Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally-Robust Approach

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin A. Brooks ◽  
Songzi Du
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design ◽  
Robust Approach ◽  
Common Values ◽  
Optimal Auction

Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informationally-Robust Approach

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Brooks ◽  
Songzi Du
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design ◽  
Robust Approach ◽  
Common Values ◽  
Optimal Auction

Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saeed Alaei ◽  
Alexandre Belloni ◽  
Ali Makhdoumi ◽  
Azarakhsh Malekian
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design ◽  
Optimal Auction

scholarly journals Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Benjamin A. Brooks ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design ◽  
Optimal Auction

Analyzing the Dual Channels for Online Retailer

2011 ◽  
Vol 48-49 ◽  
pp. 232-235
Author(s):  
Sheng Li Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Model ◽  
Design Principle ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Threshold Policy ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Optimal Auction ◽  
Dual Channels ◽  
High Valuation ◽  
Dual Mechanism

By constructing the exponential delay cost function, we formulate the consumer decision model based on the threshold strategies in dual-mechanism, and prove that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which the high-valuation consumers use a threshold policy to choose between the two selling channels. On the basis of the consumer’s threshold strategies, taking the auction length, the auctioned quantity in each period, and the posted price as the decision variables, we develop the seller’ optimal decision model in dual-mechanism, and show the optimal auction design principle and strategy by numerical analysis.

scholarly journals Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Benjamin A. Brooks ◽  
Stephen Edward Morris
Keyword(s):  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Optimal Auction ◽  
Value Model

Value-Based Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Design

2014 ◽  
pp. 147-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kamesh Munagala ◽  
Xiaoming Xu
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Optimal Auction

scholarly journals Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Athey ◽  
Dominic Coey ◽  
Jonathan Levin
Keyword(s):  
Small Business ◽  
Empirical Model ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Forest Service ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Alternative Policy ◽  
Optimal Auction ◽  
Out Of Sample ◽  
Efficiency Cost ◽  
Us Forest Service

Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of US Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales used for estimation, and when we predict (out-of-sample) outcomes for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it increases small business participation. An alternative policy of subsidizing small bidders would increase revenue and small bidder profit, with little efficiency cost. We explain these findings by connecting to the theory of optimal auction design. (JEL D44, H57, L73, Q23)

Optimal Auction Design for Wi-Fi Procurement

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Liangfei Qiu ◽  
Huaxia Rui ◽  
Andrew Whinston
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design ◽  
Optimal Auction

scholarly journals Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 597-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Edelman ◽  
Michael Schwarz
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Sponsored Search ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Sponsored Search Auctions ◽  
Optimal Auction
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document