ISLAMIC ENDOGENOUS MONEY: EVIDENCE FROM ISLAMIC BANKING SYSTEM IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA

This research is conducted due to the un-ware contemporary Muslim economists on the feature of money whether exogenous or endogenous. Arguing that money in Islam should be endogenous, Choudhury (1997) asserts that fiat and fractional reserve systems makes money exogenous. If it is true, this condition leads to the un-oriented development of Islamic monetary and financial systems that are basically is fiat and fractional reserve systems. Accordingly, the empirical studies on Islamic monetary policy in Islamic financial system that is based on exogenous money concept cannot reveal the true money supply for the economy. This paper aims to propose the theoretical model of endogenous Islamic money and conduct an empirical study of the model on Islamic banking that is based on fiat and fractional reserve systems. The empirical method used is based on the ARDL and ECM. The result of the research gives evidence that the profit and loss sharing system is a core feature of the Islamic endogenous money system in the fractional reserve requirement system. Other evidence reveals that the development of the Islamic financial system can minimize the existence of exogenous money in a fiat monetary system. By these results, this study argues that Islamic endogenous money system can be developed in fiat and fractional reserve banking systems through the profit and loss sharing systems.

A Digital Currency Architecture for Privacy and Owner-Custodianship

In recent years, electronic retail payment mechanisms, especially e-commerce and card payments at the point of sale, have increasingly replaced cash in many developed countries. As a result, societies are losing a critical public retail payment option, and retail consumers are losing important rights associated with using cash. To address this concern, we propose an approach to digital currency that would allow people without banking relationships to transact electronically and privately, including both e-commerce purchases and point-of-sale purchases that are required to be cashless. Our proposal introduces a government-backed, privately-operated digital currency infrastructure to ensure that every transaction is registered by a bank or money services business, and it relies upon non-custodial wallets backed by privacy-enhancing technology, such as blind signatures or zero-knowledge proofs, to ensure that transaction counterparties are not revealed. Our approach to digital currency can also facilitate more efficient and transparent clearing, settlement, and management of systemic risk. We argue that our system can restore and preserve the salient features of cash, including privacy, owner-custodianship, fungibility, and accessibility, while also preserving fractional reserve banking and the existing two-tiered banking system. We also show that it is possible to introduce regulation of digital currency transactions involving non-custodial wallets that unconditionally protect the privacy of end-users.

Unanswered quibbles: George Selgin still gets it wrong with fractional reserve free banking

In this article we reply to George Selgin’s counterarguments to our article «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin regards holding cash as saving while we focus on the real savings necessary to maintain investment projects. Real savings are unconsumed real income. Variations in real savings are not necessarily equal to variations in cash holdings. We show that a coordinated credit expansion in a fractional reserve free banking (FRFB) system is possible and that precautionary reserves consequently do not pose a necessary limit. We discuss various instances in which a FRFB system may expand credit without a prior increase in real savings. These facets all demonstrate why a fractional reserve banking system —even a free banking one— is inherently unstable, and incentivized to impose a stabilizing central bank. We find that at the root of our disagreements with Selgin lies a different approach to monetary theory. Selgin subscribes to the aggregative equation of exchange, which impedes him from seeing the microeconomic problems that the stabilization of «MV» by a FRFB system causes. Key words: Free banking, fractional reserve, monetary equilibrium, credit expansion, economic cycle. JEL Classification: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34. Resumen: En este artículo respondemos a George Selgin, que a su vez respondió a nuestro artículo «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin considera que los saldos de tesorería son ahorros, mientras nosotros nos fijamos en los ahorros reales necesarios para mantener proyectos de inversion. Ahorros reales son ingresos reales no consumidos. Variaciones en los ahorros reales no necesariamente coinciden con las variaciones en los saldos de tesoreria. Mostramos que una expansión crediticia coordinada es posible en un sistema bancario de reserva fraccionaria (FRFB) y que las reservas prudenciales no constituyen necesariamente un limite a la expansión co - ordinada. Discutimos varios escenarios en los que el sistema FRFB puede expandir los créditos sin un aumento previo en los ahorros reales. Todas estas facetas muestran que un sistema bancario de reservas fraccionarias —incluso uno de banca libre— es inherentemente inestable y produce incentivos para imponer un banco central estabilizador. Mostramos que el origen de nuestras diferencias con Selgin está en un enfoque diferente a la teoría monetaria. Selgin es partidario de la ecuación de intercambio que es muy agregada y que le impide ver los problemas microeconomicas que la estabilización de «MV» por parte del sistema FRFB produce. Palabras clave: Banca libre, reserva fraccionaria, equilibrio monetario, expansión crediticia, ciclo económico. Clasificación JEL: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34.

