Strategies and Techniques for the Internationalization of Non-Dominant Firms: A Qualitative Study

This study focuses on the strategies and techniques used by small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to join and dominate large firms in global markets. The analytical works refer to the prevailing writings on international markets and entrepreneurship. Based on the categorizations and analyses of the themes and sub-themes, the historical development of global markets and theories is recounted, thereby creating a foundation for assessing the strategies and techniques of non-dominant firms. The findings indicate that the number of small and medium enterprises joining international markets is growing due to the adoption of robust strategies and techniques. An international model is proposed, which consists of three techniques of the Diaspora approach, social media approach, and re-approach, along with strategies that consist of three dimensions: a big dream or desire to internationalize, a need to internationalize, and an ability to internationalize." This paper provides a point of reference for practitioners and researchers interested in attaining comprehensive insight into internationalization.

Market Investigations

In many economic sectors – the digital industries being first and foremost – the market power of dominant firms has been steadily increasing and is rarely challenged by competitors. Existing competition laws and regulations have been unable to make markets more contestable. The book argues that a new competition tool is needed: market investigations. This tool allows authorities to intervene in markets which do not function as they should, due to market features such as network effects, scale economies, switching costs, and behavioural biases. The book explains the role of market investigations, assesses their use in the few jurisdictions where they exist, and discusses how they should be designed. In so doing, it provides an invaluable and timely instrument to both practitioners and academics.

Is Genericness Still Adequately Defined? Internet Search Firms and the Economic Rationale for Trademarks

Landes and Posner’s highly cited economics of trademark law based on search cost reduction has influenced economists, legislators, and courts for decades. Their account, however, predates consumer use of the Internet for search and did not anticipate the rise of firms such as Google to economy-wide power in search. Consequently, trademark law intended to help consumers find a preferred brand now also protects the means they typically use. An outdated view of trademarks as a natural and equitable right––very scrutable to STS––has led to Internet search firms owning reflexive “marks for finding other marks,” a structural advantage they have exploited through new dynamic and microtargeted forms of advertising into technoscientific rentiership. This paper revises Landes and Posner’s model to fit the case of an economy containing dominant firms with significant economy-wide search cost reduction power, adding (1) differentiation of technological elements of the original formal model and (2) analysis of the distribution and function of marks such as GOOGLE in consumer decision-making. The updated theory shows that marks granted to search firms are equivalent to generic marks in economic effect and constitute a new but unrecognized class that are functionally “super-generic.”

5. Article 102

This chapter discusses the main features of Article 102 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is concerned with the abusive conduct of dominant firms. It begins by discussing the meaning of ‘undertaking’ and ‘effect on trade between Member States’ in the context of Article 102. It then considers what is meant by a dominant position and looks at the requirement that any dominant position must be held in a substantial part of the internal market. Thereafter it discusses some general considerations relevant to the concept of abuse of dominance, followed by an explanation of what is meant by ‘exploitative’, ‘exclusionary’ and ‘single market’ abuses. It then discusses possible defences to allegations of abuse, and concludes by considering the consequences of infringing Article 102.

“Protein” Industry Convergence and Its Implications for Resilient and Equitable Food Systems

Recent years have seen the convergence of industries that focus on higher protein foods, such as meat processing firms expanding into plant-based substitutes and/or cellular meat production, and fisheries firms expanding into aquaculture. A driving force behind these changes is dominant firms seeking to increase their power relative to close competitors, including by extending beyond boundaries that pose constraints to growth. The broad banner of “protein” offers a promising space to achieve this goal, despite its nutritionally reductionist focus on a single macronutrient. Protein firm strategies to increase their dominance are likely to further diminish equity in food systems by exacerbating power asymmetries. In addition, the resilience of food systems has the potential to be weakened as these strategies tend to reduce organizational diversity, as well as the genetic diversity of livestock and crops. To better understand these changes, we visually characterize firms that are most dominant in higher protein food industries globally and their recent strategic moves. We discuss the likelihood for these trends to further jeopardize food system resilience and equity, and we make recommendations for avoiding these impacts.

The New Vertical Merger Guidelines: Muddying the Waters

The new U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Vertical Merger Guidelines focus on how vertical mergers are likely to affect static pricing incentives. While vertical mergers can create incentives to increase prices, they can also provide incentives to decrease prices. Which of the possible outcomes is likely to occur depends on details that are generally difficult to measure. Potential competition between dominant firms, the theory of potential harm to competition that the 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines stressed, remains a more compelling rationale for blocking vertical mergers than the likely effect on static pricing incentives.

