scholarly journals The Legal Periphery of Dominant Firm Conduct

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas

This chapter focuses on Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits dominant firms from abusing their dominant position. Two elements need to be present for Article 102 to apply to a given firm conduct: (i) that firm must be dominant on one or several markets and (ii) it must have abused that dominant position. The first step in the assessment of dominance is to define the relevant market(s). Once such markets have been defined, various economic tools can be used to determine the extent to which one or several firms are dominant on them. For Article 102 to apply, it must be demonstrated that the dominant firm has committed one or several abuses on the market(s) in question. Article 102 prohibits two main categories of abuses: exclusionary abuses (Art 102(b) and (d)) and exploitative abuses (Art 102(a)). Article 102 also prohibits certain forms of price discrimination.


Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino

This chapter deals with the key arguments that underpin the policy goals behind merger control which, in essence, relate to two factors: first, the creation or extension of monopoly power, including the raising of barriers to entry for potential competitors; and second, increasing the scope for collusion in a market which, post-merger, will be more oligopolistic and less competitive than was the market premerger. The first of these two factors is related to the control of dominant firm conduct; dominance itself is not condemned in either the EU or the UK. Nevertheless, in merger control there is a situation where the attainment or extension of dominance may be condemned or prevented.


2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Farrell ◽  
Janis K. Pappalardo ◽  
Howard Shelanski

Author(s):  
David J. Gerber

A firm acting alone—that is, unilaterally—can also harm competition. If it has sufficient influence on a market, it can exclude rivals or limit their capacity to compete. Competition law regimes typically contain provisions prohibiting such conduct. Most use the concept of abuse of dominance to identify and combat it, but a few, including the US, use the term “monopolization” for this purpose. This component of competition law is often controversial and politically sensitive, and globalization increases this tension. This chapter identifies the issues in applying competition law to single firm conduct and reveals how regimes decide whether to pursue it. A single firm can harm competition only if it has sufficient power to influence a particular market, so the chapter looks at how regimes assess this power, how they define the relevant market, and which kinds of conduct constitute a competition law violation. Although most competition laws target this type of conduct, variations in actual treatment are great. The Guide outlines the global patterns and the factors that lead to them.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Gale ◽  
Daniel P O'Brien

A use-or-lose provision requires that firms employ a certain minimum fraction of their productive capacity. Variants have been used by regulators in the airline and wireless communications industries, among others. A typical stated objective is to limit capacity hoarding, thereby increasing aggregate output and welfare. When the dominant firm is more efficient than fringe firms, we find that imposing a use-or-lose provision induces the dominant firm to acquire capacity from the fringe, which causes aggregate output to fall. When the dominant firm is less efficient than the fringe, aggregate output rises. In both cases, total surplus may rise or fall. (JEL D43, K21, L13, L93)


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