asymmetric pricing
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Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 1630
Author(s):  
Hang Lin ◽  
Lixin Liu ◽  
Zhengjun Zhang

Tail risk is an important financial issue today, but directly hedging tail risks with an ad hoc option is still an unresolved problem since it is not easy to specify a suitable and asymmetric pricing kernel. By defining two ad hoc underlying “assets”, this paper designs two novel tail risk options (TROs) for hedging and evaluating short-term tail risks. Under the Fréchet distribution assumption for maximum losses, the closed-form TRO pricing formulas are obtained. Simulation examples demonstrate the accuracy of the pricing formulas. Furthermore, they show that, no matter whether at scale level (symmetric “normal” risk, with greater volatility) or shape level (asymmetric tail risk, with a smaller value in tail index), the greater the risk, the more expensive the TRO calls, and the cheaper the TRO puts. Using calibration, one can obtain the TRO-implied volatility and the TRO-implied tail index. The former is analogous to the Black-Scholes implied volatility, which can measure the overall symmetric market volatility. The latter measures the asymmetry in underlying losses, mirrors market sentiment, and provides financial crisis warnings. Regarding the newly proposed TRO and its implied tail index, economic implications can be offered to investors, portfolio managers, and policy-makers.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yeşim Aliefendioğlu ◽  
Harun Tanrivermis ◽  
Monsurat Ayojimi Salami

Purpose This paper aims to investigate asymmetric pricing behaviour and impact of coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic shocks on house price index (HPI) of Turkey and Kazakhstan. Design/methodology/approach Monthly HPIs and consumer price index (CPI) data ranges from 2010M1 to 2020M5 are used. This study uses a nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag model for empirical analysis. Findings The findings of this study reveal that the Covid-19 pandemic exerted both long-run and short-run asymmetric relationship on HPI of Turkey while in Kazakhstan, the long-run impact of Covid-19 pandemic shock is symmetrical long-run positive effect is similar in both HPI markets. Research limitations/implications The main limitations of this study are the study scope and data set due to data constraint. Several other macroeconomic variables may affect housing prices; however, variables used in this study satisfy the focus of this study in the presence of data constraint. HPI and CPI variables were made available on monthly basis for a considerably longer period which guaranteed the ranges of data set used in this study. Practical implications Despite the limitation, this study provides necessary information for authorities and prospective investors in HPI to make a sound investment decision. Originality/value This is the first study that rigorously and simultaneously examines the pricing behaviour of Turkey and Kazakhstan HPIs in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic shocks at the regional level. HPI of Kazakhstan is recognized in the global real estate transparency index but the study is rare. The study contributes to regional studies on housing price by bridging this gap in the real estate literature.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-35
Author(s):  
K. V. Simonov

The slowdown in Russian economy caused a drop in demand for exhibition business services. Operating in the segment of trade fairs organizing companies faced a decrease in the intensity of economic exchanges due to the outflow of customers. The paper considers modification of the exchange management in order to intensify the latter. The research methodology bases the provisions of the theory of bilateral markets, theories of management, marketing and logistics, methods of analysis and synthesis, as well as on the experience of exhibition activities. As a result of the study: the expediency of application by linear companies-organizers of the business model “two-sided market” was justified; the interpretation of business model determined by two-component functional two-stage system was given when the platform (service) is prepared within the linear fragment and then the main fragment turns on — two-sided market, providing intensification of exchanges management by means of asymmetric pricing strategies and network effects. Recommendations are formulated for practitioners who are puzzled by the problem of economic exchanges intensification. The combination of these theoretically and practically significant results develops the theory of two-sided exhibition markets, as well as provides scientific support in the format of recommendations and descriptions of tools that help exhibition business practitioners cope with the problem of managing economic exchanges.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2-4) ◽  
pp. 213-225
Author(s):  
Haipeng (Allan) Chen ◽  
Lisa E. Bolton ◽  
Sharon Ng ◽  
Dian Wang

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 ◽  
pp. 46-68
Author(s):  
Quynh Chau Pham Holland ◽  
Benjamin Liu ◽  
Eduardo Roca ◽  
Afees A. Salisu

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-73
Author(s):  
Gokce Kurucu

Abstract This paper analyzes the optimal market structures and pricing strategies of a monopolist platform in a two-sided market where the agents on each side prefer the platform to be less competitive on their side; that is, in a market with negative intra-group network externalities. Results show that the equilibrium market structure varies with the extent of negative intra-group network externalities. If the negative network externalities are substantial, that is, if an agent’s disutility due to a larger sized market on his side is high (enough), then the profit-maximizing strategy for the matchmaker will be to match the highest types of one side with all of the agents on the other side. In that case, the matchmaker will charge a high entrance fee from the former side and allow free entrance to the agents of the latter side. However, if the network externalities are not substantial, then the matchmaker will maximize profits by matching an equal number of agents from each side. This paper thus provides an explanation of the asymmetric pricing schedules in two-sided markets when the matchmaker uses a one-program pricing schedule.


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