scholarly journals Competitive Equilibrium and Optimal Capacity Matrix in Electricity Markets with Renewables

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Moita ◽  
Daniel Monte
Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (18) ◽  
pp. 5889
Author(s):  
Sebastian Schäfer ◽  
Lisa Altvater

There is a debate if electricity markets on the basis of energy-only markets ensure a sufficient generation capacity. Various capacity mechanisms are discussed to tackle this potential problem. Capacity auctions with reliability options are seen as one market-based solution. Assuming a perfect energy-only market, this mechanism leads to an equilibrium with an optimal capacity mix. This optimum is missed if there are distorted price signals at the electricity market. This is a serious problem since, despite substantial cost reductions, renewable-based electricity generation still depends on subsidies, which are not internalized at electricity markets. We develop a capacity market that internalizes subsidies for RES without direct intervention in the electricity market. The result is an endogenous discrimination of capacity prices, which enhances acceptance for a capacity market. Arising incentives direct the capacity mix to an equilibrium where discriminated prices converge to one uniform capacity price. The equilibrium is the optimal answer of fossil capacity to RES-based electricity generation.


Author(s):  
Maria Chiara D’Errico

The worldwide wave of reforms investing power industry has created new challenges to both supply demand side management. After deregulation, electric utilities restructured their opera-tions from vertically integrated mechanisms to open market systems in order to establish a new competitive sector. Reform has involved also the Italian power sector, but competition, as lar-gely shown by the empirical literature particularly in the first years of reform, has been far to be reached, and the electricity markets has been characterized by conditions of oligopoly and exercise of market power. This paper aims to analyze welfare loss and deviation from the competitive equilibrium recorded in the day ahead Italian electricity market after the first wave of reforms was almost implemented. The study presents a theoretical and empirical model to construct a competitive equilibrium, estimating market power, both, on the supply and demand sides of the day ahead electricity market. Results show the effect of non-competitive equilibriums for the hourly markets in the period 2013-2014. In an ideal competitive market, prices would be lower than historical prices by about 2-5% and quantities would be higher by about 0.5-1%.


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