Price Uncertainty and Market Power in Retail Gasoline: The Role of Price Signs on an Italian Highway

Author(s):  
Federico Rossi ◽  
Pradeep K. Chintagunta

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 753-770 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Rossi ◽  
Pradeep K. Chintagunta


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Idun ◽  
Anthony Q. Aboagye ◽  
Godfred Alufar Bokpin
Keyword(s):  




2001 ◽  
Vol 221 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Drescher ◽  
Kevin McNamara

ZusammenfassungDer vorliegende Beitrag befaßt sich mit der Beziehung zwischen Treibstoffpreisen und der Marktstruktur im deutschen Tankstellensektor. Aufbauend auf ein Cournot-Modell wird getestet, ob die zumeist bundesweit agierenden Mineralölunternehmen auf lokalen Märkten Marktmacht ausüben. Die häufig geäußerte Vermutung, daß aufgrund einer relativ hohen Konzentration auf Bundesebene und einer vielfach noch höheren regionalen bzw. lokalen Konzentration Mineralölfirmen Marktmacht ausüben, konnte empirisch nicht belegt werden. Auch einige Modellvariationen führten nicht zu grundsätzlich anderen Ergebnissen. Da allerdings weitere Konzentrationstendenzen auf dem Tankstellenmarkt zu beobachten sind, bleibt abzuwarten, ob eine empirische Uberprüfung mittels aktueller Daten nicht zu einer Veränderung der Ergebnisse führt.



2007 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Preston McAfee ◽  
Philip J. Reny


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-8
Author(s):  
Tracy Ti Gu ◽  
Dan A. Simunic ◽  
Michael T. Stein ◽  
Minlei Ye ◽  
Ping Zhang

ABSTRACT The market for audit services has been the subject of extensive academic research since the 1970s. The prevailing view is that audit markets are characterized by tiers of suppliers (Big 4 versus non-Big 4, and industry specialists versus non-specialists) where the upper tier suppliers produce and sell a systematically higher level of assurance, while competition among suppliers within tiers is essentially perfect and a uniform price prevails within the submarkets. We discuss three papers that challenge this orthodoxy. These papers argue and find that the price of an audit is essentially unique to each (auditor, client) pair and that this price depends on both audit firm size and client size. Furthermore, audit firm size is linked with the firm's capital investments, which enhance auditor efficiency and market power. We conclude that audit markets are atomistic and that local market power is an important determinant of audit prices and audit fees.



2021 ◽  
pp. 206-228
Author(s):  
Stephen E. Gent ◽  
Mark J. C. Crescenzi

This concluding chapter addresses some additional aspects of market power politics and outlines several implications of this study for scholars and policymakers. First, to complement the previous case studies of violence and strategic delay, it provides a brief discussion of Russia’s decision to abandon a delay strategy and agree to a settlement of the long-running dispute over the Caspian Sea. It then outlines a set of questions for future research on market power politics. Next, the chapter reflects upon how the research in the book informs an understanding of international relations. It highlights some important lessons concerning the effects of market structure on conflict behavior and the limitations of international institutions. It then contemplates the future role of gray zone tactics by countries like Russia and China. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the policy implications that follow from this research.





2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 603-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannu Piekkola ◽  
Jaana Rahko


2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Ploog ◽  
Michael Stolpe

AbstractThis paper discusses policy options to reduce underpricing in initial public offerings (IPOs). It surveys recent theoretical insights into the causes and welfare implications of underpricing and reviews evidence on the signalling hypothesis, the winner’s curse model, the role of underwriters in assessing issuing firms’ future profitability and the genesis of speculative bubbles in IPO markets. The paper concludes that governments should curtail the abuse of market power in underwriting by prohibiting the allocation of shares to insiders and by reducing the incentives for investment banks to exploit underpriced share issues in order to cross-subsidise unrelated lines of business. Moreover, governments should seek to stabilize the IPO market by committing themselves to regular equal-sized issues of shares in government assets as part of a long-term privatisation programme.



Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document