Fiduciary Duties and the Business Judgment Rule (with the Emphasis on the Citigroup Case)

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damjan Despotovic
Keyword(s):  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Business Judgment Rule

scholarly journals KEPUTUSAN BISNIS DAN TANGGUNGJAWAB DIREKSI DALAM PRINSIP FIDUCIARY DUTIES PADA PERSEROAN TERBATAS

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-56
Author(s):  
Ali Muhayatsyah
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
Limited Liability Company ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Business Judgment Rule ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Full Sense

The main party charged with fiduciary duty is the board of directors. In UUPT No. 40/2007 it does not specifically regulate fiduciary duty but rather regulates general principles. From the general principle of fiduciary duty, directors in managing the company must pay attention to the interests of the company above other interests; directors must act in accordance with the aims and objectives of the company (intra vires), and pay attention to the limitations and restrictions determined by the law and the articles of association of the company. In carrying out their duties as directors, they are required to have in good faith and in full sense of responsibility; Directors must carry out their duties diligently, carefully, and smartly and skillfully. Keywords: Directors, Fiduciary Duty, Business Judgment Rule, Limited Liability Company,   Abstrak Pihak utama yang dibebankan kewajiban fiduciary duty adalah direksi. Dalam UUPT Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 tidak mengatur secara khusus mengenai fiduciary duty tetapi mengatur prinsip-prinsip umumnya. Dari prinsip umum fiduciary duty makadireksi dalam mengurus perseroan harus memperhatikan kepentingan perseroan di atas kepentingan lainnya;direksi harus bertindak sesuai dengan maksud dan tujuan perseroan (intra vires), serta memperhatikan batasan dan larangan yang ditentukan UU dan anggaran dasar Perseroan. Dalam melaksanakan tugas sebagai direksi, diharuskan memiliki itikad baik (in good faith) dan tanggung jawab (in full sense of responsibility); Direksi harus melaksanakan tugasnya dengan rajin (diligently), penuh kehati-hatian (carefully), dan pintar serta terampil (skillfully). Kata kunci: Direksi, Fiduciary Duty, Business Judgement Rule, Perseroan Terbatas,

scholarly journals Courts, Constituencies, and the Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties in the Nonprofit Sector

2016 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Mead ◽  
Michael Pollack
Keyword(s):  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Nonprofit Sector ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Institutional Characteristics ◽  
Empirical Reality ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Business Judgment Rule ◽  
Corporation Law

Directors of nonprofit organizations owe fiduciary duties to their organization, but the content of these duties--and how and when courts should enforce these duties--has long been debated among scholars and courts.  This debate emerges in several areas, including the level of deference to be shown by courts to nonprofit directors (the business judgment rule), who should be allowed to sue to enforce duties (standing), and the type of relief available to prevailing plaintiffs (remedies).  Existing literature debates these legal rules in isolation and in abstraction, generally failing to consider how the rules interact with each other and ignoring the empirical reality of the nonprofit sector. Because for-profit and nonprofit corporations evolved from a common ancestor, courts generally apply the corporation law principles developed in the context of for-profit corporations to nonprofit corporations as well.  But for-profit and nonprofit corporations often differ in key ways, including sources of income, constituencies, and other institutional characteristics. These differences make rote application of corporate law principles to nonprofit corporations a conceptually questionable endeavor.  Rather than setting nonprofit rules through strained analogies to for-profit concepts of ownership and profit-maximization, we propose employing an analysis of institutional features that can operate in a whole range of governance contexts, including the nonprofit sector.  This approach considers opportunities for voice and exit, impact range, homogeneity, and comparative competence between boards and courts, and it does so among different types of nonprofit actors, like directors, members, employees, donors, customers, and beneficiaries.  Using this institutional analysis with for-profit corporation law as the baseline, we compare emerging legal rules in the nonprofit sector against existing empirical literature.  We find that, with one exception, institutional characteristics vis-à-vis nonprofit actors are reasonably comparable to their for-profit counterparts, and we therefore place the applicable legal regime with respect to those actors on a more conceptually sound footing.  However, beneficiaries of a nonprofit organization tend to lack opportunities for exit or voice, face risk of considerable deprivation, and often differ considerably in relevant aspects from the individuals who manage the organization.  We argue that the law should take into account the limited power of beneficiaries in nonprofit governance structures, and we analyze options for reform.

