Executive compensation disclosure and private control benefits: A comparison of U.S. and Canadian dual class firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 32-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Surjit Tinaikar
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Private Control ◽  
Compensation Disclosure ◽  
Dual Class

scholarly journals Corporate Social Responsibility And The Quality Of Executive Compensation Disclosures

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 625
Author(s):  
Walid Ben-Amar ◽  
Nadia Smaili ◽  
Eustache Ebondo Wa Mandzila
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Social Engagement ◽  
Disclosure Quality ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Compensation Disclosure ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Relationship

This paper examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility and executive compensation disclosure quality. We test whether socially responsible firms disclose more transparent and detailed information about their executive compensation packages than firms that are less committed to social responsibility initiatives. Using a sample of 187 publicly listed Canadian firms, we find a positive relation between CSR and executive compensation disclosure quality. We also document a positive (negative) association between firm size (ownership concentration) and executive compensation disclosure. These findings support the conclusion that increased disclosure transparency reflects a companys social engagement towards its stakeholders.

Policy Choices and Conclusions

2019 ◽  
pp. 101-104
Author(s):  
Anita Indira Anand
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Important Phenomenon ◽  
Contractual Relationships ◽  
Dual Class

This concluding chapter argues that the nexus-of-contract model continues to bear importance in analyses of the corporation but that this model only explains part of the story. While the corporation is certainly a hub of contractual relationships, it remains subject to the increasingly important phenomenon of shareholder-driven corporate governance (SCG). The chapter examines policy choices in a regime that allows and facilitates SCG. SCG is a trend to be observed, but it is also an ideal to be achieved. Achieving this ideal calls for greater shareholder participation in corporate governance, a weighty objective that can be reached by providing shareholders with the ability to nominate directors, imposing protections in dual-class share companies, and imposing restrictions on executive compensation, for example.

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