Does Improved Disclosure Lead to Higher Executive Compensation? Evidence from the Convergence to IRFS and the Dual-Class Share System in China

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Lu ◽  
Zhen Shi

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 1580-1594 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Amoako-Adu ◽  
Vishaal Baulkaran ◽  
Brian F. Smith


Author(s):  
Anita Indira Anand

This concluding chapter argues that the nexus-of-contract model continues to bear importance in analyses of the corporation but that this model only explains part of the story. While the corporation is certainly a hub of contractual relationships, it remains subject to the increasingly important phenomenon of shareholder-driven corporate governance (SCG). The chapter examines policy choices in a regime that allows and facilitates SCG. SCG is a trend to be observed, but it is also an ideal to be achieved. Achieving this ideal calls for greater shareholder participation in corporate governance, a weighty objective that can be reached by providing shareholders with the ability to nominate directors, imposing protections in dual-class share companies, and imposing restrictions on executive compensation, for example.



2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-274
Author(s):  
Mi-Kyung Yum




CFA Digest ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-99
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Horan


CFA Digest ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 20-22
Author(s):  
Lorne Jeremy Zeiler


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