CEO Pay Disparity: Efficient Contracting or CEO Entrenchment?

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Thanh Nha Vo ◽  
Jean Canil
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 271-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guan-Ying Huang ◽  
Henry H. Huang ◽  
Chun I Lee
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 168-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Thanh Nha Vo ◽  
Jean Milva Canil

2021 ◽  
pp. 234094442110517
Author(s):  
Carlos Fernández Méndez ◽  
Rubén Arrondo García ◽  
Shams Pathan

We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm’s generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family’s aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38


Author(s):  
Bill B. Francis ◽  
Kose John ◽  
Iftekhar Hasan ◽  
Maya Waisman
Keyword(s):  

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