scholarly journals FIDUCIARY GAME RULES AND THE GOVERNANCE NATURE IN THE COMPANY

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 144-155
Author(s):  
S. I. Lutsenko
Keyword(s):  
Economic Benefit ◽  
Shareholder Value ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Management Board ◽  
Personal Benefit ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Business Judgment Rule ◽  
Critical Resource ◽  
The Given

The author considers features of relationships between the fiduciary (management, board of director) and shareholders (beneficiaries). The nature of fiduciary relations is connected with «a critical resource» (assets) of the beneficiary.  In the company economic interests of various participants (shareholders, management) face. Delegation discretion the shareholder to the management will allow to build together with the shareholder effective economic strategy of the company, under condition of execution of fiduciary duties. The management possesses administrative immunity within the limits of application of the business judgment rule. Actions of the management at transaction fulfilment should have real character, possess economic sense, a rationality and to promote achievement of economic benefit in the form of increase to shareholder value. The special attention is given to the fiduciary nature of interaction. Imposing of fiduciary duties on the management allows the beneficiary to protect the company from destruction of shareholder value. The shareholder should specify such game rules that the management was unable break them or, at least, cost of their infringement would be above reception of personal benefit. Fiduciary principles allow to soften the conflict between management and the shareholder. Besides, the fiduciary mechanism possesses a preventive element, keeping the company from destruction. The given obligation of loyalty protects resources of the shareholder from wrongful acts from the management. Fiduciary principles allow to balance economic interests between a management and shareholders.

scholarly journals BUSINESS JUDGEMENT RULE: KETENTUAN DAN PELAKSANAANNYA OLEH PENGADILAN DI INGGRIS, KANADA DAN INDONESIA

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 275
Author(s):  
Yafet Yosafet Wilben Rissy
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Business Decisions ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Business Judgment Rule ◽  
The Uk

AbstractThis article discusses the provisions of business judgment rule (BJR) in the company law and the application of BJR by the courts in the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and Indonesia. In the UK and Canada, the courts have been long examined the appropriateness of directors’ business decisions. Later, BJR was codified into the Canadian Business Corporations Act 2019, meanwhile, duty of care and fiduciary duties were codified into the UK 2006 Companies Law which implicitly regulates BJR. Indonesia adopts BJR in the Company Act 2007 but the courts rarely examine directors’ business decisions and the adoption needs to be rearranged systematically.IntisariArtikel ini membahas bagaimana dan kapan pengadilan menguji aturan penilaian bisnis (APS) dan bagaimana APS diatur dalam hukum perusahaan di Inggris Raya, Kanada, dan Indonesia. Pada pengadilan Inggris dan Kanada yang menganut tradisi hukum kebiasaan, APS telah lama diterapkan untuk menilai keputusan bisnis direktur. Baru-baru ini, APS dikodifikasikan ke dalam Undang-Undang Perusahaan Bisnis 2019. Sementara itu, tugas direktur untuk peduli dan tugas fidusia juga dikodifikasikan ke dalam Undang-Undang Perusahaan Inggris 2006 yang secara implisit mengatur APS. Indonesia juga mengadopsi APS dalam Undang-Undang PT 2007 tetapi pengadilan jarang menguji keputusan bisnis direktur dan adopsi ini perlu diatur ulang secara lebih sistematis.

scholarly journals Corporate Auctions and Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third-Generation Business Judgment Rule

1988 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven G. Bradbury
Keyword(s):  
Third Generation ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Business Judgment Rule

Labor Director System and the Fiduciary Duties of Labor Directors

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-35
Author(s):  
Eung Ki Jung
Keyword(s):  
Fiduciary Duties

Nachweis einer „angemessenen Information“ im Sinne der Business Judgment Rule

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Graumann ◽  
Jens Grundei
Keyword(s):  
Business Judgment Rule

Fiduciary Duties in Takeovers: UK & India Laws - A Comparison

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joy Dey
Keyword(s):  
Fiduciary Duties
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