THE CONCEPT OF KUNSTLEHRE IN THE HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY

The article proposes a reconstruction of the Kunstlehre concept, which occupies an important place in the structural and disciplinary section of Husserl's phenomenology. The key point of the presented reconstruction is its separation from the traditional interpretation of Kunstlehre criticized by Husserl and the advancement of a new project that coordinates three levels – theoretical, normative and practical. The theoretical level (pure logic), being complementary to the normative level (pure norms of reason), forms the basis of the disciplines represented by the program of science of knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). The scientific study program falls on the period of the so- called logicism of Husserl, regarding which there is an opinion in the research literature that it was interrupted by the founder of phenomenology immediately after the writing of the first volume of “Logical Investigations”. However, on the basis of textual arguments, we show that this program was extended by Husserl up to his last works. The nature of this expansion is related to the practical level of Kunstlehre (transcendental phenomenology). The main task of this level was to provide science and scientists with noetic conditions, i.e. skills of transcendental criticism of consciousness. It is suggested that the presented reconstruction of Kunstlehre shows the permanent development of the program of logicism by Husserl, and also demonstrates the connection of this program with transcendental phenomenology.

The consistency of arithmetic

This chapter opens the part of the book that deals with ordinal proof theory. Here the systems of interest are not purely logical ones, but rather formalized versions of mathematical theories, and in particular the first-order version of classical arithmetic built on top of the sequent calculus. Classical arithmetic goes beyond pure logic in that it contains a number of specific axioms for, among other symbols, 0 and the successor function. In particular, it contains the rule of induction, which is the essential rule characterizing the natural numbers. Proving a cut-elimination theorem for this system is hopeless, but something analogous to the cut-elimination theorem can be obtained. Indeed, one can show that every proof of a sequent containing only atomic formulas can be transformed into a proof that only applies the cut rule to atomic formulas. Such proofs, which do not make use of the induction rule and which only concern sequents consisting of atomic formulas, are called simple. It is shown that simple proofs cannot be proofs of the empty sequent, i.e., of a contradiction. The process of transforming the original proof into a simple proof is quite involved and requires the successive elimination, among other things, of “complex” cuts and applications of the rules of induction. The chapter describes in some detail how this transformation works, working through a number of illustrative examples. However, the transformation on its own does not guarantee that the process will eventually terminate in a simple proof.

Taking Plurals at Face Value

Plural logic is a logical system in which plural terms and predicates figure as primitive expressions alongside the singular resources of ordinary first-order logic. The philosophical significance of this system depends on two of its alleged features: being pure logic and providing more expressive power than first-order logic. This chapter first introduces the language and axioms of plural logic and then analyzes this logic’s main philosophical applications in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, and semantics.

Cancelar derechos, reconfigurar el neoliberalismo: Autoemboscada fiscal en la ley de fomento productivo aprobada en Ecuador (2018).

Un gobierno sin ingresos es la casi garantía de poblaciones sin derechos. De tal forma que, si las estructuras llamadas a frenar las inequidades en una sociedad son aniquiladas, esto abre el camino para que “la lógica pura de mercado” opere. En efecto, el neoliberalismo se ha implementado. Sin embargo ¿Qué ocurre cuando el gobierno es el mismo impulsor de su destrucción? Nos encontramos ante una autoemboscada fiscal que tiene como fin la legitimización de ese régimen de desigualdad. El objetivo de esta investigación es analizar cómo este proceso tuvo lugar en Ecuador a partir de la identificación de mecanismos específicos en la Ley de Fomento Productivo (2018). A través del método cuantitativo se logró demostrar cómo la aplicación de los articulados en cuatro ejes: i) tributario; ii) petrolero; iii) deuda externa y; iv) financiamiento interno significaron la negación de derechos económicos, salud y educación. Palabras clave: desigualdad social, gobierno central, salud pública, derecho del trabajo, derecho a la educación. Abstract A government without income is the almost guarantee of populations without rights. In such a way that, if the structures called to stop inequities in a society are annihilated, this opens the way for “the pure logic of the market” to operate. In effect, neoliberalism has been implemented. However, what happens when the government is the very driver of its destruction? We are faced with a fiscal self-ambush that aims to legitimize this regime of inequality. The objective of this research is to analyze how this process took place in Ecuador from the identification of specific mechanisms in the Productive Promotion Law (2018). Through the quantitative method it was possible to demonstrate how the application of the articles in four axes: i) tributary; ii) oil tanker; iii) external debt and; iv) internal financing meant the denial of economic rights, health and education. Keywords: social inequality, central government, public health, labor law, right to education.

Logic and Cognitive Science

The paper examines the relationship between logic and cognitive science. We consider various aspects of this relationship, among which we distinguish three of the most importance, in our thought. First, it is the role of cognitive science in the justification of logic. Secondly, the mutual influence of cognitive science and modern trends of non-classical logic, which have a clearly applied character. Third, we discuss the prospects of the so-called experimental logic arising from attempts to apply the methods of cognitive science in logic. As usual, the conclusion summarizes the results of the research and focuses on the issue of the status of pure logic.

