Banking Crises and Crisis Dating: Disentangling Shocks and Policy Responses

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Boyd ◽  
Gianni De Nicolo ◽  
Tatiana Rodionova
2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 943-971 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Dufwenberg

Purpose – How can laboratory experiments help us understand banking crises, including the usefulness of various policy responses? After giving a concise introduction to the field of experimental economics more generally, the author attempts to provide answers. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach – The author discusses methodology and surveys relevant work. Findings – History is often too complicated to be meaningfully revamped or modified in the lab, for purposes of insight-by-analogy. But as people argue about how to understand financial history, they bring ideas to the table. It is possible and useful to test the empirical relevance of these ideas in lab experiments. Originality/value – The paper pioneers broad discussion of how lab experiments may shed light on banking crises.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 1950010
Author(s):  
Jacob M. Meyer ◽  
Nicholas R. Jenkins

Shocks to global interest rates or risk cause capital outflows for countries outside the core of the global financial system. These outflows lead to downward pressure on exchange rates and financial sector stress, in addition to having general contractionary effects. To defend the exchange rate, the appropriate internal response is a fiscal/monetary contraction. To maintain full employment and financial stability, the appropriate internal response is fiscal/monetary expansion. The contradiction in these policy responses implies policymakers prioritize hitting either internal or external targets after these shocks; but how do they decide? Using a fixed effects model and data from 100 emerging market and developing economies from 1990 to 2012, we show that the relative sensitivity of interest groups to these policy responses influences which response occurs. We find some evidence that this effect is stronger in the presence of more political-institutional constraints. Using a strategic probit model, we also find some evidence that this policy response influences the relative likelihood of banking crises versus currency crashes after these global shocks.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Bernauer ◽  
Vally Koubi

Restrictive policies aimed at reducing the likelihood of bank failure during recessions tend to increase the probability of a credit crunch. In this paper we infer governments' policy responses to this dilemma by studying the cyclical behavior of bank capital in 1369 banks from 28 OECD countries during the period 1992–98. We find significant differences across countries. In the US and Japan, bank capital is counter-cyclical, that is, the typical bank strengthens its capital base during periods of weak economic activity. In the other countries, there is no relationship between the level of macroeconomic activity and bank capital. From these findings we infer that severe banking crises in the US and Japan may have made policymakers there more vigilant towards “unhealthy” banks, even when this implies an increase in the risk of a credit crunch. In countries without such crisis experience, policymakers seem to be less concerned about future banking crises. Our results suggest that the strong push by the US for the 1988 Basle Accord may have been a reflection of this increased sensitivity. They also suggest that, to the extent business cycles do not develop in synchronicity across countries and policymakers respond differently to the banking crisis-credit crunch dilemma, current reforms of the Basle Accord, which are designed to tighten regulatory requirements, may encounter difficulties.


2006 ◽  
Vol 06 (263) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Céline Rochon ◽  
Andrew Feltenstein ◽  
◽  

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Frecaut

Purpose This paper aims to suggest ways to complete the enhancement of the policy responses to systemic banking crises that followed the Great Financial Crisis. Design/methodology/approach An integrated macrofinancial analytical framework was designed to overcome the segregation between macro work, based on national accounting concepts, and prudential oversight of financial institutions, based on business accounting and concepts. Findings The design and implementation of the integrated macrofinancial framework are within reach, supported by extensive ongoing research work around the world, and correspond to rising expectations by the international community. It will lead to improvements in the way systemic banking crises are managed. Even more importantly, it offers a promising avenue to make further progress in the prevention of future crises. Research limitations/implications The main limitations are the need to overcome the well-known constraints of national accounting, and to overcome the enduring silo separating macro-economists from financial sector experts. The implications are the need for extensive additional interaction between these two groups of experts. Practical implications The practical, operational implications are extensive, and could yield a major impact on the global financial stability work agenda. The design of policy responses to systemic banking crises could be profoundly affected, in particular with regard to the target of these responses (corporates vs banks in particular). Social implications The direct and indirect costs of systemic banking crises could be reduced, with widespread benefits for society at large. Originality/value This is a fully original new proposed approach with extensive operational value for practitioners.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 45-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Boyd ◽  
Gianni De Nicolò ◽  
Tatiana Rodionova

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