Stability of Gold Standard and Its Selected Consequences

The gold standard was quite stable in the past: the price level changes were relatively small, and trade cycles mild. However, its past stability does not guarantee stability nowadays. We show that the stability of the gold standard to shocks stemming from the world gold market depends critically on the size of the monetary stock of gold relative to the extent of these shocks. Every change decreasing the relative size of the monetary stock of gold lowers its stability. We discuss some consequences of the thesis too: first, any system economizing on its gold reserves (e.g. the mature fractional reserve free banking system of the Scottish type) may undermine the stability of the gold standard. Second, an attempt to reestablish the gold standard may have to include a collective action of many countries of a great economic power. If a single small country tried to resume to the gold, its monetary stock of gold would probably be tiny relative to the world gold market shocks, and the economy could be destabilized by these shocks. It makes the return of the gold standard rather improbable in the near future. Key words: Gold Standard, Stability, Inflation, Trade Cycle. JEL Classification: E31, E39, E42, N10.

The Uneasy Case for Fractional- Reserve Free Banking

Since a few decades several sub-disciplines within economics have witnessed a reorientation towards institutional analysis. This development has in particular also affected the fields of macroeconomics and monetary theory where it has led to several proposals for far-reaching financial and monetary reform. One of the more successful of these proposals advocates a fractional-reserve free banking system, that is, a system with no central bank, but with permission for the banks to operate with a fractional reserve. This article exposes several conceptual flaws in this proposal. In particular several claims of the fractional-reserve free bankers with respect to the purported working characteristics of this system are criticized from the perspective of economic theory. In particular, the claim that a fractional-reserve free banking system would lead to the disappearance of the business cycle is recognized as false. Furthermore an invisible-hand analysis is performed, reinforcing the conclusion that fractional-reserve free banking is incompatible with the ethical and juridical principles underlying a free society. Key words: monetary and banking regimes, comparative institutional analysis, fractional-reserve free banking, business cycle, invisible hand. Clasificación JEL: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34 Resumen: Desde hace algunas décadas varias subdisciplinas de la economía se ven reorientadas hacia el análisis institucional. Este desarrollo ha afectado más específicamente también a los campos de la macroeconomía y la teoría monetaria donde ha llevado a varias propuestas de reformas financieras y monetarias de gran alcance. Una de las propuestas más exitosas aboga por una banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, o sea un sistema sin banco central en el cual, sin embargo, los bancos puedan operar con una reserva fraccionaria. Este artículo comenta varios defectos conceptuales de dicha propuesta. Más específicamente, varias alegaciones de los banqueros de la banca libre con reserva fraccionaria relativas a las supuestas características operativas de este sistema se critican partiendo de la teoría económica. Más en particular, se denuncia como errónea la alegación de que una banca libre con reserva fraccionaria llevaría a la desaparición del ciclo económico. Además, se realiza un análisis de mano invisible lo cual refuerza la conclusión que la banca libre con reserva fraccionaria es incompatible con los principios éticos y jurídicos propios de una sociedad libre. Palabras clave: banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, ciclo económico, mano invisible.

