18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 753-806
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
Predatory Pricing ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It first discusses various cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. This taxonomy is over-schematic, in that the categories overlap with one another: for example price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary, and an excessively high price may in reality be a way of preventing parallel imports or of excluding a competitor from the market; nevertheless this division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It discusses cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive and deals with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices harmful to the single market. Price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary and an excessively high price may be a way of preventing parallel imports or excluding a competitor from the market; but the division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and the EU Courts is considered, followed by cases in the UK. Where appropriate, reference is made to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

scholarly journals Insights from the Slovak Hybrid Mail Services Case. Case Comment to the Judgement of the General Court of 25 March 2015 and Order of Court of Justice of the EU of 30 June 2016 Slovenská pošta v Commission (Cases T-556/08, C-293/15P)

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 191-203
Author(s):  
Karolis Kačerauskas
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Strange Situation ◽  
Member States ◽  
Commission Decision ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

The Slovak hybrid mail services case (or Slovenska posta case) is truly unique in EU jurisprudence. Within the last decade, the European Commission rarely applied Article 106(1) in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions in individual cases. Thus Slovenska posta constitutes one of the rare examples of such enforcement. Slovenska posta also constitutes a very rare example of a judicial review of Commission decisions based on Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU. Slovenska posta is only the second case when European courts were called upon to review the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU by the Commission and the first when the judicial review was conducted over a Commission decision regarding “failure to meet the demand”. Indeed, since 1989–1990 (when the Commission commenced to apply Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions introduced by the Member States) and until 2014, when the Court of Justice adopted its decision in Greek lignite (DEI) case, none of the Commission decisions was reviewed by EU courts. Such lack of appeals resulted in a rather strange situation under which the Commission and CJEU developed their own jurisprudence on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU and occasionally interpreted the same legal criteria differently. In this regard, a court review in Slovenska posta was eagerly awaited in the hope it would reconcile these diverging positions and provide more clarity on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU.

17. Abuse of dominance (1): non-pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 715-752
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter considers abusive non-pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It deals in turn with exclusive dealing agreements; tying; refusals to supply; abusive non-pricing practices that are harmful to the single market; and miscellaneous other non-pricing practices which might infringe Article 102 or the Chapter II prohibition. Reference is made to the case-law of the Court of Justice and the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings

'Juncker Plan' could mean EU investment bulge

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Geographical Distribution ◽  
High Grade ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Chinese Investment ◽  
Investment Plan ◽  
Eu Referendum ◽  
Commission President ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

Subject The possible economic impact of the EU investment plan (the 'Juncker Plan'). Significance The EU investment plan launched by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker just over a year ago has made a slow start. This will encourage doubts that have existed since the scheme's inception about its operation and likely impact. Impacts Even by 2020, the EU economy will still probably require every effort to boost growth and make up for lost investment. Given continuing strong demand for high-grade bonds and equity investments, it should be possible to achieve the fundraising target. The plan could become a vehicle for Chinese investment into the EU: China is talking of 5-10 billion euros in future investments. The geographical distribution of funded projects could be politically sensitive within the EU. The plan could come under scrutiny during the UK EU referendum campaign; UK projects may come too late to have an impact before the vote.

Brexit and the Scottish Question

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott
Keyword(s):  
Single Market ◽  
Scant Attention ◽  
Constitutional Conventions ◽  
Uk Government ◽  
Scottish Government ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

The chapter examines Brexit and the Scottish question, arguing that the UK secession from the EU may be the trigger for Scotland’s secession from the UK. While Scottish voters had by majority rejected independence in a referendum in 2014, they voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU during the Brexit referendum. At the same time, as Douglas-Scott explains, efforts by the Scottish government after the Brexit referendum to obtain a special deal to remain within the EU single market have received only scant attention from the UK government. Moreover, new tensions are likely to emerge between Holyrood and Westminster in the implementation of the UK government. EU Withdrawal Bill. Although pursuant to the Sewel Convention Scotland should be consulted on any UK primary Legislation relating to its devolved powers, the UK government does not seem sensitive to the issue—not least because the UKSC in Miller classified constitutional conventions as non-enforceable norms. Given the unsuccessful exhaustion of all these alternative roads to protect Scotland’s interest, the prospect of a new independence referendum gains credibility.

