Bachelor's Thesis in European Competition Law, The Google Android Case: Article 102 TFEU and the Abuse of Dominance in the (EU) Digital Sector: Is the Google Android Case a Wake-Up Call for a Different Approach by the EU Commission and the CJEU?

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nasir Yousufzai
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Google Android ◽  
European Competition Law ◽  
Eu Commission ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

scholarly journals Aplicabilidad de un acuerdo de elección de foro a una reclamación de indemnización de daños por vulneración del Artículo 102 TFUE: el caso Apple Sales International (C-595/17) = Applicability of a jurisdiction agreement to a claim of damages by infringement of Article 102 TFEU: the Apple Sales International case (C-595/17)

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 439
Author(s):  
Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca ◽  
Julia Suderow
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Damage Claims ◽  
The Will ◽  
European Competition Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

Resumen: La aplicación privada del derecho de la Competencia no se limita tan sólo a acciones de daños por infracciones del art. 101 TFUE, sino que también abarca las acciones follow on y stand alone contra los abusos de posición de dominio sancionados por el art. 102 TFUE. Se trata de acciones que tienen su origen en conductas unilaterales en las que las cláusulas de atribución de competencia juegan un papel esencial. El TJUE resuelve con la sentencia Ap-ple Sales ciertas dudas sobre el alcance de estas cláusulas si bien su respuesta genera nuevas cuestiones que podrán plantearse en futuros litigios. La voluntad de las partes y la proporcio-nalidad tendrán que seguir siendo los elementos sobre los que pivote la exclusividad del foro de sumisión expresa.Palabras clave: acciones para la indemnización de daños anticompetitivos, acciones autónomas, acciones de seguimiento, acuerdos de elección de foro, arbitraje, competencia judicial internacional, Daños, Derecho antitrust, Derecho europeo de la competencia, Unión Europea.Abstract: Private enforcement of Competition Law is not limited to cartel damage claims based on infringements of art. 101 TFUE. Follow on and Stand alone actions against the abuse of dominance sanctioned by art. 102 TFUE are also included. They are actions derived from unilateral conducts where jurisdiction agreements play an important role. In the ruling Apple Sales, the ECJ solves certain doubts about the scope of this type of clauses but its answer generates new questions that will be dealt in future disputes. The will of the parties as well as the proportionality will still be the basis of the exclusivity of the forum.Keywords: antitrust damages actions, stand-alone actions, follow-on actions, jurisdiction agreements, arbitration, jurisdiction, damages (Torts), Antitrust Law, European Competition Law, European Union.

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 753-806
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
Predatory Pricing ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It first discusses various cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. This taxonomy is over-schematic, in that the categories overlap with one another: for example price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary, and an excessively high price may in reality be a way of preventing parallel imports or of excluding a competitor from the market; nevertheless this division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It discusses cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive and deals with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices harmful to the single market. Price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary and an excessively high price may be a way of preventing parallel imports or excluding a competitor from the market; but the division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and the EU Courts is considered, followed by cases in the UK. Where appropriate, reference is made to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

LOYALTY REBATES AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-28
Author(s):  
Mark Friend
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Missed Opportunity

THE recent judgment of the Court of Justice in Intel v Commission (Case C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632) deserves a cautious welcome for signalling a move to a more economics-based approach to the assessment of loyalty rebates under Article 102 TFEU, and for modulating the rigid legal presumptions that have characterised nearly four decades of case law. Yet it also represents a missed opportunity to provide a comprehensive analytical framework for one of the more unsatisfactory areas of EU competition law.

Licensing Terms for IoT Standard-Setting

2019 ◽  
pp. 204-217
Author(s):  
Matt Heckman
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Standard Setting ◽  
Active Participation ◽  
End User ◽  
Development Organizations ◽  
Specific Choice ◽  
Eu Commission ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Standard Development

The development of 5G and IoT standards requires an active participation of small and medium-sized companies (SMEs). These SMEs do not always have the resources and expertise to participate in the work of standard development organizations (SDOs). The valuation of the patents in standards can be based on “license for all” or “end-user” concepts. A specific choice for use-based licensing terms by an SDO might drive SMEs more towards standard-setting in consortia. The chapter will discuss the competition law aspects of both licensing concepts for SMEs and the recent communication in this field by the EU Commission.

Exclusionary Abuses

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-112
Author(s):  
Renato Nazzini
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Pharmaceutical Sector ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Third ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
The Eu

Chapter 4 deals with exclusionary abuses under the Competition Act 1998, covering both public and private enforcement cases. The analysis concerns the approach to dominance as well as tests for abuse, focusing on retroactive rebates and bundled discounts, exclusion in multi-market settings, exclusivity, most favoured nation and equivalent clauses, discrimination, and exclusionary abuses in the pharmaceutical sector. This chapter argues that, in its second decade, modern UK competition law continued a trend that was already clear in the first decade: the prohibition of abuse of dominance is applied in a more economically robust and commercially reasonable way than it is by the EU institutions - the Commission and the EU courts - and in certain other Member States. The chapter notes that the third decade of the Competition Act 1998 will see the UK develop its competition policy free from the constraints of EU law and may allow for some divergence in the approach to exclusionary abuses in the future.

scholarly journals El Derecho internacional privado de la Unión Europea frente a las acciones por daños anticompetitivos = European Union Private International Law in front of antitrust damages actions

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca ◽  
Javier Carrascosa González
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Legal Standing ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
European Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

Resumen: Este trabajo muestra cómo el TJUE y los tribunales nacionales de los Estados miem­bros de la UE aplican los Reglamento Bruselas I-bis y Roma II a las acciones de daños por infracción del Derecho antitrust europeo. Este trabajo subraya algunas de las dificultades que está encontrado la aplicación privada del Derecho de la competencia: la frecuente inoperancia de los foros de sumisión, la peculiar interpretación del forum delicti commissi, las sorpresas derivadas del forum connexitatis y las soluciones contrapuestas a las cuestiones de legitimación procesal activa y pasiva (como, por ejemplo, la responsabilidad de la sociedad matriz por el comportamiento de sus filiales).Palabras clave: acciones para la indemnización de daños anticompetitivos, acciones autónomas, acciones de seguimiento, acciones declarativas negativas, acciones Torpedo, competencia judicial inter­nacional, daños, defensa basada en la repercusión de sobrecostes, Derecho antitrust, Derecho aplicable, Derecho europeo de la competencia, efecto paraguas, passing-on, Unión Europea.Abstract: This essay shows how the CJEU and the national courts of the EU Member States apply the Brussels I-bis and Rome II Regulations to actions for damages for infringement of European anti­trust law. This paper highlights some of the difficulties encountered in the private application of Euro­pean competition law: the frequent inoperativeness of the submission forums, the peculiar interpretation of the forum delicti commissi, the surprises derived from the forum connexitatis and the opposing solu­tions to the issues of active and passive legal standing (as, for example, the responsibility of the parent company for the behavior of its subsidiaries).Keywords: Antitrust damages actions, Stand-alone actions, Follow-on actions, negative declara­tory actions, Torpedo actions, Jurisdiction, Damages (Torts), passing-on defence, Antitrust Law, Appli­cable Law, European Competition Law, umbrella effect, European Union.

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