scholarly journals An Investigation into Intuitionistic Logic with Identity

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Szymon Chlebowski ◽  
Dorota Leszczyńska-Jasion

We define Kripke semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic with Suszko’s identity (ISCI). We propose sequent calculus for ISCI along with cut-elimination theorem. We sketch a constructive interpretation of Suszko’s propositional identity connective.

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1177-1216
Author(s):  
CHUCK LIANG

This article presents a unified logic that combines classical logic, intuitionistic logic and affine linear logic (restricting contraction but not weakening). We show that this unification can be achieved semantically, syntactically and in the computational interpretation of proofs. It extends our previous work in combining classical and intuitionistic logics. Compared to linear logic, classical fragments of proofs are better isolated from non-classical fragments. We define a phase semantics for this logic that naturally extends the Kripke semantics of intuitionistic logic. We present a sequent calculus with novel structural rules, which entail a more elaborate procedure for cut elimination. Computationally, this system allows affine-linear interpretations of proofs to be combined with classical interpretations, such as the λμ calculus. We show how cut elimination must respect the boundaries between classical and non-classical modes of proof that correspond to delimited control effects.


2021 ◽  
pp. 268-311
Author(s):  
Paolo Mancosu ◽  
Sergio Galvan ◽  
Richard Zach

This chapter opens the part of the book that deals with ordinal proof theory. Here the systems of interest are not purely logical ones, but rather formalized versions of mathematical theories, and in particular the first-order version of classical arithmetic built on top of the sequent calculus. Classical arithmetic goes beyond pure logic in that it contains a number of specific axioms for, among other symbols, 0 and the successor function. In particular, it contains the rule of induction, which is the essential rule characterizing the natural numbers. Proving a cut-elimination theorem for this system is hopeless, but something analogous to the cut-elimination theorem can be obtained. Indeed, one can show that every proof of a sequent containing only atomic formulas can be transformed into a proof that only applies the cut rule to atomic formulas. Such proofs, which do not make use of the induction rule and which only concern sequents consisting of atomic formulas, are called simple. It is shown that simple proofs cannot be proofs of the empty sequent, i.e., of a contradiction. The process of transforming the original proof into a simple proof is quite involved and requires the successive elimination, among other things, of “complex” cuts and applications of the rules of induction. The chapter describes in some detail how this transformation works, working through a number of illustrative examples. However, the transformation on its own does not guarantee that the process will eventually terminate in a simple proof.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 596-623
Author(s):  
Zhe Lin ◽  
Minghui Ma

Abstract Intuitionistic modal logics are extensions of intuitionistic propositional logic with modal axioms. We treat with two modal languages ${\mathscr{L}}_\Diamond $ and $\mathscr{L}_{\Diamond ,\Box }$ which extend the intuitionistic propositional language with $\Diamond $ and $\Diamond ,\Box $, respectively. Gentzen sequent calculi are established for several intuitionistic modal logics. In particular, we introduce a Gentzen sequent calculus for the well-known intuitionistic modal logic $\textsf{MIPC}$. These sequent calculi admit cut elimination and subformula property. They are decidable.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 720-747
Author(s):  
SERGEY DROBYSHEVICH ◽  
HEINRICH WANSING

AbstractWe present novel proof systems for various FDE-based modal logics. Among the systems considered are a number of Belnapian modal logics introduced in Odintsov & Wansing (2010) and Odintsov & Wansing (2017), as well as the modal logic KN4 with strong implication introduced in Goble (2006). In particular, we provide a Hilbert-style axiom system for the logic $BK^{\square - } $ and characterize the logic BK as an axiomatic extension of the system $BK^{FS} $. For KN4 we provide both an FDE-style axiom system and a decidable sequent calculus for which a contraction elimination and a cut elimination result are shown.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 281-294
Author(s):  
Vladimir N Krupski

Abstract The formal system of intuitionistic epistemic logic (IEL) was proposed by S. Artemov and T. Protopopescu. It provides the formal foundation for the study of knowledge from an intuitionistic point of view based on Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics of intuitionism. We construct a cut-free sequent calculus for IEL and establish that polynomial space is sufficient for the proof search in it. We prove that IEL is PSPACE-complete.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 882-886
Author(s):  
ANDREAS FJELLSTAD

AbstractThis note shows that the permutation instructions presented by Zardini (2011) for eliminating cuts on universally quantified formulas in the sequent calculus for the noncontractive theory of truth IKTω are inadequate. To that purpose the note presents a derivation in the sequent calculus for IKTω ending with an application of cut on a universally quantified formula which the permutation instructions cannot deal with. The counterexample is of the kind that leaves open the question whether cut can be shown to be eliminable in the sequent calculus for IKTω with an alternative strategy.


1977 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan P. Seldin

The sequent calculus formulation (L-formulation) of the theory of functionality without the rules allowing for conversion of subjects of [3, §14E6] fails because the (cut) elimination theorem (ET) fails. This can be most easily seen by the fact that it is easy to prove in the systemandbut not (as is obvious if α is an atomic type [an F-simple])The error in the “proof” of ET in [14, §3E6], [3, §14E6], and [7, §9C] occurs in Stage 3, where it is implicitly assumed that if [x]X ≡ [x] Y then X ≡ Y. In the above counterexample, we have [x]x ≡ ∣ ≡ [x](∣x) but x ≢ ∣x. Since the formulation of [2, §9F] is not really satisfactory (for reasons stated in [3, §14E]), a new seguent calculus formulation is needed for the case in which the rules for subject conversions are not present. The main part of this paper is devoted to presenting such a formulation and proving it equivalent to the natural deduction formulation (T-formulation). The paper will conclude in §6 with some remarks on the result that every ob (term) with a type (functional character) has a normal form.The conventions and definitions of [3], especially of §12D and Chapter 14, will be used throughout the paper.


2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan von Plato

AbstractGentzen writes in the published version of his doctoral thesis Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen (Investigations into logical reasoning) that he was able to prove the normalization theorem only for intuitionistic natural deduction, but not for classical. To cover the latter, he developed classical sequent calculus and proved a corresponding theorem, the famous cut elimination result. Its proof was organized so that a cut elimination result for an intuitionistic sequent calculus came out as a special case, namely the one in which the sequents have at most one formula in the right, succedent part. Thus, there was no need for a direct proof of normalization for intuitionistic natural deduction. The only traces of such a proof in the published thesis are some convertibilities, such as when an implication introduction is followed by an implication elimination [1934–35, II.5.13]. It remained to Dag Prawitz in 1965 to work out a proof of normalization. Another, less known proof was given also in 1965 by Andres Raggio.We found in February 2005 an early handwritten version of Gentzen's thesis, with exactly the above title, but with rather different contents: Most remarkably, it contains a detailed proof of normalization for what became the standard system of natural deduction. The manuscript is located in the Paul Bernays collection at the ETH-Zurichwith the signum Hs. 974: 271. Bernays must have gotten it well before the time of his being expelled from Göttingen on the basis of the racial laws in April 1933.


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