Are Costly Signals More Credible? Evidence from Three Experiments

This chapter investigates the militia summer of 1936, which had been a summer of both chaos and valor in the defense of the Republic. It describes the militias that arose to fight the rebels, which varied widely in their insistence that combatants send costly signals of commitment to fight. It also clarifies how the Republic transformed its armed forces to regularize them and put power back in the hands of the state by imposing military discipline and a single command structure on its militia forces. The chapter argues that the new discipline rules imposed costly signals of commitment on volunteers, requiring that they sign on to more demanding forms of warfare. It discusses the Republic's recruitment of less-committed troops by imposing conscription at the same time.

Download Full-text

How Do Observers Assess Resolve?

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123418000595 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 1-23 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Joshua D Kertzer ◽

Jonathan Renshon ◽

Keren Yarhi-Milo

Keyword(s):

Decision Makers ◽

Credibility Theory ◽

Theoretical Frameworks ◽

Integrative Framework ◽

Research Designs ◽

The Us ◽

Alternative Research ◽

Conjoint Experiment ◽

Costly Signals ◽

Ordinary Citizens

ABSTRACTDespite a plethora of theoretical frameworks, IR scholars have struggled with the question of how observers assess resolve. We make two important contributions in this direction. Conceptually, we develop an integrative framework that unites otherwise disconnected theories, viewing them as a set of heuristics actors use to simplify information-rich environments. Methodologically, we employ a conjoint experiment that provides empirical traction impossible to obtain using alternative research designs. We find that ordinary citizens are ‘intuitive deterrence theorists’ who focus to a great extent on capabilities, stakes, signals and past actions in judging resolve. We also find that observers see democracies as less resolved than autocracies (not more), casting doubt on key propositions of democratic credibility theory. Finally, a conceptual replication shows that a group of elite decision makers converge with the US public in how they interpret costly signals, and in viewing democracies as less resolved than autocracies.

Download Full-text

Signals, strongholds, and support: Political party protests in South Africa

Politics ◽

10.1177/0263395720935029 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 026339572093502

Author(s):

Jacob S Lewis

Keyword(s):

South African ◽

African National Congress ◽

African Politics ◽

Credible Commitments ◽

National Elections ◽

Protest Movements ◽

The People ◽

South African Politics ◽

Costly Signals ◽

Opposition Parties

South African politics are in a period of transition: the dominant African National Congress (ANC) is in decline, support for opposition parties has been rising, and voters have been disengaging rapidly from the electoral process. As protest movements have become more common and more powerful, established political parties have increasingly led their own protests, often addressing the same issues that citizens rise up about. This phenomenon has been understudied but has important ramifications for the future of South African politics. This article addresses this gap in the literature, arguing that party-led protests can be interpreted as costly signals of credible commitments to address the very issues that citizens are upset about. In a time when established parties are losing support, they may turn to these costly protests to demonstrate their commitment to addressing the needs of the people. Using counts of party-led protests and riots as well as election outcomes in the 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 national elections, this article demonstrates that party-led protests primarily target stronghold municipalities. In doing so, they positively correlate with vote-shares during elections. This boon accrues primarily to the opposition parties, but not the incumbent ANC.

Download Full-text