Corporate Governance in Portugal

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-167
Author(s):  
João Teodósio
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
International Investors

This study provides a literature review of the research on the corporate governance mechanisms of Portuguese firms. Based on a sample of 47 articles published, between 2004 and 2019, it is documented that research is predominantly focused on corporate governance mechanisms as determinants of the performance on non-financial listed firms. Literature reports, in its majority, that board size decreases firm performance while CEO (Chief Executive Officer) non-duality promotes it; board size, board independence, and CEO non-duality improve the level of firms' information disclosure; CEO age is positively associated with an increase of CEO pay but CEO duality has an opposite effect; board independence increases firm risk-taking. These results should be of interest to national authorities in the development of future regulation related to firms' corporate governance and to national and international investors that intend to invest in Portuguese companies.

Corporate governance and risk in cross-listed and Canadian only companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (10) ◽  
pp. 2740-2757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atreya Chakraborty ◽  
Lucia Gao ◽  
Shahbaz Sheikh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Differential Effect ◽  
Composite Index ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a differential effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk in Canadian companies cross-listed on US markets and Canadian companies not cross-listed (Canadian only companies). Design/methodology/approach Using a sample comprised of all Canadian companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index for the period 2009–2014, this study applies OLS and fixed effect regressions to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk. Interaction variables between governance mechanisms and the cross-listing status are used to examine if this effect is different for cross-listed firms. Findings Results indicate that the effect of board characteristics such as size, independence and proportion of female directors remains the same in both cross-listed and not cross-listed firms. CEO duality and insider equity ownership impact firm risk only in cross-listed companies, while institutional shareholdings, environmental, social and governance disclosure and family control affect firm risk in Canadian only firms. Overall, the empirical results indicate that some governance mechanisms impact firm risk only in firms that cross-list, while others are well-suited for Canadian only firms. Practical implications This study suggests that some of the differences between Canadian companies that cross-list and the Canadian companies that do not cross-list in US stock markets may change the impact of governance mechanisms on firm risk. Therefore, these findings have important implications for the design of governance mechanisms in Canadian firms. Since some of these differences are common to other economies, the conclusions can be extended to companies in other countries with similar governance structures. Originality/value Although previous studies have investigated the effect of governance mechanism on firm risk, this is the first paper that studies the differential effect for companies that cross-list in US markets. Specifically, differences in the ownership structure, firm control and in the regulatory and institutional environment, may explain this differential effect. Unlike most of the previous studies that focus on the effect of individual governance mechanisms, this study uses several mechanisms and their interactions at the same time.

scholarly journals The effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the financial leverage–profitability relation

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-409
Author(s):  
Hanh Song Thi Pham ◽  
Duy Thanh Nguyen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Financial Leverage ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the moderating effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the financial leverage–profitability relation in emerging market firms. Design/methodology/approach The paper examines the impacts by estimating the empirical model in which a firm’s accounting profitability is a dependent variable, while financial leverage, board size, board independence, CEO duality, CEO ownership, state ownership and the interaction variables are predictors. The paper uses the panel data set of 295 listed firms in Vietnam in the period 2011-2015 and two key econometric methods for panel data, namely, the two-stage least square instrumental variable and general moments method. Findings The paper finds the evidence for the significant and positive effect of board size, board independence and state ownership on the financial leverage–profitability relation. The effect of CEO duality on the financial leverage–profitability relation tends to be negative, and the impact CEO ownership inclines to be positive, although both of them are statistically insignificant. The results are consistent across different estimation methods. Originality/value This paper is the first investigating the moderating effect of various corporate governance mechanisms on the financial leverage–profitability relationship in emerging market firms.

scholarly journals Corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of Malaysian listed firms

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 384-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shamsul Nahar Abdullah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Tobin’S Q ◽  
Women Directors ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Tobin's Q ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Listed Firms

In the aftermath of the Asian Financial crisis in 1997/1998, the Malaysia Securities Commission (SC) issued the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2000 (MCCG 2000). It was subsequently revised in 2007 following the Enron and Transmile debacles. In 2012, the SC issued the latest MCCG 2012 which introduced several new recommendations that are in line with developments in other parts of the world. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of the structure of the board and its activities on firm performance post MCCG 2007. The study also aims to shed light on the effectiveness of the board of directors since the issuance of MCCG 2000 and of MCCG 2007. It also aims to reveal the preparedness of listed firms in Malaysia to embrace MCCG 2012. Using a population of non-finance listed firms for the 2009, 2010 and 2011 financial years, it was found that board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) duality, directors’ busyness, nomination committee independence, the establishment of a risk management committee (RMC) and board meetings are not associated with firm performance, i.e. Tobin’s q. However, the market appears to be in favour of a larger board size. As for return on assets (ROA), it is not associated with board independence, board size, directors’ busyness and nomination committee independence. On the other hand CEO duality and the establishment of a RMC improve ROA, while board meetings are detrimental to ROA. It can therefore be concluded that board independence is not associated with either Tobin’s q or ROA. Hence, any corporate governance reforms should not over-emphasize the representation of independent directors on the board, rather the focus might be shifted to board activities, such as board meetings and the establishment of a RMC. With regard to board size, since the market is in favour of a larger board size, firms should increase the board’s size to enable the appointment of women directors to the board. Finally, combining the CEO and board chairman roles should not be disallowed as the market views this favourably. Hence, the ‘one-hat approach’ does not appear to be applicable in the case of CEO duality.

scholarly journals Corporate governance mechanisms and accounting conservatism: evidence from Egypt