Private Enforcement of the EU Rules on Competition – Nullity Neglected

Private enforcement of the European Union’s rules on competition (Arts. 101, 102 TFEU) has become prominent as a counterpart to their public enforcement. Mostly, it is identified with tort actions brought under EU-harmonized national law by individuals claiming compensation for the harm suffered from anticompetitive agreements or practices. However, claims for compensation represent imperfect sanctions for the infringement of the competition rules because they are brought only once the damage is done and at a time when the conditions of competition may have changed. Typically also, such private actions are no equivalent or complement to administrative enforcement, but are largely dependent on it (follow-on actions). In addition, bringing them is attractive only if the damage suffered is considerable, sufficient evidence available, and the defendant solvent enough. Therefore, this paper revisits the first line of private enforcement, which is enforcing the nullity of anticompetitive agreements as provided for directly by primary Union law in Art. 101(2) TFEU. Nullity was a much-discussed issue under the authorization regime of Reg. 17/62, the first regulation implementing the enforcement of the competition rules, but has become somewhat neglected as a sanction since Reg. 1/2003 changed the enforcement system. Yet, it is precisely under the regime of immediate and direct applicability of both Arts. 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU, which Reg. 1/2003 reestablished, that the potential of nullity as a sanction of anticompetitive agreements could be fully activated. Such active use of invalidity challenges may lead to redefining the interface between EU law and national contract law, which is the line of severability of the innocent parts of a restrictive agreement from its anti-competitive parts. It should also result in reassessing the legal fate of follow-on transactions concluded by a party to an anticompetitive agreement with third parties, and it should bring abusive contracts within the realm of the nullity sanction that dominant firms impose on third parties. The guiding principle for such general reappraisal of the nullity sanction must be to bring its purpose fully to bear, which is to facilitate exit from anticompetitive agreements or from (abusive) contract clauses with a view to reopening competition and/or to allow the renegotiating of a transaction in terms of undistorted competition. This may mean that only the party whose freedom of competition is restricted may claim nullity.

New Approach to State Protection of Competition

The aim of the article is to improve the possibilities for learning and applying practical tips on competition protection, and to develop ways to promote competition and economic growth that will enhance the prosperity of the economy and society. It is important that the goal of competition protection is to create conditions that will lead to a more competitive market structure and business behavior without direct intervention from the competition body. Note that the most disadvantageous alternative to the competition body is the application of close and lasting control of the dominant firms by competition law. This alternative results in more inadequate funding by requiring more resources. Modern economic reality, characterized by the transformation of economic relations, business globalization, integration of transitional economies into the global space, makes the development of competitive relationships more important for improving economic and innovation performance. As a result, it has been established that a successful market economy requires a competitive culture within the country. Both consumers and the business community need to be aware of their competitive policies and how they can benefit from it. Competition agencies play an important role in this learning process.

Sustainable Use of the Environment, Planetary Boundaries and Market Power

Many of the environment and natural resources that constitute key “safe operating spaces”, as designated by planetary boundaries, are being exploited by a handful of large firms with considerable market share. In this paper, we discuss how the environment and natural resources that occur within a safe operating space can be treated as an exploitable finite stock. We use an optimal depletion model to show how the extraction of these exhaustible assets can be managed optimally, and allow for adjustment in price paths due to technological innovation and environmental externalities. Given the growing market concentration and monopoly power in the key economic sectors that exploit the environment and resources that constitute many safe operating spaces, we then explore how monopoly conditions can alter the extraction and price path of the environmental assets over time compared to that under competitive market conditions. We show that the monopoly may be compatible with more sustainable use, by extending the life of the exploitable, depletable stock, at the expense of firms capturing excessive resource rents from exploitation. This tradeoff means that any policies implemented to tax the excessive monopoly rents need to be designed without compromising the sustainable use of the environment. The tax revenue raised can be channeled into protecting or regenerating natural assets that are essential for global environmental sustainability. If investment in regeneration efforts is sufficiently substantial, or if the wider social and environmental values associated with the exhaustible assets are taken into account, then the safe operating space may be conserved indefinitely. Such policy challenges will become increasingly important as dominant firms exert market power over the planet’s remaining environment and resources that constitute key “safe operating spaces”, as designated by planetary boundaries.