Partial Acquisitions and Dilution of Minority Shareholders' Wealth

Author(s):  
Patricia Charlety ◽  
Marie-Cécile Fagart ◽  
Said Souam
Think India ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
Hitesh Shukla ◽  
Nailesh Limbasiya

Growth, progress, and prosperity of any country depend highly on the corporate governance mechanism of that country. Good governance of a country helps it to sustainable growth and consistency in progress. The good governance should contribute towards the improvement in transparency, ethics, morality, and disclosure. The principles of good governance stand on honesty, trust, integrity, openness, and performance orientation. Our honorable Prime Minister Narendra bhai Modi had given the three E for good governance during his speech on Independence Day i.e. Effective Governance, Electronic Governance, and Ethical Governance. The fundamental concern of corporate governance mechanism is to ensure the protection of minority shareholders/owners of specific firms. Mechanism of a corporate governance specifies the relations among the shareholders, board of directors, and managers. The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the board by calculating the corporate governance score. The mandatory and non-mandatory guidelines have been considered while assigning points to specific parameters of the corporate governance.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duarte Brito ◽  
Ricardo Ribeiro ◽  
Helder Vasconcelos

1998 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Burkart ◽  
Denis Gromb ◽  
Fausto Panunzi

2009 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 206-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kirkbride ◽  
Steve Letza ◽  
Clive Smallman

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 82-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Man Dang ◽  
Darren Henry ◽  
Xiangkang Yin ◽  
Thuy Anh Vo

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 943-966 ◽  
Author(s):  
Venky Nagar ◽  
Kathy Petroni ◽  
Daniel Wolfenzon

AbstractA major governance problem in closely held corporations is the majority shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders. As a solution, legal and finance research recommends that the main shareholder surrender some control to minority shareholders via ownership rights. We test this proposition on a large data set of closely held corporations. We find that shared-ownership firms report a substantially larger return on assets and lower expense-to-sales ratios. These findings are robust to institutionally motivated corrections for endogeneity of ownership structure. We provide evidence on the presence of governance problems and the effectiveness of shared ownership as a solution in settings characterized by illiquidity of ownership.


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