Can the EU be a federal democracy? Assessing the horizontal and vertical dimension of the EU government from comparative perspective

The European Union remains an ambivalent polity. This uncertainty complicates the assessment of its democratic and federal quality. Drawing on comparative federalism research can contribute not only to making sense of whether, or rather which kind of federalism the EU has developed. It can also enable addressing such a compounded, but necessary inquiry into the federal and democratic character of the EU and how to ascertain which type of democratic government for which type of federal union may be appropriate. The article first elaborates a framework to assess the dimensions of federal and democratic government, drawing on comparative federalism research to delineate basic types of federal democracy. Here the democratic dimension of government is taken as referring primarily to the horizontal division of powers (among ‘branches’) of government, the federal dimension to the vertical division of powers (among ‘levels’) of governments. The framework is applied to the government of the EU in order to gauge its own type(s) of division of power arrangements and the interlinkage between them. Finally, the discussion reflects on whether or rather how the EU could comprise a federal democracy, especially in light of recent crisis challenges and subsequent institutional developments in EU governance.

The middle-income trap in Central and Eastern Europe in the 2010s: institutions and divergent growth models

The paper evaluates the convergence paths of Central and Eastern European member states of the EU during the 2010s, when the main task for these countries was avoiding the middle-income trap—when wages are not so low anymore to compete with less developed countries, while innovation is not developed enough yet to compete with developed countries. Using various statistical indicators, the paper shows that while most countries in the region have been on a convergence path during the decade under analysis, not all succeeded in avoiding the trap. While some countries successfully implemented policies to step on the path of productivity- and innovation-led growth (Czechia, Slovenia, Estonia, and Lithuania), in several other states, growth was supported mainly by low costs and loose monetary conditions including significant transfers from the EU. The comparative analysis of Estonia and Hungary illustrates the different growth models and shows how the institutional system plays a key role in exiting the trap.

Austria and the Global Compact on Migration: the ‘populist securitization’ of foreign policy

Bridging arguments between securitization theory and populist communication, this article shifts attention to the strategy of ‘populist securitization’. It argues that populist parties may seek to ‘securitize’ international political issues for the purpose of domestic political mobilization. Empirically, it demonstrates the relevance of populist securitization for the case of Austria’s foreign policy on the Global Compact on Migration during the coalition government (2017–2019) between the populist radical right Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the conservative People’s Party (ÖVP). The case study of the GCM elucidates the active interest populist parties like the FPÖ take in shaping foreign policy decisions that are close to their domestic political agenda. If successful, populist securitization can have a profound and sustained impact on the public perceptions of foreign policy issues and can create a sense of urgency about the need for an appropriate foreign policy response. In doing so, foreign policy becomes part of the game of domestic politics that can affect foreign policy decisions.

A sovereignist revolution? Italy’s foreign policy under the “Yellow–Green” government

In Italy, the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Northern League (LN) formed a coalition government after the legislative elections of March 2018. What has been the actual impact of the populist executive in the Italian foreign policy? Relying on the (few) existing analyses that have developed specific hypotheses on the expected international repercussions of populist parties-ruled governments, the paper examines Italy’s foreign policy under the Italian “Yellow–Green” cabinet (June 2018–August 2019). The manuscript advances three hypotheses. First, the foreign policy of the Conte’s government has been featured by a personalistic and a centralized decision-making process. Second, the Yellow-Green executive has adopted a vocal confrontational stance on the world stage, especially within multilateral frameworks, to “take back control” over national sovereignty. Third, such sovereignist foreign policy was largely symbolic because of “strategic” populist attitudes toward public opinion and due to domestic and international constraints. The manuscript—which is based on secondary and primary sources, such as interviews with former ministers, MPs, and diplomats—aims at offering a new perspective on populist parties and foreign policy, alimenting the rising debate on foreign policy change.