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 386-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud A. Nasr ◽  
Collins G. Ntim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Regression Techniques ◽  
External Auditor ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms (board size, board independence, separation of chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) roles and external auditor type) on accounting conservatism in Egypt. Design/methodology/approach Archival data relating to CG and accounting conservatism are collected and analysed using multivariate regression techniques. Findings The findings indicate that board independence is positively associated with accounting conservatism. By contrast, board size and auditor type are negatively associated with accounting conservatism, while separating the chairperson and CEO roles has no significant relationship with accounting conservatism. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is one of the first empirical attempts at providing evidence on the relationship between CG and accounting conservatism in Egypt.

scholarly journals Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Tax Avoidance in Nigeria: A Quantile Regression Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 20
Author(s):  
Francis Chinedu Egbunike ◽  
Ardi Gunardi ◽  
Udunze Ugochukwu ◽  
Atang Hermawan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Quantile Regression ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

The main objective of the study was to investigate the effect of corporate governance on tax avoidance of quoted manufacturing firms in Nigeria. The study focused on internal corporate governance mechanisms and specifically examined the effect of board size, board independence, board diligence, CEO duality, and audit committee diligence. The ex post facto research design was adopted. The population comprised of all quoted manufacturing companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). The sample was purposively drawn as all companies in the consumer goods sector of the NSE. The study relied on secondary data obtained from annual reports and accounts of the sampled companies. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyze the data. The hypotheses were validated using Quantile Regression technique. Results showed that board size, board independence, and board diligence were significant at the median and 75th quantile. CEO duality and audit committee diligence were not significant at the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile. The study recommended among others moderate board sizes to improve efficiency of decision-making. In addition, the need for more independent directors and meeting frequency should be tailored to suit the needs of the company. Keywords: corporate governance mechanisms, tax avoidance, quantile regression

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis of Manufacturing Listed Firms in Ghana

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beatrice Sarpong-Danquah ◽  
Prince Gyimah ◽  
Richard Owusu Afriyie ◽  
Albert Asiama
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Generalized Least Squares ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Listed Firms

This paper assesses the effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of manufacturing firms in a developing country. Specifically, the paper investigates whether gender diversity, board independence, and board size affects return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) of manufacturing listed firms in Ghana. We use the generalized least squares (GLS) panel regression model to analyze the dataset of 11 listed manufacturing firms from 2009-2013. Our result reveals an insignificant representation of women on boards. Also, the empirical result shows that board independence and board gender diversity have significant positive effect on ROE and ROA. However, there is no statistical significant relationship between board size and firm performance (ROE and ROA). We suggest that manufacturing firms should appoint female board members as well as outside directors on their boards as this can make significant contribution to firm’s performance. Our study provides the first comprehensive explicit exposition of corporate governance-performance nexus using data from the manufacturing sector in Ghana.

The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Relationship Between Cash Holdings and Audit Fees in Egyptian Listed Companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 314
Author(s):  
Eman Abdel-Wanis
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This paper explores the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the nature of the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees, which helps provide an opportunity to identify whether these mechanisms enable to mitigate agency problems, and thus lower audit fees through a sample of 78 Egyptian listed firms in EGX 100 during the period 2014-2016 using panel data analysis. Results indicated that cash holding increases auditing fees. The board characteristics affect negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. Also, ownership structure affects negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. As well audit committee affects negatively on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees. There results support the view that corporate governance mitigate on the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees.

scholarly journals The Relationship between Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Going Concern Evaluation: Evidence from Firms Listed on Amman Stock Exchange

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
Bilal Nayef Zureigat ◽  
Faudziah Hanim Fadzil ◽  
Syed Soffian Syed Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Board Meeting ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Relationship

This study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (representative by each of managerial, institutional ownership, board independence and board meeting) and going concern evaluation among Jordanian listed firms. Through using multiple regression analysis, the results of this study illustrates that there is a positive relationship between managerial ownership, board independence and board meeting and going-concern evaluation, while a negative relationship is found with institutional ownership. There are four main hypotheses, two of them which are managerial and institutional ownership are accepted, while board independence and board meeting are not supported. This study shed more light on the importance of complying with the requirements of governance code and instructions by the companies and the need to impose fines or sanctions on non-compliant companies. The results of this study contribute to the creditors’ interest to be more alert to companies which may possess characteristics that contribute in manipulation of future companies.

scholarly journals The influence of internal corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure decisions of Chinese listed firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agyenim Boateng ◽  
Huifen Cai ◽  
Daniel Borgia ◽  
Xiao Gang Bi ◽  
Franklin Nnaemeka Ngwu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
The State ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the capital structure decisions of Chinese-listed firms. Design/methodology/approach Using a large and more recent data set consisting of 2,386 Chinese-listed firms over the period from 1998 to 2012, the authors use different statistical methods (OLS, fixed effects and system GMM) to analyse the effects of firm-specific and corporate governance influences on capital structure. Findings The authors find that the proportion of independent directors and ownership concentration exert significant influence on the level of Chinese long-term debt ratios after controlling for firm-specific determinants and split share reforms. Further analysis separating the sample of this paper into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs) suggests that ownership concentration in the hands of the state leads to decrease in debt ratios. Research limitations/implications The finding implies that concentrated ownership in the hands of the state appears more efficient compared to their private counterparts in their monitoring role. Originality/value This paper extends prior literature, which has concentrated disproportionately on firm-specific influences on capital structure, to the effects of within-firm governance mechanisms on capital structure decisions. The paper contributes to the agency theory–capital structure discourse in an emerging country context where corporate governance system appears weak.

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