Board Effectiveness: An Evaluation based on Corporate Governance Score

Think India ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
Hitesh Shukla ◽  
Nailesh Limbasiya

Growth, progress, and prosperity of any country depend highly on the corporate governance mechanism of that country. Good governance of a country helps it to sustainable growth and consistency in progress. The good governance should contribute towards the improvement in transparency, ethics, morality, and disclosure. The principles of good governance stand on honesty, trust, integrity, openness, and performance orientation. Our honorable Prime Minister Narendra bhai Modi had given the three E for good governance during his speech on Independence Day i.e. Effective Governance, Electronic Governance, and Ethical Governance. The fundamental concern of corporate governance mechanism is to ensure the protection of minority shareholders/owners of specific firms. Mechanism of a corporate governance specifies the relations among the shareholders, board of directors, and managers. The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the board by calculating the corporate governance score. The mandatory and non-mandatory guidelines have been considered while assigning points to specific parameters of the corporate governance.

Author(s):  
Hitesh Shukla ◽  
Nailesh Limbasiya

Growth, progress, and prosperity of any country depend highly on the corporate governance mechanism of that country. Good governance of a country helps it to sustainable growth and consistency in progress. The good governance should contribute towards the improvement in transparency, ethics, morality, and disclosure. The principles of good governance stand on honesty, trust, integrity, openness, and performance orientation. Our honorable Prime Minister Narendra bhai Modi had given the three E for good governance during his speech on Independence Day i.e. Effective Governance, Electronic Governance, and Ethical Governance. The fundamental concern of corporate governance mechanism is to ensure the protection of minority shareholders/owners of specific firms. Mechanism of a corporate governance specifies the relations among the shareholders, board of directors, and managers. The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the board by calculating the corporate governance score. The mandatory and non-mandatory guidelines have been considered while assigning points to specific parameters of the corporate governance.


Green Finance ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-262
Author(s):  
Muhammad Junaid ◽  
◽  
Ye Xue ◽  
Muzzammil Wasim Syed ◽  
Muhammad Ziaullah ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Han Li

This research consists with prior business strategy typology and accounting conservatism theories. It investigates the joint effect of business strategy and accounting conservatism on the firm’s financial performance. The paper finds that accounting conservatism as a prudent accounting reporting principle plays an important corporate governance mechanism. The conservatism can mitigate the negative effect of the aggressive business strategy. The joint effect between business strategy and accounting conservatism is positively related with financial performance. The result is robustness when the different measurements of the strategy and the conservatism are applied. When the firm has weak internal control quality, the joint effect on financial performance also exists significantly.


Think India ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shivan Sarpal ◽  
Fulbag Singh

The subject of corporate governance has always been of keen interest to the researchers in the area of management and finance. This paper basically concentrates on the corporate board of directors which is an internal corporate governance mechanism. Since the effectiveness of boards counts on several characteristics such as board size, board composition, leadership structure etc, therefore considering this viewpoint, the present study is based on the analysis of board size of BSE listed companies in India. This analysis broadly embraces the relationship between board size and performance as represented by various indicators such as Operating Profit Margin, Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Earnings per Share and Tobin’s Q. Spearman’s rho correlation, One Way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests were applied to draw the inferences. Results of the study remained robust and thus concluded that both board size and firm performance were independent of each other as board size was not found to be associated with firm performance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-103
Author(s):  
Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed Khan

This article examines the role of Islamic Law in convergence to western corporate governance features in Pakistan. The recent financial crisis in the world highlighted the importance of good corporate governance features. This phenomenon highlighted the possibility of adopting an alternative to conventional financial system in Pakistan. Islamic finance has shown its presence in the wake of financial crisis in the world. Therefore, this articles analyses, in comparative perspective, the Islamic financial system viz a viz conventional financial system. It further analyses the possibility of convergence of corporate governance mechanism, which is key for good governance in any financial system, in Pakistan. It concludes that Islamic Financial System may be adopted as alternative financial system as well as corporate governance mechanism may be converged to western corporate governance features in Pakistan. However, while doing so Islamic norms may act as a litmus test which may not be as problematic as it appears at first sight.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (03) ◽  
pp. 2050025 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sakthi Mahenthiran ◽  
David Cademartori ◽  
Tom Gjerde

