It is Not Enough to Assess Conflicts of Interest When We Bring the Commercial Sector to the Policy Table; Comment on "Towards Preventing and Managing Conflict of Interest in Nutrition Policy? An Analysis of Submissions to a Consultation on a Draft WHO Tool"

Ralston et al. offer us an interesting analysis of the consultation process of World Health Organization’s "Draft approach on the prevention and management of conflicts of interests in the policy development and implementation of nutrition programs at country level", in which it shows us how the industry tries to frame the discussion in individual conflicts of interest, avoiding structural conflicts of interest. We must not forget other issues of importance in policy-making, such as the imbalance of power between different actors and the strategies of undue influence used by food and beverage corporations. It is essential to develop regulatory-based tools and procedures that embody ethics and good governance and that can be applied systematically and routinely to prevent corporate influence in health policy making. A global observatory of corporate practices would also be needed to recommend to governments efficient actions to avoid corporate capture of their policies.

Mechanisms for addressing the influence of corporations on public health

Introduction Manufacturers, such as producers of cigarettes, drugs or ultra-processed foods, influence health policy, research and practice. This influence is one of the main barriers against the implementation of public health policies around the world. Our goal was to identify existing mechanisms to limit this influence. Methods We conducted a scoping review in 2019. We searched five scientific databases: Web of Science Core Collection; BIOSIS; MEDLINE; Base; Scopus. Twenty-eight institutions and networks related to our research objective were also contacted to identify additional mechanisms and examples. In addition, we identified mechanisms and examples drawn from our collective experience. We have classified the mechanisms into two groups: those of international organizations and governments; those for universities, the media and civil society. Results Thirty-one publications were included in our review, including eight scientific articles. Nine mechanisms focused on several industries; while the other documents targeted specific industries. We identified 49 mechanisms that could help limit corporate influence in health policy, science and practice. For 41 of these mechanisms, we found examples, around the world, where they have been implemented. The main objectives of the mechanisms identified were to manage conflicts of interest and ethical issues, while increasing the transparency of public-private interactions. Mechanisms for governments (n = 17) and universities (n = 13) were most frequently identified, with fewer examples existing to protect the media and civil society. Discussion The development, implementation and monitoring of these mechanisms are essential to protect public health from industrial influence. Key messages We found 49 mechanisms that could help limit corporate influence in health policy, science and practice. There are fewer mechanisms to protect the media and civil society, than to protect governments and universities.

"Part of the Solution:" Food Corporation Strategies for Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy

Background: For decades, the food industry has sought to deflect criticisms of its products and block public health legislation through a range of offensive and defensive strategies. More recently, food corporations have moved on to present themselves as "part of the solution" to the health problems their products cause. This strategic approach is characterised by appeasement, co-option and partnership, and involves incremental concessions and attempts to partner with health actors. This paper details how corporate practices have evolved and changed over the past two decades and gives some definition to what this new political economy signifies for the wider behaviours of corporations producing and selling harmful commodities. Methods: This paper draws on public health and political science literature to classify the food industry’s "part of the solution" strategy into three broad components: regulatory responses and capture; relationship building; and market strategies. We detail the key characteristics and consequences of each component. Results: The three components of the food industry’s "part of the solution" strategy all involve elements of appeasement and co-option. They also improve the political environment and resources of the food industry. Regulatory responses offer incremental concessions that seek to maintain corporate influence over governance processes and minimise the threat of regulations; relationship building fosters access to health and government stakeholders, and opportunities to acquire and maintain channels of direct influence; and market strategies to make products and portfolios healthier bolster the market share and revenue of food corporations while improving their public image. Conclusion: Rather being a signal of lost position and power, the food industry’s repositioning as "part of the solution" has created a highly profitable political economy of ‘healthy’ food production, alongside continued production of unhealthy commodities, a strategy in which it is also less burdensome and conflictual for corporations to exercise political power and influence.

