Simple Markovian Equilibria in Dynamic Spatial Legislative Bargaining

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Zapal
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining

Legislative Bargaining with Teams

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony J. Bradfield ◽  
John H. Kagel
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining

Gains Versus Costs in Legislative Bargaining

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nels Christiansen ◽  
Tanushree Jhunjhunwala ◽  
John H. Kagel
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining

Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly recognition

2018 ◽  
Vol 163 ◽  
pp. 102-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mustafa Yildirim
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining

Negotiating under Political Uncertainty: National Elections and the Dynamics of International Co-operation

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 315-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mareike Kleine ◽  
Clement Minaudier
Keyword(s):  
International Negotiations ◽  
Informational Efficiency ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Political Uncertainty ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Run Up ◽  
Uncertain Outcomes ◽  
Level 2 ◽  
The Eu

This article explores if (and how) national elections affect the chances of concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature about the informational efficiency of elections, it examines how political uncertainty in the run-up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Using the case of decision making in the European Union (EU), it finds that (1) pending national elections significantly reduce the chances of reaching an agreement at the international level (2) this effect is strongest during close elections with uncertain outcomes and (3) the effect is particularly pronounced in the case of elections in larger member states. The findings highlight the fruitfulness of further research on the dynamics between national and international politics. The article has positive and normative implications for the literature on two-level games, international negotiations and legislative bargaining in the EU.

scholarly journals Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules

2015 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 1076-1088 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon X. Eguia ◽  
Kenneth A. Shepsle
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining

scholarly journals Communication in Legislative Bargaining

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Baranski ◽  
John H. Kagel
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining

scholarly journals Legislative Bargaining and Incremental Budgeting

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dhammika Dharmapala
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining

UNIQUENESS IN RANDOM-PROPOSER MULTILATERAL BARGAINING

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 407-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUIBIN YAN
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Characteristic Functions ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Multilateral Bargaining ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Uniqueness Results ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Special Case

Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a characteristic function? This paper investigates a random-proposer model first studied in Okada (1993) in which each period players have equal probabilities of being selected to make a proposal and bargaining ends after one coalition forms. Focusing on transferable utility environments and Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE), we find ex ante SSPE payoff uniqueness for symmetric and convex characteristic functions, considerably expanding the conditions under which this model is known to exhibit SSPE payoff uniqueness. Our model includes as a special case a variant of the legislative bargaining model in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and our results imply (unrestricted) SSPE payoff uniqueness in this case.

scholarly journals Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining

10.3386/w6589 ◽  
1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elhanan Helpman ◽  
Torsten Persson
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining
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