Chilean publicly listed companies are required by law to pay out a minimum 30% of distributable earnings after taxes as dividends on common stock. The study extends Lintner’s [Lintner, J (1956). Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividend retained earnings and taxes. American Economic Review, 46, 97–113.] model of dividend smoothing and Banerjee [Banerjee, S, VA Gatchev and PA Spindt (2007). Stock market liquidity and firm dividend policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42(2), 369–398.] logistic model of the likelihood of a firm paying a dividend to investigate the signaling, liquidity, corporate governance, and information risk-based theories of dividends. The results show that Chilean firms’ excess dividends are smoothed in relation to the prior period level of excess dividends, and lagged earnings do not drive excess dividends even though the mandatory minimum dividend is defined in terms of lagged earnings. This insight establishes that dividend decisions regarding the size of the excess dividend and the likelihood of paying an excess dividend are distinct from the mandatory dividend payment. Additionally, the size of excess dividends and their likelihood are higher at firms with higher growth opportunities, a result consistent with the use of excess dividends as a signaling device. Results also demonstrate that greater transparency is associated with a greater likelihood of paying an excess dividend, but transparency does not drive policy regarding the size of the excess dividend. Moreover, the corporate governance mechanism creditor monitoring influences the size of excess dividends but not the likelihood of paying excess dividends. These results have implications for securities regulators evaluating the pros and cons of a mandatory dividend policy to protect minority shareholders in emerging markets.


2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 173-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anlin Chen ◽  
Lanfeng Kao ◽  
Yi-Kai Chen

Controlling shareholders' share collateral is a new source of the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights leading to minority shareholder expropriation. However, controlling shareholders' share collateral is not forbidden and has not received particular restriction leading to its popularity in the capital markets. Neglecting the potential agency costs resulting from controlling shareholders' share collateral would hurt the interests of creditors and minority shareholders. We need legal regulation on controlling shareholders' share collateral to reinforce corporate governance mechanism to protect the interests of creditors and minority shareholders.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 988-1012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Nawaz ◽  
Sana Iqbal ◽  
Sadaf Ehsan

The current study contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and social performance (SP) of microfinance institutions (MFIs) by introducing CG index for the first time purely in the perspective of Asian MFIs. Moreover, this research also investigates the existence of endogeneity by checking the reverse causality between CG and SP as many previous studies highlighted the endogenous nature of many governance and performance variables. Using a panel of 173 MFIs in 18 Asian countries for the period of 5 years, a comprehensive CG index (CGI) based on seven internal governance mechanism variables is constructed as an indicator of the overall CG mechanism of MFIs. By employing generalized least squares (GLS) model, our results indicate insignificant impact of CG on many SP variables which are attributed to the endogenous nature of this relationship as the significance of results improved by studying relationship in reverse direction by employing ordered logit model. Our results indicate that SP is an important determinant of CG mechanism of MFIs even after controlling for MFI-related characteristics.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-271
Author(s):  
Olufemi Bodunde Obembe ◽  
Rosemary Olufunmilayo Soetan

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of interactive effect of competition and corporate governance on productivity growth of firms in Nigeria. Studies that have considered this issue were mainly from developed countries possessing strong institutions as against those of developing countries like Nigeria. Moreover, studies from Nigeria have focused exclusively on corporate governance and firm performance. The interaction effect of competition on corporate governance is yet to be addressed in the context of Nigeria. Design/methodology/approach – The study adopts the dynamic panel data analysis approach suggested by Arellano and Bond for productivity growth analysis. Data on 76 non-financial firms for 11 years beginning from 1997 were extracted from the financial statements of companies collected from the Nigerian Stock Exchange and subsequently analysed using General Methods of Moments (GMM). Findings – The results show that competition had a positive impact on productivity growth, however, its interaction effect with corporate governance had a substitute but not significant impact on productivity growth. When competition was interacted with an alternative corporate governance mechanism – bank – a positive and significant impact was, however, observed which shows that competition and bank loans are complementary in stimulating productivity growth of firms in Nigeria. Research limitations/implications – The study could not be carried out beyond year 2007 owing to the exit of some firms after 2007 which could have reduced the sample size drastically. The findings emanating from this study suggests that government should focus much more on implementing competitive policies and bother less on writing corporate governance codes. Practical implications – The results demonstrate that corporate governance had no significant impact on productivity growth even when it was interacted with competition. However, competition on its own had a significant impact on productivity which means that Nigeria should concentrate more on building a competitive private sector, and in this regard, government should try and pursue policies that will foster competition and eliminate monopolistic tendencies. Once, there is effective competition, the corporate governance may be strengthened. However, the interactive effect of competition and bank loans was found with a positive and significant impact which indicates that banks as alternate corporate governance mechanism can only be effective if competition is strong. This goes to show that the financial sector may not be able to effectively and positively impact the real sector in Nigeria if the prevailing level of competition is low. In such a situation finance may not be channelled to projects that have long-run implications on sustainable growth and development. Social implications – Socially, if the environment for competition is not fostered in Nigeria, the country may face an uphill task in combating the problem of poverty through a private sector-led solution. Hence, there is a need for government to begin to formulate comprehensive competition policies that will ensure that resources are optimally utilized in Nigeria. Originality/value – In the context of Nigeria, this study is novel, the use of productivity growth as against firm financial performance is unique for Nigeria while the use of GMM method of analysis helps in reducing the effect of endogeneity inherent in corporate governance and performance of firms in Nigeria.


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