14. The elements of Article 102 TFEU

This chapter discusses Article 102 TFEU, which applies to abusive conduct engaged in by undertakings in a dominant position. The dominant position must be held in a ‘substantial part’ of the internal market for EU competition law to apply. Abuses can take many forms, and include conduct designed to preserve or expand the power of the undertaking (‘exclusionary abuses’) and conduct aiming to exploit the power of the undertaking (‘exploitative abuses’). No exemptions are available, but the alleged abusive conduct may be defended on the grounds that it is ‘objectively justifiable’ or if there are efficiency justifications. A breach of Article 102 TFEU may incur penalties, damages, and a requirement of conduct modification.

3. The relationship between European Union and United Kingdom competition law

This chapter focuses on the current interaction between European Union and UK law. EU law is currently a source of UK law. However, the relationship between the two regimes is expected to change in the future as a consequence of the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 stipulates that the European Communities Act 1972 will be ‘repealed on exit day’, which would be 29 March 2019 provided that the two-year period since Article 50 TEU was triggered is not extended. Once the European Communities Act 1972 has been repealed, EU law will cease to be a source of UK law. No major immediate changes to the national competition legislation are to be expected, but future reforms could distance the UK system from the EU rules.

21. State intervention: public undertakings and state aid

Competition law in the EU also exerts some degree of control over the actions of the Member States when they intervene in the market in ways which could harm the competitive process. The Member States commit to complying with these and other obligations the moment they agree to be bound by the acquis unionaire, which is a prerequisite for EU membership. There are two main provisions in this regard: Articles 106 and 107 TFEU. This chapter covers the basic principles underlying the application of Articles 106 and 107 TFEU, and explores the interplay between the general prohibitions they contain and their multiple exceptions. Article 106 ensures that undertakings owned, established, or regulated by the State are not protected or advantaged vis-à-vis private competitors, while Article 107 TFEU contains a general prohibition of state aid.

16. An analysis of the principal abusive practices

This chapter focuses on the most important pricing and non-pricing practices, which together constitute the larger part of the anti-competitive and exploitative abuses of dominant firms. The types of conduct considered abusive of market power are similar under most competition regimes, and include both pricing and non-pricing practices. The ‘form-based’ analysis of abusive practices is progressively shifting to an ‘effects-based approach’. In the EU and the UK, both exclusionary and exploitative abuses may fall foul of the relevant competition law provisions. Exclusionary practices are usually considered abusive when they are likely to lead to ‘anticompetitive foreclosure’. The EU and UK law and practice in relation to all these potential abuses is and will remain aligned until the UK has formally left the EU.

13. The economics of monopoly abuse

This chapter considers the economics of monopoly abuse. A monopolist is a firm which is the sole supplier in a relevant market. Monopolists are able to determine the market price. This will be higher than the competitive price, with the quantity supplied being lower. This situation leads to a loss of welfare to society as a whole, and also a redistribution of income from some of the monopolist’s customers to the monopolist. The monopolist may also engage in wasteful strategic behaviour to protect its privileged position. In both the EU and UK regimes, competition enforcement is largely complaint driven. This forces the courts, and therefore economists as expert witnesses, to consider the (anti-)competitive impact of short-run activity that might be expected to have little in the way of long-run repercussions.

8. The economics of agreements, collusion, and parallel conduct

A group of firms can act together and damage the market and produce unwelcome welfare effects. This is known as a ‘cartel’ or ‘cartelization’. However, multi-firm conduct is often a more difficult phenomenon to analyse and identify than single firm or monopoly behaviour. This chapter discusses horizontal restraints, vertical agreements, and vertical restraints. Horizontal agreements may raise concerns that competition is being harmed, but collusion may be difficult to detect. The problems of policing horizontal conduct may be exacerbated in oligopoly markets, where there are few competitors which frequently mimic each other’s conduct without necessarily coordinating. Cartel arrangements may be difficult to put in place, but may have long-term success. Vertical agreements are less likely to raise competitive concern, unless they are linked to the exercise of market power, or contribute to the exclusion of competitors from a market.

2. The European Union and United Kingdom competition regimes

This chapter discusses competition law in the European Union and United Kingdom. ‘Undertakings’ are the sole subjects of the substantive law relating to agreements and the abuse of dominant positions. This is the word used in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and in EU secondary legislation, and has been adopted in the UK Competition Act 1998 (CA). Market integration has been highly influential in the shaping of EU competition policy. UK competition laws are not governed by similar concerns. The role of the European Commission in competition law is fundamental, and the European Courts have contributed to clarifying the interpretation of competition law provisions. In the United Kingdom, the Competition and Markets Authority (and the sectoral regulators) and the Competition Appeals Tribunal are the principal enforcers.

1. Introduction to competition law

This chapter presents an introduction to competition law covering the development of competition law, the experience of the United States, economics and competition law, and competition law resources. Competition law is the legislation that ensures competition is protected from unrestrained market power in free market economies. The primary purpose of competition law is to remedy some of the situations in which the free market system — in which supply and demand, and not government intervention, determine the allocation of resources — breaks down. The point was well made in the House of Lords debate during the passage of the Competition Act 1998 (CA) that ‘competition law provides the framework for competitive activity. It protects the process of competition’.

23. The common law and competition

This chapter considers the areas in which the operation of the common law impacts upon issues that are closely related to the public regulation of competition. Certain doctrines of common law may be applied to situations in which competition is being restrained, or to competitive conduct. Common law doctrines in antitrust are becoming less important following the growth of modern competition law. The restraint of trade doctrine remains vibrant, and is often relied on in professional disputes. Restraint of trade is a doctrine of contract law under which certain contracts are unenforceable if they unreasonably restrain the activity of a party after the termination of the main contract. A number of rarely used torts may also be relevant to certain competitive situations.

22. Competition law and intellectual property

This chapter discusses the relationship between competition law and intellectual property rights. Competition law may limit the ability to exercise intellectual property rights. Article 101 TFEU and Chapter I Prohibition may apply to agreements to license intellectual property, as well as pay-for-delay settlements between a patent holder and potential competitors. Article 102 TFEU and Chapter II Prohibition may apply to the use of intellectual property rights by a dominant undertaking, particularly when the protected asset is essential to third parties. The existence of intellectual property rights does not automatically confer a dominant position — the product or service may still face competition.