The Crowd-out Effect of Government Spending for Volunteering on Volunteering

2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Song Jeong An
2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (5) ◽  
pp. 498-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter O. Simmons ◽  
Rosemarie Emanuele

2002 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Knight

Contrary to simple theoretical predictions, existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending. A legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods; this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd-out. To correct for such endogeneity, the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations. Exploiting this exogenous variation in grants, the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd-out that is statistically and economically significant. This endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect, a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income.


2017 ◽  
pp. 131-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Yefimov

The review discusses the institutional theory of money considered in the books by King and Huber, and the conclusions that follow from it for economic policy. In accordance with this theory, at present the most of the money supply is created not by the Central Bank but by private banks. When a bank issues a loan, new money is created, and when the loan is repaid this money is destructed. The concept of sovereign money involves the monopoly of money creation of the central bank. In this case the most of newly created money is handed over to the ministry of finance to implement government spending.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document