scholarly journals Conversations with Sir John Hamilton Baker QC: Aspects of Resolving the Legal History of the Common Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley Dingle
Author(s):  
John Baker

This book contains selected cases, statutes, and a few other texts, relating to the history of English private law between 1194 and 1750. (Cases after 1750 are mostly available in the English Reports.) It may be used as a companion to the textbooks written by the compilers, but the purpose is different from that of a textbook. The original materials are here allowed to speak for themselves, without commentary. Most of them are reports of cases, which show how the common law evolved through argument. The losing arguments help to explain those which prevailed, and it is often instructive to know what was not argued. Most of the reports were written in law French, but they are here given in English translation, corrected or augmented from manuscripts, together with notes from the enrolled Latin records. Much of this material is not available in English translation elsewhere. The second impression (2019) contains corrections and additions.


1936 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 119-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. F. T. Plucknett

One of the most fascinating features in the study of the history of the common law as revealed in six centuries of law reports is the possibility of tracing the growth of legal thought over long periods of time; hints, suggestions, unsuccessful attempts to establish a rule or a doctrine often appear in such sources long before the innovation has received the final approbation of the courts, and so we are privileged to watch the progress of legal speculation, to overhear the debates upon new departures, and to estimate the forces which produced or obstructed some projected innovation. It is this possibility which gives such life and vividness to legal history. In many fields of thought we are mainly confined to those considered statements of results which have been deliberately left to us by philosophers, theologians, or politaical theorists, but the historian of the common law has more intimate and more human material at his disposal.


Author(s):  
Joshua Getzler

This chapter investigates the idea of doctrine as a focus of historical scholarship, asking how the doctrinal mentality arose, and how historical approaches to doctrine emerged strongly in both common-law and civilian or Romanistic legal cultures. It first defines the meaning of ‘doctrine’, and sets out a guiding thesis. It argues that an important dimension of doctrine is communication; and jurists become fascinated by the history of doctrine when social and political conditions necessitate an expansion or transfer of the legal system, with concomitant transfers of doctrinal thought. The chapter then traces the development of doctrinal history from Gaius to the common law tradition.


1954 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. F. C. Milsom

This article will tell some elementary stories about the history of contract and tort. Its purpose is primarily pedagogic: although the stories are largely old, they are not very clearly explained in the books, and in particular they are done something less than justice in the standard work, Mr. Fifoot's invaluable History and Sources of the Common Law. Since the present aim is to explain what the stories are, rather than to prove that they are true, their telling will be as little encumbered as possible with old cases and their technicalities. A secondary purpose is to set the stories together, and show how far they turn out to be the same story. It is doubtful whether even Ames, who first stated the most important of them, fully realised how far the point was the same in each; and since in one guise or another it is the point of much legal history it deserves more emphasis than it has had. Finally, since Professor Plucknett freed us from the sterile delusion that case was somehow “like” trespass, there has grown up a new background of ideas in which the old stories must be set afresh.


2021 ◽  
pp. 009059172110397
Author(s):  
Paul Sagar

This essay has two purposes—first, to identify Adam Smith as intervening in the debate between Montesquieu and Hume regarding the nature, age, and robustness of English liberty. Whereas Montesquieu took English liberty to be old and fragile, Hume took it to be new and robust. Smith disagreed with both: it was older than Hume supposed, but not fragile in the way Montesquieu claimed. The reason for this was the importance of the common law in England’s legal history. Seeing this enables the essay’s second purpose: achieving a more thorough and nuanced understanding of Smith’s account of liberty. This requires us to go beyond repeating Smith’s famous claim that modern liberty was the result of the feudal barons trading away their wealth and power for inane status goods. As I demonstrate, this is only one part of a much wider story: of liberty requiring, and also being constituted by, the rise of the regular administration of justice, and ultimately the rule of law. Although Smith’s history of the English courts and common law has been almost entirely neglected by scholars, it is indispensable to understanding both his reply to Montesquieu and Hume and his wider political theory of modern freedom.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley Dingle

AbstractProfessor Sir John Baker was born in Sheffield in April 1944 towards the end of the Second World War. His path into legal history was via the Edward VI Grammar School in Chelmsford, and University College London (UCL) in the early 1960s. It was his good fortune that lecturing arrangements still in place at UCL as a wartime legacy caused him to fall under the inspirational guidance of Professor Toby Milsom at LSE for his legal history tuition. By the time John Baker moved to Cambridge in 1971 he had been called to the Bar at the Inner Temple, and his interest in the development of the common law in the late mediaeval/early Tudor period was firmly grounded. The next forty years were spent at Cambridge, where he established an enviable reputation as an innovative and meticulous scholar, whose publications output has become legendary. He retired from the Downing Chair of the Laws of England in 2011, and was knighted for his services to legal history in 2003. This article by Lesley Dingle attempts to highlight some aspects of Professor Baker's illustrious career, and should be read in conjunction with his entry in the Cambridge Eminent Scholars Archive, both of which are based on interviews that she conducted with Sir John in the Law Faculty in February-March 2017.


2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Hunter

Australian legal history has only emerged as a field of scholarship in its own right in the last twenty years. Prior to that, Australian legal history tended to be written and taught as a footnote to the great sweep of English legal history—the history of the king's courts, the common law and equity, and major nineteenth-century statutory reforms, with a chapter at the end about the classification of the Australian colonies as “settled” colonies, and the consequent reception of English law. This year (2002) sees the twentieth anniversary of Alex Castles's groundbreaking work An Australian Legal History, the first book to take Australian laws and legal institutions as its entire subject matter. It is also the twentieth anniversary of the first Australian Law and History Conference. The years since 1982 have seen the advent of the Australian and New Zealand Law and History Society, increasing attendances at its annual conferences, the establishment of the Australian Journal of Legal History, the completion of a number of Ph.D.theses in the field, and the publication of further influential texts and edited collections by (among others) the authors of the two articles featured in this forum. Two of the most productive strands in this developing literature have concerned the history of colonization and the dispossession of indigenous peoples and histories of women and gender relations in law, although these are by no means that only areas that have been explored. Running through much of this literature, too, are themes of imperial-colonial relations, and relations between law and colonial economies and societies, particularly prior to federation in 1901.


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eltjo Schrage

Within both the civil law and the common law (as well as in mixed legal systems), there are means of acquiring and losing rights, or of freeing ourselves from obligations with the passage of time. The reason for this is at least twofold: on the one hand, for a claimant, a dispossessed owner or a creditor, limitation and prescription provide stimuli for bringing the action; on the other, this sanction upon the negligence of the claimant implies in many cases a windfall for the defendant. If a creditor is negligent in protecting his assets, the law at a certain stage no longer protects him or her. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said aptly some 100 years ago: “Sometimes it is said that, if a man neglects to enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his example”.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document