scholarly journals Referential Opacity in Propositional Attitudes

2013 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Nam-Kil Kang
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Referential Opacity

Fictional Contexts and Referential Opacity

1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
L.A. Whitt
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Quantified Modal Logic ◽  
Referential Opacity

Quantified modal logic and propositional attitudes have long been regarded as sites susceptible to referential opacity — that curious affliction first diagnosed by Quine. In this paper I suggest a way of alleviating the symptoms of referential opacity as they manifest themselves in fictional contexts, contexts in which we are confronted by discourse about fiction(s). Indeed, a case might be made against Quine that it is fictional, rather than quotational, contexts which are the referentially opaque contexts par excellence. For whether we take a Fregean line on the matter and consider the obliquity of fictional terms as due to shift of reference, or a Quinean line and consider their opacity as due to failure of reference, their non-standard (or as Kaplan might put it, non-vulgar) occurrence is clear and avowed. Moreover, as the non-standardness or non-vulgarity of terms in fictional contexts is by design and not due to some mere accident of orthography, they seem in many ways to be both more interesting and potentially more revealing.

Truth and Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Rowett
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Propositional Attitudes

The first part of the chapter explores the relations between knowledge and truth and between knowledge and belief. It challenges a number of muddles in the literature concerning propositional attitudes, particularly the idea that while belief is a propositional attitude, knowledge is not. Second, it explores ancient words for ‘truth’, and how truth and being are related in ancient thought, including the so-called veridical sense of the verb einai. It argues that truth is (both for Plato, and in truth) first a property of things, and is then derivatively found in likenesses, such as reflections, pictures, and descriptions, where it comes in degrees according to the representation’s faithfulness to the truth. Finally, it connects this to the iconic method in Plato, whereby he uses such images as a means of accessing the truth that cannot be seen.

scholarly journals Closed Structure

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Fritz ◽  
Harvey Lederman ◽  
Gabriel Uzquiano
Keyword(s):  
Formal Language ◽  
Syntactic Structure ◽  
Natural Extension ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Structured Propositions ◽  
Higher Order Logic ◽  
Closed Structure

AbstractAccording to the structured theory of propositions, if two sentences express the same proposition, then they have the same syntactic structure, with corresponding syntactic constituents expressing the same entities. A number of philosophers have recently focused attention on a powerful argument against this theory, based on a result by Bertrand Russell, which shows that the theory of structured propositions is inconsistent in higher order-logic. This paper explores a response to this argument, which involves restricting the scope of the claim that propositions are structured, so that it does not hold for all propositions whatsoever, but only for those which are expressible using closed sentences of a given formal language. We call this restricted principle Closed Structure, and show that it is consistent in classical higher-order logic. As a schematic principle, the strength of Closed Structure is dependent on the chosen language. For its consistency to be philosophically significant, it also needs to be consistent in every extension of the language which the theorist of structured propositions is apt to accept. But, we go on to show, Closed Structure is in fact inconsistent in a very natural extension of the standard language of higher-order logic, which adds resources for plural talk of propositions. We conclude that this particular strategy of restricting the scope of the claim that propositions are structured is not a compelling response to the argument based on Russell’s result, though we note that for some applications, for instance to propositional attitudes, a restricted thesis in the vicinity may hold some promise.

Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Fodor
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Methodological Solipsism ◽  
Semantic Properties

AbstractThe paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes to itself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful.

Propositional attitudes in written and spoken language

2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judy Reilly ◽  
Elisheva Baruch ◽  
Harriet Jisa ◽  
Ruth A. Berman
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Linguistic Analysis ◽  
Spoken Language

This study considers the use of modal expressions (auxiliaries like should , can), semi-modals (e.g. have to, be likely to), and adverbials and complement-taking expressions (maybe, it is possible that ) to convey the attitudes and feelings of speaker/writers about the events they describe and the ideas they express. The topic of “propositional attitudes” thus overlaps with the domains of linguistic analysis known as “mood and modality.” This paper considers selected facets of linguistic modality in developmental and cross-linguistic perspective.

Understanding Irrationality

1985 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcia Cavell
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Primary Process ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
The World ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Wish Fulfillment

AbstractRecent philosophical work attempts to understand irrational acts on the model of practical reasoning. Such acts are regarded as intelligible in the light of ordinary propositional attitudes which are nevertheless conjoined in a way that explains the irrationality. It is here argued that some irrational acts cannot be so understood; that they are not actions, per se; and that Freud’s notion of “primary process”, particularly in its emphasis on hallucinatory wish-fulfillment and on what he calls “omnipotence of thought”, provides a useful description of such acts. Where hallucinatory wish-fulfillment (or phantasy) is operative, an anxiety or need causes an agent to see the world as one in which the anxiety-provoking state does not exist or has- somehow been dealt with satisfactorily. The need or lack is not acknowledged, as it is when one can properly speak of desire and of a reasoning that attempts to implement it.

Explicit representations in hypothetical thinking

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 763-764 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans ◽  
David E. Over
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Processing Resources ◽  
Explicit Representations ◽  
Implicit Systems ◽  
Explicit Processing

Dienes' & Perner's proposals are discussed in relation to the distinction between explicit and implicit systems of thinking. Evans and Over (1996) propose that explicit processing resources are required for hypothetical thinking, in which mental models of possible world states are constructed. Such thinking requires representations in which the individuals' propositional attitudes including relevant beliefs and goals are made fully explicit.

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