Sobre a relação entre os níveis de lógica doutrinária nos Prolegômenos à lógica pura de E. Husserl

Focusing on the introductory volume of Logical Investigations, by E. Husserl (Prolegomena to Pure Logic), the present paper aims to clarify the interactions between his conceptions of Logic as a discipline. This task was performed, mainly, by exposing their respective positions before the layers of Science, also extracted from the work. In this sense, it has been found that each of these disciplines relates to a specific part of Science. Thus (simply) Normative Logic has its sentences directed to Knowledge, understood in a subjective and ideal way. Pratical Logic turns to research methods, thus regulating human scientific activities. However, what is most significant for all these disciplines is that they do so in a general way, comprehending globally their corresponding areas of science. Hereupon, it is found, starting from the notion that knowledge is subjectivation of objectivity, that these disciplines are subordinated to the Pure Logic, which, in turn, have formal laws directed, in the most general way, towards all the objectivity of science. In this sense, the main contribution brought by the research is the idea of a hierarchical flow throughout each doctrine, which emanates from Pure Logic until it reaches, by way of Normative Logic, Technological Logic.

FILSAFAT AKHLAK DALAM KONTEKS PEMIKIRAN ETIKA MODEREN

This article discusses moral philosophy in the context of modern ethical thought. The currents that the authors mean are various ethical value systems introduced by several critical thinkers who have long colored the world from the Greek era to our present time. The method used in this research is library research. Greek philosophers perceive morals as something that is fitri, which will exist with the existence of man himself from the results he obtained based on pure logic without undergoing change and is permanent because it has been owned since birth. But in general, they do not have a standardized agreement because they are extracted based on the power of thought related to the conditions of their residence and experience. Muslim philosophers perceive that morals are basic traits that are firmly planted and color the behavior of a person with these basic qualities and then spontaneous treatment appears without going through thought or prolonged consideration.Keywords: Philosophy; Morality; modern ethics. Artikel ini membahas filsafat akhlak dalam konteks pemikiran etika moderen. Arus yang penulis maksudkan adalah berbagai sistem nilai etika yang diperkenalkan oleh beberapa tokoh pemikir kritis yang sudah sejak lama mewarnai dunia mulai zaman Yunani sampai pada masa kita sekarang ini. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah library research. Filosof Yunani mempersepsikan akhlak sebagai sesuatu yang fitri, yang akan ada dengan adanya manusia sendiri dari hasil yang di dapatnya berdasar logika murni tanpa mengalami perubahan dan bersifat tetap karena telah dimiliki sejak lahir. Namun secara umum mereka belum memiliki ukuran kesepakatan yang baku karena di gali berdasarkan kekuatan pikir terkait dengan kondisi tempta tinggal serta pengalaman mereka. Filosof Muslim mempersepsikan bahwa akhlak merupakan sifat-sifat dasar yang tertanam kokoh dan mewarnai tingkah laku seseorang dengan sifat-sifat dasar tersebut kemudian muncul perlakuan spontan tanpa melalui pemikiran atau pertimbangan yang berkepanjangan.Kata kunci: Filsafat; Akhlak; etika modern.

Reality, fundamentality, grounding (and cognate notions)

The notion of grounding is one of the central notions in the debates concerning ontological dependence in contemporary metaphysics and metametaphysics. In this paper we have carried out a comparative analysis of grounding, supervenience, reality, fundamentality, and cognate notions, and we have demonstrated what their role should be in the context of neo-Aristotelian hierarchical ontologies and the project of metaphysical foundationalism. We have also sketched out some basic outlines of what Kit Fine calls ?the pure logic of ground? by establishing certain formal desiderata which grounding ought to meet in order to successfully carry out its specific ontologico- explanatory role. It is finally shown that grounding suffers from similar problems and shortcomings as supervenience, and that a satisfactory solution of those problems cannot be found by looking to metaphysical primitivism according to which grounding is a sui generis, primitive and unanalysable notion which is nonetheless essential for metaphysics. Even though grounding might turn out to be an ?essentially contested concept?, in the end we suggest how the aforementioned problems might be met by means of holistic considerations of grounding within the broader context of the entire (meta)metaphysical theory.

What Would a Phenomenology of Logic Look Like?

The phenomenological movement begins in the Prolegomena to Husserl’s Logical Investigations as a philosophy of logic. Despite this, remarkably little attention has been paid to Husserl’s arguments in the Prolegomena in the contemporary philosophy of logic. In particular, the literature spawned by Gilbert Harman’s work on the normative status of logic is almost silent on Husserl’s contribution to this topic. I begin by raising a worry for Husserl’s conception of ‘pure logic’ similar to Harman’s challenge to explain the connection between logic and reasoning. If logic is the study of the forms of all possible theories, it will include the study of many logical consequence relations; by what criteria, then, should we select one (or a distinguished few) consequence relation(s) as correct? I consider how Husserl might respond to this worry by looking to his late account of the ‘genealogy of logic’ in connection with Gurwitsch’s claim that ‘[i]t is to prepredicative perceptual experience … that one must return for a radical clarification and for the definitive justification of logic’. Drawing also on Sartre and Heidegger, I consider how prepredicative experience might constrain or guide our selection of a logical consequence relation and our understanding of connectives like implication and negation.