The great transformer: Examining the role of large language models in the political economy of AI

In recent years, AI research has become more and more computationally demanding. In natural language processing (NLP), this tendency is reflected in the emergence of large language models (LLMs) like GPT-3. These powerful neural network-based models can be used for a range of NLP tasks and their language generation capacities have become so sophisticated that it can be very difficult to distinguish their outputs from human language. LLMs have raised concerns over their demonstrable biases, heavy environmental footprints, and future social ramifications. In December 2020, critical research on LLMs led Google to fire Timnit Gebru, co-lead of the company’s AI Ethics team, which sparked a major public controversy around LLMs and the growing corporate influence over AI research. This article explores the role LLMs play in the political economy of AI as infrastructural components for AI research and development. Retracing the technical developments that have led to the emergence of LLMs, we point out how they are intertwined with the business model of big tech companies and further shift power relations in their favour. This becomes visible through the Transformer, which is the underlying architecture of most LLMs today and started the race for ever bigger models when it was introduced by Google in 2017. Using the example of GPT-3, we shed light on recent corporate efforts to commodify LLMs through paid API access and exclusive licensing, raising questions around monopolization and dependency in a field that is increasingly divided by access to large-scale computing power.

The Science for Profit Model—How and why corporations influence science and the use of science in policy and practice

Science has been at the centre of attempts by major industries, including tobacco, chemical, and pharmaceutical, to delay progress in tackling threats to human and planetary health by, inter alia, obscuring industry harms, and opposing regulation. Some aspects of this influence are well documented, others remain poorly understood, and similarities between industries remain underexplored. This study, therefore, aims to synthesise the literature to develop an evidence-based typology and model of corporate influence on science in order to provide an overview of this multi-faceted phenomenon. We obtained literature examining corporate attempts to influence science and the use of science in policy and practice from: database searches, bibliographies, expert recommendations, and web alerts; using a modified scoping review methodology (n = 68). Through interpretive analysis we developed the Science for Profit Typology and Model. We identified eight corporate sectors repeatedly engaging in activities to influence science, including: manipulation of scientific methods; reshaping of criteria for establishing scientific “proof”; threats against scientists; and clandestine promotion of policy reforms that increase reliance on industry evidence. The typology identifies five macro-level strategies used consistently across the eight industries, comprising 19 meso-level strategies. The model shows how these strategies work to maximise the volume, credibility, reach, and use of industry-favourable science, while minimising these same aspects of industry-unfavourable science. This creates doubt about harms of industry products/practices or efficacy of policies affecting industry; promotes industry-favoured policy responses and industry products as solutions; and legitimises industry’s role as scientific stakeholder. These efforts ultimately serve to weaken policy, prevent litigation, and maximise use of industry products/practices—maximising corporate profitability. We provide an accessible way to understand how and why corporations influence science, demonstrate the need for collective solutions, and discuss changes needed to ensure science works in the public interest.

Social Responsibility Beyond the Corporate: Executive Mental Accounting Across Sectoral and Issue Domains

Business elites influence the allocation of resources to a range of causes related to the social good, such as to corporate community or environmental programs. We extend research on executive influence on corporate attention to alternative causes by showing how chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) engagement in two distinct institutional domains, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and independent foundation philanthropy, are interrelated. We draw on the psychology of moral accounting to refine the assumption of personal consistency prevalent in studies of executives’ corporate influence. Specifically, we show that executives use flexible means to realize an overall aspiration of doing good, resulting in divergent emphases in their CSR and philanthropic causes. Evidence comes from a panel of 677 corporations linked to 309 foundations through 1,109 CEOs during the period 2003–2011. CEOs compensated for deficits in their firms’ CSR record by joining the board of trustees of specific nonprofit foundations, but subsequently advanced divergent cause priorities in the corporation and the foundation. Our work suggests that studies of CSR and of executive influence on organizations benefit from taking into account executives’ cross-domain engagement.

Climate literacy in the political forum using Canada as a case study

<p>Evidence-based policy is still lacking in decision-making in Canada and around the world. As much of the world now faces concurrent crises among which are climate change, a global pandemic, and rising wealth inequality, the relationship between politicians and scientists is more important than ever. Climate literacy among office-holders, public servants, and regulators is critical for ushering in change and much needed transformation. Using Canada as a case study, this presentation from an engineer-turned-politician will discuss (1) the progress that has been made in climate literacy, with particular attention to its evolution in the political forum and the role of politicians, (2) a discussion of Canada’s national and the global response to climate change and its link with the COVID-19 pandemic, (3) the climate literacy in the public sphere and the obstacles to its health including undue corporate influence and disinformation. Politicians have an ethical duty to uphold the interests of their constituents, a duty that extends to the environment and to future generations; best-available science rather than the allures of crony-capitalism must win out the tug-of-war to realize that duty.</p>