Exploring the interdependence between gainsharing and performance evaluation in a credit union,

ABSTRACT This study aims to investigate the interdependence between gainsharing and performance evaluation (objective and subjective) in a credit union. There is a recent debate on the interdependence between management control practices, which emerges from the discussion of control packages or systems. This study delves into this discussion by investigating the complementarity between gainsharing (group incentive modality) and performance evaluation in a credit union context, given the need for qualitative empirical studies on this phenomenon. This study is considered relevant because the joint use of management control practices can allow organizations to effectively mitigate control problems such as lack of direction, motivation, and competence. This research promotes insights into management control practices’ operation - given the discussion of complementarity between gainsharing, which is not a prevalent incentive system in most organizations - and objective and subjective performance evaluation. The methodology consists of a qualitative field study in a credit union using data collection, interviews, and access to documents analyzed using an interpretive approach. This research presents evidence on the phenomenon of interdependence between management control practices, adding to the literature by addressing different forms of complementarity between a group incentive system in the form of gainsharing and performance evaluation. It became evident that gainsharing reinforces the objective performance evaluation process by mitigating motivation and direction problems, while the subjective performance evaluation compensates the objective performance evaluation by shifting the focus of the evaluation to the individual's skills.

Subjective Performance Evaluation and Forward-Looking Implications: The Role of Supervisor Incentives

In this study, I examine whether supervisors respond to their own preferences in subjective performance evaluation under a forced distribution system (FDS). Using a proprietary, archival dataset in a car dealership, I find that subjective evaluations are higher when longer supervisor-subordinate relationships exist, whereas subjective evaluations are lower when larger supervisor-subordinate age differences exist. The empirical evidence also indicates that subjective evaluations predict promotions and future performance of the employees, implying that the use of subjectivity allows supervisors to incorporate forward-looking information of employee performance despite its potential biases. This study contributes to the literature by focusing on the performance appraisal based on the FDS and documenting the impact of supervisor incentives on subjective performance evaluation.

Effect of trust in leadership on team effectiveness and performance in Iranian Futsal Super League players

El objetivo del estudio fue examinar el efecto de la confianza en el liderazgo sobre la efectividad y el rendimiento del equipo en los jugadores de la Súper Liga de Fútbol Sala de Irán. La muestra estuvo compuesta por todos los jugadores masculinos de la Súper Liga de Fútbol Sala de Irán en 2017-2018 (n = 163). Los participantes completaron los siguientes cuestionarios: 1) Cuestionario de confianza de liderazgo. 2) Cuestionario de efectividad del equipo. 3) Evaluación subjetiva del rendimiento. Se utilizaron técnicas estadísticas descriptivas e inferenciales para analizar los datos. Los resultados indicaron que la confianza en el entrenador tuvo un efecto positivo significativo para los jugadores en la efectividad del equipo (sig = 0,001; t = 5,869) y en el rendimiento del equipo (sig = 0,001; t = 7,194). En conclusión, para ganarse la confianza del equipo, los entrenadores deben ser capaces de tomar las decisiones correctas en diferentes situaciones y tener las habilidades y cualidades necesarias (justicia, benevolencia, honestidad y habilidad), lo que a su vez resulta en mayor efectividad y rendimiento del equipo. The purpose of the study was to examine the effect of trust in leadership on team effectiveness and performance in Iranian Futsal Super League players. The sample consisted of all the male players of the Iranian Futsal Super League in 2017-2018 (n=163). The participants completed the following questionnaires: 1) Leadership Confidence Questionnaire. 2) Team Effectiveness Questionnaire. 3) Subjective performance evaluation. Descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyze the data. The results indicated that trust in the coach had a significant positive effect for the players on team effectiveness (sig = 0.001, t = 5.869) and on team performance (sig = 0.001, t = 7.194). In conclusion, in order to gain the trust of the team, the coaches should be able to make the right decisions in different situations and have the necessary skills and qualities (justice, benevolence, honesty, and ability), which in turn results in higher team effectiveness and team performance.

Strategic Priorities and Organizational Design

ABSTRACT This paper examines how relations among organizational design choices (subjective performance evaluation, delegation, incentive intensity) vary with strategic priorities. In particular, I examine firms' organizational designs when multiple strategies are followed and managers need to be incentivized to make strategy-consistent decisions balancing different, partially opposing objectives. Analyzing survey data from 151 firms, I find support for my predictions: subjective performance measurement and incentive intensity are complements for firms following a low cost and a differentiation strategy simultaneously. In contrast, and in line with prior literature, incentive intensity has a substitutive relation with both subjective weighting and discretion for firms following a one-dimensional strategy. The relation between delegation and subjectivity or incentive intensity does not vary systematically across strategic priorities. My findings suggest that firms couple subjective performance measurement and incentive intensity to address the challenge of incentivizing balanced actions when a low cost and a differentiation strategy are followed simultaneously.

Selective Attention as a Determinant of Escalation Bias in Subjective Performance Evaluation Judgments

ABSTRACT We use an experiment to examine escalation bias in subjective performance evaluations. Participants assume the role of manager and evaluate the performance of an employee based on a balanced-scorecard-type performance report. We manipulate whether managers recommended positively or negatively about the evaluated employee's promotion to his current position. Consistent with the presence of escalation bias, we find that managers give higher performance ratings to employees about whom they advised positively than to employees about whom they advised negatively. Using eye-tracking data, we investigate whether escalation bias arises because managers with different prior commitments toward the evaluated employee pay attention to different items in the scorecard. We find that evaluators' prior recommendation does not affect what proportion of their visual attention is given to favorable (versus unfavorable) performance measures, and that the relative attention paid to favorable measures is not associated with the performance rating.