This article examines two issues regarding the Constitution’s Impeachment Clause and the federal judiciary: first, is impeachment the sole permissible mechanism for judicial removal? Second, who, if anyone is authorized to discipline federal judges through sanctions short of removal? This article argues that a form of “strict originalism,” that is, the attempt to discern the Constitution’s resolution of particular issues according to the founders’ expectations regarding those very issues—makes sense with respect to political mechanisms for judicial discipline and removal. Political mechanisms are those which can by fully initiated and implemented by the elected branches of the federal government without the involvement of the judiciary. However, employing “neoclassical” constitutional interpretation—examining general values revealed by the founders’ debates about the Constitution as a whole rather than highly specific original understandings of particular questions—demonstrates that (1) federal judges may also be disciplined through judicially enforceable civil and criminal sanctions imposed through executive or independent counsel prosecution, and (2) the federal judiciary, subject to congressional regulation, may exercise powers of self-regulation for judges not sitting on the Supreme Court.
The Disarming Nature of the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act: A Constitutional Analysis of Wyoming’s Interposition Between its Citizens and the Federal Government