scholarly journals Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders

1998 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Burkart ◽  
Denis Gromb ◽  
Fausto Panunzi
Keyword(s):  
Minority Shareholders

Minority Shareholders' Remedies

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. J. Boyle
Keyword(s):  
Minority Shareholders

Board Effectiveness: An Evaluation based on Corporate Governance Score

Think India ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
Hitesh Shukla ◽  
Nailesh Limbasiya
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Effective Governance ◽  
Performance Orientation ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Ethical Governance

Growth, progress, and prosperity of any country depend highly on the corporate governance mechanism of that country. Good governance of a country helps it to sustainable growth and consistency in progress. The good governance should contribute towards the improvement in transparency, ethics, morality, and disclosure. The principles of good governance stand on honesty, trust, integrity, openness, and performance orientation. Our honorable Prime Minister Narendra bhai Modi had given the three E for good governance during his speech on Independence Day i.e. Effective Governance, Electronic Governance, and Ethical Governance. The fundamental concern of corporate governance mechanism is to ensure the protection of minority shareholders/owners of specific firms. Mechanism of a corporate governance specifies the relations among the shareholders, board of directors, and managers. The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the board by calculating the corporate governance score. The mandatory and non-mandatory guidelines have been considered while assigning points to specific parameters of the corporate governance.

Partial Acquisitions and Dilution of Minority Shareholders' Wealth

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Charlety ◽  
Marie-Cécile Fagart ◽  
Said Souam
Keyword(s):  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Partial Acquisitions

Minority Shareholders' Remedies. A.J. Boyle

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-374
Author(s):  
Christopher Riley
Keyword(s):  
Minority Shareholders

Minority shareholders and corporate governance

2009 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 206-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kirkbride ◽  
Steve Letza ◽  
Clive Smallman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Minority Shareholders

Governance Problems in Closely Held Corporations

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 943-966 ◽  
Author(s):  
Venky Nagar ◽  
Kathy Petroni ◽  
Daniel Wolfenzon
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Large Data ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Large Data Set ◽  
Ownership Rights ◽  
Shared Ownership

AbstractA major governance problem in closely held corporations is the majority shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders. As a solution, legal and finance research recommends that the main shareholder surrender some control to minority shareholders via ownership rights. We test this proposition on a large data set of closely held corporations. We find that shared-ownership firms report a substantially larger return on assets and lower expense-to-sales ratios. These findings are robust to institutionally motivated corrections for endogeneity of ownership structure. We provide evidence on the presence of governance problems and the effectiveness of shared ownership as a solution in settings characterized by illiquidity of ownership.

Voting Trusts and Antitrust: Rethinking the Role of Shareholder Litigation in Public Regulation, from the 1880s to the 1930s

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-600
Author(s):  
Naomi R. Lamoreaux ◽  
Laura Phillips Sawyer
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Antitrust Policy ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Public Regulation ◽  
Economic Concentration ◽  
Over Time

Scholars have long recognized that the states’ authority to charter corporations bolstered their antitrust powers in ways that were not available to the federal government. Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing attention on the relevance for competition policy of lawsuits brought by minority shareholders against their own companies, especially lawsuits challenging voting trusts. Historically judges had been reluctant to intervene in corporations’ internal affairs and had been wary of the potential for opportunism in shareholders’ derivative suits. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, they had begun to revise their views and see shareholders as useful allies in the struggle against monopoly. Although the balance between judges’ suspicion of and support for shareholders’ activism shifted back and forth over time, in the end the lawsuits provoked state legislatures to strengthen antitrust policy by making devices like voting trusts unsuitable for purposes of economic concentration.

The Elimination of a Minority Shareholders by a Reverse Stock Split

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 75-110
Author(s):  
Jae-bum Kim
Keyword(s):  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Stock Split ◽  
Reverse Stock Split
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