scholarly journals Analyzing Systemic Risk in the Chinese Banking System

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiubin Huang ◽  
Jakob de Haan ◽  
Bert Scholtens
2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 348-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiubin Huang ◽  
Jakob De Haan ◽  
Bert Scholtens

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (14) ◽  
pp. 7954
Author(s):  
Tonmoy Choudhury ◽  
Simone Scagnelli ◽  
Jaime Yong ◽  
Zhaoyong Zhang

Systemic risk contagion is a key issue in the banking sector in maintaining financial system stability. This study is among the first few to use three different distance-to-risk measures to empirically assess the domestic interbank linkages and systemic contagion risk of the Chinese banking industry, by using bivariate dynamic conditional correlation GARCH model on data collected from eight prominent Chinese banks for the period 2006–2018. The results show a relatively high correlation among almost all the banks, suggesting an interconnectedness among the banks. We found evidence that the banking system is exposed to significant domestic contagion risks arising from systemic defaults. Given that Chinese markets deliver weak signals of forthcoming stress in banking sectors, new policy intervention is crucial to resolve the hidden stress in the system. The results have important policy implications and will provide scholars and policymakers further insight into the risk contagion originating from interbank networks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 130
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Goodell ◽  
Hazem Danny Al-Nakib ◽  
Paolo Tasca

In recent years, electronic retail payment mechanisms, especially e-commerce and card payments at the point of sale, have increasingly replaced cash in many developed countries. As a result, societies are losing a critical public retail payment option, and retail consumers are losing important rights associated with using cash. To address this concern, we propose an approach to digital currency that would allow people without banking relationships to transact electronically and privately, including both e-commerce purchases and point-of-sale purchases that are required to be cashless. Our proposal introduces a government-backed, privately-operated digital currency infrastructure to ensure that every transaction is registered by a bank or money services business, and it relies upon non-custodial wallets backed by privacy-enhancing technology, such as blind signatures or zero-knowledge proofs, to ensure that transaction counterparties are not revealed. Our approach to digital currency can also facilitate more efficient and transparent clearing, settlement, and management of systemic risk. We argue that our system can restore and preserve the salient features of cash, including privacy, owner-custodianship, fungibility, and accessibility, while also preserving fractional reserve banking and the existing two-tiered banking system. We also show that it is possible to introduce regulation of digital currency transactions involving non-custodial wallets that unconditionally protect the privacy of end-users.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-656 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Xu ◽  
Francis In ◽  
Catherine Forbes ◽  
Inchang Hwang
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arash Riasi

<p>This paper tries to find out why shadow banking system has become so competitive in the global financial system and how it can be controlled. For this reason we use Porter’s diamond model to find the competitive advantages of shadow banking. Based on the results of this study it can be concluded that factor conditions, chance and government do not contribute to the competitiveness of shadow banking industry. On the other hand the results suggested that related and supporting industries, firm strategy, structure and rivalry, and demand conditions contribute to the competitiveness of shadow banking industry. It is important to regulate the activities of shadow banking industry in order to prevent this industry from creating systemic risk.</p>


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