Credit expansion, the prisoner’s dilemma and free banking as mechanism design

Despite the distinctive character of the Austrian approach to «microfoundations for macroeconomics», the literature on free banking contains a number of arguments which make use of game-theoretic concepts and models such as the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma model. While there can be no general a priori presumption against the possible usefulness of game-theoretic concepts for Austrian theorizing, in the context of the debate on free banking such concepts and models have been used with varying degrees of perspicacity. One example which is elaborated in the paper is concerned with the interaction configuration between independent banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system, which has sometimes been modeled as a One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This conceptualization does not provide a sufficient argument for the in-concert overexpansion thesis, nor for the thesis that fractional-reserve free banking will tend to lead to the establishment of a central bank. The author drops the implicit assumption that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the outcome matrix and the utility matrix. When it is acknowledged that banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system need not necessarily adopt a «myopic», self-regarding perspective but may recognize the long-run harmony of interests between the banking sector and society at large, a different conceptualization and a different matrix representation emerge. Key words: Economic Mechanism Design; Business Cycle Theory; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Free Banking. JEL codes: D01, E31, E32, E42, E52, E58, E66, G18, K39. Resumen: A pesar del carácter distintivo del enfoque austríaco de las «microfundaciones para la macroeconomía», la literatura sobre la banca libre contiene algunos argumentos que recurren a los conceptos y modelos de la teoría de juegos tales como el conocido modelo Dilema del Prisionero. A pesar de que no puede existir una presunción a priori sobre la posible utilidad de conceptos de la teoría de juegos para las teorías austríacas, en el contexto del debate sobre la banca libre tales conceptos y modelos han sido manejados con distintos grados de perspicacia. Un ejemplo elaborado en el documento comenta la configuración de interacción entre los bancos independientes en un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, que a veces ha sido modelado como un juego de Dilema del Prisionero One-Shot. Esta conceptualización no ofrece suficientes argumentos para la tesis de la sobreexpansión in-concert, ni para la tesis de que un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria tendería a la creación de un banco central. El autor abandona la asunción implícita de que existe una correspondencia de uno a uno entre la matriz de resultado y la matriz de utilidad. Al reconocerse que los bancos en un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria no deben adoptar necesariamente una perspectiva «miope» y egoísta, pero pueden reconocer la armonía de intereses a largo plazo entre el sector bancario y la sociedad en general, surgen una conceptualización y representación de la matriz distintas. Palabras clave: Diseño de mecanismo económico; Teoría del ciclo económico; Dilema del Prisionero; Banca libre. Códigos JEL: D01, E31, E32, E42, E52, E58, E66, G18, K39.

A brief note on economic recessions, banking reform and the future of capitalism

In my book «Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles» (1st Spanish Edition 1992, 2nd English Edition 2009) I present a detailed analysis of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory. Now I will concentrate on the financial crisis and the current worldwide economic recession as one of the most challenging problems we must now cope with and the way in which the Austrian Business Cycle Theory can help us to understand its causes and the best approach to economic recovery. Having witnessed the intellectual and practical defeat of socialism specially during the last decades of the twentieth century, in my opinion one of the main challenges that still remains for the future of Capitalism is the urgent need to privatize money by dismantling the organ of central monetary planning: the Central Bank. In other words, real Socialism, represented by state money, Central banks and financial administrative regulations, is still in force in the monetary and credit sectors of the so called free market economies. As a result of this fact we experience regularly in the area of money and credit all the negative consequences established by the Theorem of the Impossibility of Socialism discovered by those distinguished members of the Austrian School of Economics Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Specifically, the central planners of state money are unable to know, to follow and to control the changes in both the demand and supply of money. Furthermore, the whole financial system is based on the legal privilege given by the state to private bankers to act with a fractional reserve ratio in relation with the demand deposits they receive from their clients. As a result of this privilege, private bankers are not true financial intermediaries, but are mainly creators of deposits materializing in credit expansions. These credit expansions are artificial and do not correspond to any previous increases in the voluntary savings of the citizens. In this way the current fractional reserve banking system, tends to worsen and amplify the systemic intertemporal distortions and investment misallocations that the macroeconomic planners working for central banks induce in the production structure of the whole real economy. These distortions manifest themselves in the stages of financial bubbles, economic boom, overall malinvestment and afterwards in the stages of financial crisis, deep economic recession and unemployment.

