Political Repression and Dissent in Chad, the Case of Hissene Habre and the Prosecution of Criminal Responsibility in Africa and International Law

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Halle Edward
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Political Repression

Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.

Challenges to Criminalizing State Responsibility for Genocide

Postgenocide ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 33-62
Author(s):  
Kevin Aquilina
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
State Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Courts ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
Corporate Criminal Liability ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

This chapter shows that although often states are parties in a genocide enterprise, the centrality—and responsibility—of states for genocide does not receive attention commensurate with the severity of the problem. Indeed, genocidal states are not held criminally responsibility for genocide. Underscoring difficulties at proving state criminal responsibility for genocide, the analysis compares and contrasts individual criminal responsibility and state criminal responsible for genocide. Whereas in the former case the matter has been dealt with by domestic and international criminal courts and tribunals, in the latter case there is no international judicial authority which can try states for criminal responsibility. However, non-state corporate criminal liability, and evolution of this institute in international law, may provide some transferable lessons for state responsibility for genocide. The chapter highlights the nexus between individual responsibility and state responsibility, and the failures of international genocide law in establishing state responsibility for genocide.

Defences in the Law of State ResponsibilityA View from Jurisprudence

2020 ◽  
pp. 179-202
Author(s):  
Luís Duarte d’Almeida
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
State Responsibility ◽  
The Law ◽  
Cross Fertilization

Ongoing discussions among international lawyers on defences in state responsibility have close analogies with debates in two other fields: debates in general legal theory on defeasibility in law, and debates in criminal law theory (and philosophy) on the elements of criminal responsibility. The similarities are not surprising. But it is striking how little cross-fertilization there seems to have been. For jurisprudence and criminal law scholars have developed a number of points and distinctions that international law theorists working on defences should find helpful. This chapter illustrates these claims. Section 2 looks at defences from the point of view of general legal theory, and section 3 does the same from the point of view of criminal law theory, recommending specific solutions to particular problems. Section 4 then shows how these contributions can help to answer some persistent questions surrounding defences in the law of state responsibility.

International Criminal Justice History Writing as Anachronism

2019 ◽  
pp. 72-89
Author(s):  
Frédéric Mégret
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
International Law ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Justice ◽  
History Writing ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Individual Accountability

This chapter focuses on the extent to which the contemporary project of international criminal justice cannot easily lay claim to what it imagines to be its past, because that past, despite superficial similarities, often exhibited fundamentally different concerns. It highlights three areas in which international criminal justice today is arguably dramatically different from how it was understood up to the 1990s. First, international criminal justice was for a long time much less obsessed with the criminalization of international law prohibitions specifically, and much more interested in the transnational dimensions of the criminal law. Second, it was much less committed to a strict model of individual accountability under international law and much more willing to see the state as the central pivot of international criminal responsibility. Third, it was intimately linked to peace projects whereas it has become intimately associated to the fight against atrocities and mass human rights violations.

s.I Actors, Ch.3 Neither Here nor There: The Position of the Defence in International Criminal Tribunals

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacobs Dov
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Structural Position ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
Trial Process ◽  
International Criminal Tribunals ◽  
Different Types ◽  
International Tribunals

This chapter argues that international tribunals minimize the need to accurately determine the defendant’s guilt by routinely ‘balancing away’ defence rights vis-à-vis other values that are deemed more important, such as ‘combating impunity’ or acknowledging the suffering of the victims. It identifies four different types of such balancing: foundational, procedural, institutional, and systemic. Foundational balancing concerns the (mis)use of the sources of international law. Procedural balancing primarily involves de-emphasizing the importance of defence rights by elevating the (assumed) rights of other actors in the system. Institutional balancing relates to the structural position of the defence at international tribunals. And systemic balancing focuses on how the collective nature of international crimes requires international tribunals to rely on substantive doctrines that make it more difficult to accurately assess the criminal responsibility of individual defendants. Those four types of balancing, this chapter suggests, relegate defendants to the margins of the trial process, significantly increasing the likelihood of unjust verdicts.

Part 3 General Principles of Criminal Law: Principes Généraux Du Droit Pénal, Art.27 Irrelevance of official capacity/Défaut de pertinence de la qualité officielle

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Schabas William A
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Head Of State

This chapter comments on Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 27 consists two paragraphs that are often confounded but fulfil different functions. Paragraph 1 denies a defence of official capacity, i.e. official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by States Parties to the Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own Head of State to which they are entitled by virtue of customary international law. In contrast with paragraph 1, it is without precedent in international criminal law instruments.

Legislated Out of Existence: Mass Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality Resulting in Statelessness as an International Crime

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1026-1067
Author(s):  
Cóman Kenny
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Crime ◽  
World War ◽  
Mass Atrocity ◽  
The Individual ◽  
First Time ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

Abstract A state’s prerogative to legislate for nationality remains subject to international law, with the arbitrary deprivation of nationality prohibited. The human rights implications of statelessness are profound, permeating all aspects of life and resulting in the marginalisation and oppression of those affected. Nonetheless, states have implemented laws depriving particular groups of legal status and making them stateless. In addition to the severe impact on the individual, such targeted discrimination creates a permissive atmosphere of dehumanisation that threatens a group’s existence and has been the precursor to mass atrocity. This article assesses, for the first time, whether individual criminal responsibility could be established for the creation or maintenance of a state policy to arbitrarily deprive a group of its nationality, rendering its members stateless. Based on post-World War ii precedent, it argues that such conduct could constitute a crime under the Rome Statute.

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