Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Aghion ◽  
Drew Fudenberg ◽  
Richard Holden
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information

scholarly journals The simple geometry of perfect information games

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Demichelis ◽  
Klaus Ritzberger ◽  
Jeroen M. Swinkels
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Simple Geometry ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem

Episteme ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 248-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Binmore
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Common Knowledge Of Rationality

AbstractRobert Aumann argues that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information. I have argued that it does not. A literature now exists in which various formal arguments are offered in support of both positions. This paper argues that Aumann's claim can be justified if knowledge is suitably reinterpreted.

Worth of perfect information in bernoulli bandits

1991 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald A. Berry ◽  
Robert P. Kertz
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Prior Distributions ◽  
Minimax Approach

For k-armed Bernoulli bandits with discounting, sharp comparisons are given between average optimal rewards for a gambler and for a ‘perfectly informed' gambler, over natural collections of prior distributions. Some of these comparisons are proved under general discounting, and others under non-increasing discount sequences. Connections are made between these comparisons and the concept of ‘regret' in the minimax approach to bandit processes. Identification of extremal cases in the sharp comparisons is emphasized.

Informácia o jednej zaujímavej všeobecno-vzdelávacej aktivite časopisu Quark

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 24-25
Author(s):  
Karol Jesenák
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
Correct Answer ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Editorial Office ◽  
School Problems ◽  
Basic Premise ◽  
Original Picture ◽  
Type Of School ◽  
Typical School

At the end of 2020, the Quark editorial office launched on its Facebook page an interesting competition called "Photo Puzzle". The basic premise is that the editors of the journal publish an original picture related in some way to science and technology, with an enclosed question. However, the image itself usually does not provide enough information to identify the correct answer. Instead, it provides an opportunity to creatively think about possible solutions in the absence of perfect information. In this sense, the questions differ from the typical school problems, which require accurate formulation and have clear answers. Since in everyday life we rarely encounter this type of „school“ questions, this activity by Quark staff should be appreciated.

scholarly journals Parameterized games of perfect information

2018 ◽  
Vol 287 (2) ◽  
pp. 683-699 ◽  
Author(s):  
János Flesch ◽  
Arkadi Predtetchinski
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information

The Perfect Information Storm

2010 ◽  
pp. 49-71
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information

scholarly journals Predation Under Perfect Information

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cédric Argenton
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information

scholarly journals Endogena korupcija kao ravnoteza sekvencijalne igre

2003 ◽  
Vol 44 (156) ◽  
pp. 21-43
Author(s):  
Milic Milovanovic
Keyword(s):  
Working Conditions ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Power Struggle ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Sequential Game ◽  
Privatized Firms ◽  
Motivational Structure ◽  
Insider Privatization

In this paper power struggle over the control of an insider privatized firm is modeled as a sequential game with perfect information. The endogenous corruption is a consequence of an insider privatization plan, where employees obtain majority of shares. In the post privatization game three players are dominant: managers, employees, and outside owners. Managers are by far the strongest player, with their key position in privatized firms despite their minority ownership stake. Since managers control working conditions of employees-cum-owners, they exercise an unparalleled power. Motivational structure is given for each player. Their ranked lists of goals and fears are necessary in order to specify parameters for the model. The game is modeled in an extensive form, and backward induction suggests a coalition of insiders (managers and employees) against the interests of outsiders. Under stated conditions, the equilibrium strategy results in an endogenous corruption.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document