frankfurt School sought to combat.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason D'Cruz

Abstract In making the case that “rationalization is rational,” Cushman downplays its signature liability: Rationalization exposes a person to the hazard of delusion and self-sabotage. In paradigm cases, rationalization undermines instrumental rationality by introducing inaccuracies into the representational map required for planning and effective agency.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-106

The article analyzes methodological errors Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, particularly their incorrect use of the concepts of mimicry and mimesis. The author of the article maintains that the leaders of the Frankfurt School made a mistake that threatens to undermine their argument when they juxtaposed mimesis and the attraction to death, which has led philosophers to trace back to mimesis the desire for destruction that is found in a civilization constructed by instrumental reasoning. The author reviews the arguments of the Dialectic of Enlightenment and emphasizes the unsuccessful attempt to fuse Freudian and Hegelian methods, which exposes the instability of opposing scientific reasoning to “living” nature. Some amusing quotations from Roger Caillois, who refused to think of mimesis as something entirely rational, are also brought to bear. As Brassier gradually unfolds Adorno and Horkheimer’s thesis, he indicates the consequences of their mistake, which confined thinkers to the bucolic dungeon of “remembering” the authentic nature that they cannot abandon because they have denied themselves access to both reductionist psychological models and to phenomenological theory as such. Brassier delineates the boundaries of this trap and notes the excessive attachment of the Dialectic of Enlightenment to the human. Brassier goes on to describe the prospects for a civilization of enlightenment: a mimesis of death in both senses (death imitates and is imitated) finds its highest expression in the technological automation of the intellect, which for Adorno and Horkheimer means the final implementation of the self-destructive mind. However, for Brassier it means the rewriting of the history of reason in space. This topological rewriting of history, carried out through an enlightenment, reestablishes the dynamics of horror more than mythical temporality: it will become clear that the human mind appears as the dream of a mimetic insect.


Peace Review ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-218
Author(s):  
Frances B. McCrea ◽  
Gerald E. Markle

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Jan Peil ◽  
Aloys Wijngaards ◽  
Toine van den Hoogen

AbstractThis article seeks to contribute to the development of a conversation between public theology and economics. A major problem for this conversation is the dichotomy between normative and positive judgements about our social reality. This translates into the use of distinctive concepts of value rationality and instrumental rationality. This article proposes an alternative conception of rationality that offers a way out of the positive‐normative dichotomy and embeds our approach in the framework of public theology.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document