Treated Politicians, Treated Voters: A Natural Experiment of Political Budget Cycle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kentaro Fukumoto ◽  
Yusaku Horiuchi ◽  
Shoichiro Tanaka
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Budget Cycle

Electoral and Partisan Cycles in the Canadian Provinces

1999 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Petry ◽  
Louis M. Imbeau ◽  
Jean Crête ◽  
Michel Clavet
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Discretionary Power ◽  
Normal Behaviour ◽  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Budget Cycle ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
Electoral Defeat ◽  
Canadian Provinces ◽  
The Government ◽  
Expansionary Policy

AbstractThis study tests explanations of the growth of Canadian provincial governments that draw from the political budget cycle approach. The approach assumes that governments jointly respond to electoral and partisan goals. When the next election is not expected soon, the government uses its discretionary power to pursue its ideological target. When the next election is near, politicians in government, fearing electoral defeat, deviate from their normal behaviour and engage in a re-election effort by undertaking an expansionary policy. This study suggests that provincial governments behave in the opportunistic fashion described by the model. Moreover, there is no sign that this opportunistic behaviour has been affected by government cutbacks in the 1990s.

Political Budget Cycle: An Analysis of Brazilian Municipalities

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilberto Crispim ◽  
Leonardo Flach ◽  
Luiz Alberton ◽  
Celma Duque Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Budget Cycle

scholarly journals Revenue Decentralization, Central Oversight and the Political Budget Cycle: Evidence from Israel

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thushyanthan Baskaran ◽  
Sebastian Blesse ◽  
Adi Brender ◽  
Yaniv Reingewertz
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Budget Cycle

scholarly journals The Stability and Growth Pact: A European Answer to the Political Budget Cycle?

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Donahue ◽  
Thierry Warin
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Budget Cycle ◽  
The Stability

The political budget cycle across varying degrees of democracy

2020 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 102218
Author(s):  
Assaf Shmuel
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Budget Cycle

scholarly journals Dynamics of Political Budget Cycle

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-158
Author(s):  
Ganesh Manjhi ◽  
Meeta Keswani Mehra
Keyword(s):  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Budget Cycle

Unraveling the political budget cycle nexus in Greece

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 13-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikiforos T. Laopodis ◽  
Anna A. Merika ◽  
Annie Triantafillou
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Budget Cycle

scholarly journals Revenue decentralization, central oversight and the political budget cycle: Evidence from Israel

2016 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thushyanthan Baskaran ◽  
Adi Brender ◽  
Sebastian Blesse ◽  
Yaniv Reingewertz
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Budget Cycle

scholarly journals The Political-Budget Cycle in Countries of the European Union

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jitka Doležalová
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Short Time Series ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Budget Cycle ◽  
Short Time ◽  
Selection Of

The Political-Budget Cycle in Countries of the European Union We empirically estimate the political-budget cycle in the member countries of the European Union in period of 1988-2008. We indirectly analyze the potential of these countries to deal with increasing public debts which were augmented by the global economic crisis. The selection of the EU countries depends on three characteristics of democracy - shared power, openness and adaptability. The openness of democracy is the most important characteristics in relation to effective behavior of governments. We suppose that governments are motivated to make electoral manipulation in countries which have lower level of openness. We choose Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Greece to include into our sample of countries. The research of political-budget cycle confirmed our assumption. We did not find the political-budget cycle in Finland, the Netherlands and Estonia. On the other hand, we identified that Austrian, Czech and Greece governments had a tendency to manipulate fiscal policy before elections. The regression coefficients of Poland electoral dummies were very statistically significant but they had a wrong sign. We could not estimate political-budget cycle in Romania due to the short time series.

scholarly journals Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle: Evidence from Italian Municipalities

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Forni ◽  
Andrea Bonfatti ◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Budget Cycle ◽  
Budget Cycle
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