Free banking, the real-balance effect, and Walras’ Law

The author of this article draws special attention to two particular claims of the free bankers concerning the supposed working characteristics of a fractional-reserve free banking system which may strike the reader as questionable. The first of these relates to the alleged absence of a real-balance effect under free banking. The second relates to the free bankers’ reference to Walras’ Law as providing a rationale for the free banking system’s «offsetting» actions when confronted with changes in the public’s demand to hold bank liabilities. This rationale is defective since it is based on an erroneous interpretation of Walras’ Law. The author’s conclusion does not imply that it is not at all possible, from a rational viewpoint, to make a plausible case for this variant of free banking, only that the argument should be freed from certain questionable tenets. Key words: Free banking, monetary systems, real-balance effects, Walras’ Law. JEL Classification: E0; E32; E42; E5; E51; E52. Resumen: El autor de esta nota llama la atención sobre dos alegaciones particulares relativas a las supuestas características operativas de una banca libre con reserva fraccionaria que podrían resultar cuestionables al lector. La primera se refiere a la supuesta ausencia de efectos de saldo real en la banca libre. El segundo guarda relación con la referencia de los teóricos de la banca libre con reserva fraccionaria a la Ley de Walras que constituiría la base lógica de las acciones «de compensación» de la banca libre al enfrentarse a cambios en la demanda de medios fiduciarios por parte del público. Esta base lógica es defectuosa puesto que parte de una interpretación errónea de la Ley de Walras. La conclusión del autor no implica que no sea posible en absoluto, desde un punto de vista racional, elaborar una argumentación plausible para esta variante de la banca libre, sino que la argumentación debe estar libre de determinados argumentos cuestionables. Palabras clave: Banca libre, sistemas monetarios, efectos de saldo real, Ley de Walras. Clasificación JEL: E0; E32; E42; E5; E51; E52.

Considerations on Fractional Reserve Banking and Free-Banking

In this article, our goal is to examine a controversy very dear to Austrian economists: that of the legitimacy of the fractional reserve banking system, defined as a system in which the bankers keep in their vaults a quantity of money (narrowly defined) lower than the quantity of cash deposits granted to their clients. In the Austrian vision, the monetary supply, broadly defined (Mises, 1971), consists of money properly said, plus monetary substitutes (bank notes, cash deposits), plus credit-money, this one corresponding to any future right to a monetary sum (time deposits, promissory notes, pre-fixed derivatives). In a narrow sense, money supply consists in money properly said (fiat-money or commodity money). We must, however, clarify some aspects of the money supply. Monetary substitutes have their origin in the monetary certificates. Monetary certificates, in their turn, are tools utilized to confer information about the medium of exchange. For instance, precious metal coins mintage confers information about the metal’s purity and about the weight of the coin; bank notes and current account balances confer information about the amount, overseer and proprietor of the deposited money. So, money certificates can change the agents’ valuations concerning the particular good in question, even being able of independent valuation. Monetary certificates can be physically connected to the medium of exchange or separated from it. In the case of physically connected monetary certificates, we have what we normally call monetary substitutes. Monetary substitutes can, due to their nature, work as property titles to the very medium of exchange. Contemporaneously, monetary substitutes usually can be identified with cash deposits (current account balances) and paper checks, provided that the use of bank notes is increasingly rare. Having made those clarifications concerning monetary substitutes, we will, following Mises (1971, p. 135), call fiduciary media the quantity of monetary substitutes that exceeds the quantity of money properly said. However, before proceeding with our Investigation about the consequences of the legalization of the production of fake monetary substitutes (fiduciary media), we must explain what would be a fake monetary substitute and the nature of this counterfeiting. We must, therefore, start our argumentation establishing some differences about the nature of loan and deposit contracts [x].