4 Abuse of Dominance

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Dominant Firm ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Economic Tools ◽  
Firm Conduct ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter focuses on Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits dominant firms from abusing their dominant position. Two elements need to be present for Article 102 to apply to a given firm conduct: (i) that firm must be dominant on one or several markets and (ii) it must have abused that dominant position. The first step in the assessment of dominance is to define the relevant market(s). Once such markets have been defined, various economic tools can be used to determine the extent to which one or several firms are dominant on them. For Article 102 to apply, it must be demonstrated that the dominant firm has committed one or several abuses on the market(s) in question. Article 102 prohibits two main categories of abuses: exclusionary abuses (Art 102(b) and (d)) and exploitative abuses (Art 102(a)). Article 102 also prohibits certain forms of price discrimination.

Dominant Firm Unilateral Conduct: Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance

2020 ◽  
pp. 65-74
Author(s):  
David J. Gerber
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Dominant Firm ◽  
Actual Treatment ◽  
Sufficient Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Global Patterns ◽  
Firm Conduct ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

A firm acting alone—that is, unilaterally—can also harm competition. If it has sufficient influence on a market, it can exclude rivals or limit their capacity to compete. Competition law regimes typically contain provisions prohibiting such conduct. Most use the concept of abuse of dominance to identify and combat it, but a few, including the US, use the term “monopolization” for this purpose. This component of competition law is often controversial and politically sensitive, and globalization increases this tension. This chapter identifies the issues in applying competition law to single firm conduct and reveals how regimes decide whether to pursue it. A single firm can harm competition only if it has sufficient power to influence a particular market, so the chapter looks at how regimes assess this power, how they define the relevant market, and which kinds of conduct constitute a competition law violation. Although most competition laws target this type of conduct, variations in actual treatment are great. The Guide outlines the global patterns and the factors that lead to them.

5. Article 102

2021 ◽  
pp. 180-223
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

This chapter discusses the main features of Article 102 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is concerned with the abusive conduct of dominant firms. It begins by discussing the meaning of ‘undertaking’ and ‘effect on trade between Member States’ in the context of Article 102. It then considers what is meant by a dominant position and looks at the requirement that any dominant position must be held in a substantial part of the internal market. Thereafter it discusses some general considerations relevant to the concept of abuse of dominance, followed by an explanation of what is meant by ‘exploitative’, ‘exclusionary’ and ‘single market’ abuses. It then discusses possible defences to allegations of abuse, and concludes by considering the consequences of infringing Article 102.

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 753-806
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
Predatory Pricing ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It first discusses various cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. This taxonomy is over-schematic, in that the categories overlap with one another: for example price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary, and an excessively high price may in reality be a way of preventing parallel imports or of excluding a competitor from the market; nevertheless this division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It discusses cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive and deals with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices harmful to the single market. Price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary and an excessively high price may be a way of preventing parallel imports or excluding a competitor from the market; but the division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and the EU Courts is considered, followed by cases in the UK. Where appropriate, reference is made to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

5. Article 102

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Controversial Issue ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter discusses the main features of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is concerned with the abusive conduct of dominant firms. It begins by introducing the European Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article [102 TFEU] to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings. It then discusses the concept of undertaking, the requirement of an effect on trade between Member States, the concept of a dominant position and the requirement that any dominant position must be held in a substantial part of the internal market. The chapter also considers the meaning of abuse of a dominant position, which is a complex and controversial issue. A discussion of the defences to allegations of abuse is followed by a brief look at the consequences of infringing Article 102.

scholarly journals THE LACK OF AN APPROPRIATE CAUSATION FRAMEWORK IN COMPETITION LAW PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE COMPETITION ACT, 1998

Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Phumudzo S Munyai
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Legal Principle ◽  
Dominant Firms ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Common ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

Causation is one of the most under-utilised principles in public competition law. This increases the risk that defendants in competition proceedings, in particular, dominant firms in exclusionary abuse of dominance cases, may be found liable for market distortions that cannot satisfactorily be linked to their conduct. Having regard to the substantial financial penalties often levied against dominant firms found to have abused their dominant position, the central argument of this paper is that causation must be recognised and dealt with in competition proceedings as a fundamental legal principle that is central to competition liability. To this end, the paper proposes that the common-law principle of causation developed in tort law or delict can be utilised in developing an appropriate causation framework for public competition law.

7. Article 102 TFEU: Conduct Which Can Be an Abuse

2019 ◽  
pp. 359-581
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses the difficult concept of what constitutes an ‘abuse’ of a dominant position for the purposes of Article 102 and whether conduct should be condemned on account of the form it takes or only for its effects. It considers the case law of the EU Courts, the decisional practice of the Commission, and the Commission’s Guidance Paper on enforcement priorities, and the problem of distinguishing competition on the merits from illegimate conduct. The chapter looks at the different classifications of abuse, particularly exclusionary and exploitative abuses; the distinction between form- and effects-based approaches to types of abuse; the leveraging of market power between distinct markets as a theory of harm; the objective justification defence; and general issues in respect of abuses concerning prices, including the ‘as efficient competitor’ test. The chapter then examines the application of Article 102 to various forms of conduct, including: price discrimination; predatory pricing; selective low pricing; margin squeeze; exclusive dealing;; tying and bundling; refusal to supply; self-preferencing; malicious pursuit of legal proceedings; ‘regulatory gaming’; discrimination abuses; unfairly high and low pricing; hindering inter-Member State trade; and more novel claimed abuses within the digital economy.

6. Article 102 TFEU: Introduction and Dominant Position

2019 ◽  
pp. 277-358
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

Article 102 TFEU deals with the unilateral conduct of undertakings with substantial market power. It thus prohibits one or more undertakings which hold a dominant position in the internal market or a substantial part of it abusing that position insofar as it may affect inter-Member State trade. This chapter discusses the role of Article 102 and the controversy attending its application, and introduces the elements which must be established before the prohibition applies. The Commission’s review of Article 102 and the publication of its Guidance Paper on enforcement priorities, and the relationship between Article 102 and Article 101, are also considered. The chapter then explores in detail one of the principal limbs of the Article 102 prohibition, namely the concept of an undertaking holding a ‘dominant position’ in a relevant market. The definition of a dominant position in the case law of the Court is discussed, alongside its relation to the concept of substantial market power, including the Commission’s treatment in the Guidance Paper. The chapter then considers how dominance is established, addressing, inter aliai, the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Article 102; the role of market share in establishing dominance; barriers to entry and other factors indicating dominance; and dominant positions in the digital economy. Article 102

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