Developing Trade

2019 ◽  
Vol 250 ◽  
pp. R22-R29
Author(s):  
David Vines ◽  
Paul Gretton ◽  
Anne Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Market Access ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
National Policy ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
Customs Union ◽  
Executive Summary ◽  
Productivity Commission ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

Executive SummaryThe UK faces no easy options in determining how to develop its approach to international trade post-Brexit. If it finally decides to leave the European Customs Union and Single Market, it faces the possibility either of simply crashing out of the EU without a deal; trying to form market-access agreements and Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with the EU and other countries; or unilaterally reducing tariffs and liberalising trade with all countries. Each course raises significant practical difficulties, and entails major disadvantages compared with staying in the Customs Union and Single Market.The economic costs of a ‘no-deal’ approach stand to be very large, including inevitable tariffs, obstruction of UK access to EU markets, physical disruption at borders, a damping of investment and the much-discussed problem of the Irish border. Assuming ‘no-deal’ does not happen, negotiating FTAs with other countries would be possible only after a lengthy transition period, as in the Withdrawal Agreement voted down in Parliament, and would depend on the shape of the ultimate post-Brexit trading relationship between the EU and the UK. The process would be difficult, costly, and protracted; would likely be concluded on disadvantageous terms; would be even harder to apply to trade in services; and would yield extremely small gains given the volume of UK non-EU trade that is already covered by FTAs. Finally, unilateral liberalisation, while ameliorating some of the drawbacks of the first two options, faces the same problems of loss of access to European markets and disruption to trade; and would entail severe economic pain with only very gradual gains.The UK needs to conduct a much more profound and considered debate on these issues before deciding to set aside the large benefits of membership of the Customs Union and Single Market for the significant difficulties and tenuous gains offered by the alternatives. Public debate on the economic effects of trade policy has so far lacked the detailed but necessary analysis of these questions. It seems essential to establish a national policy review institution, modelled on the Australian Productivity Commission, in order to stimulate such a debate.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Scott James ◽  
Lucia Quaglia
Keyword(s):  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Single Market ◽  
Preliminary Assessment ◽  
The Future ◽  
Multi Level ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Regulatory Reforms

This chapter outlines the theoretical and empirical puzzles that inform the book, its objectives, overall argument, and structure. It sets out to explain the changing preferences and influence of the UK in shaping multi-level financial regulation. In particular, the book addresses two empirical questions. Why has the UK favoured increasingly stringent regulation in certain financial sectors since the crisis, but not in others? Why has the UK led international and EU-level regulatory reforms in some areas, but has resisted these initiatives in other areas? The chapter also outlines the book’s ambition to undertake a preliminary assessment of the impact of Brexit on the future of UK financial regulation, focused on two questions. Why has the UK decided to withdraw from the EU single market in services, including finance? How is Brexit likely to impact on the UK’s regulatory preferences and ability to shape multi-level financial regulation?

Exclusionary Abuses

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-112
Author(s):  
Renato Nazzini
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Pharmaceutical Sector ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Third ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
The Eu

Chapter 4 deals with exclusionary abuses under the Competition Act 1998, covering both public and private enforcement cases. The analysis concerns the approach to dominance as well as tests for abuse, focusing on retroactive rebates and bundled discounts, exclusion in multi-market settings, exclusivity, most favoured nation and equivalent clauses, discrimination, and exclusionary abuses in the pharmaceutical sector. This chapter argues that, in its second decade, modern UK competition law continued a trend that was already clear in the first decade: the prohibition of abuse of dominance is applied in a more economically robust and commercially reasonable way than it is by the EU institutions - the Commission and the EU courts - and in certain other Member States. The chapter notes that the third decade of the Competition Act 1998 will see the UK develop its competition policy free from the constraints of EU law and may allow for some divergence in the approach to exclusionary abuses in the future.

17. Abuse of dominance (1): non-pricing practices

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Single Market ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter considers abusive non-pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It deals in turn with exclusive dealing agreements; tying; refusals to supply; abusive non-pricing practices that are harmful to the single market; and miscellaneous other non-pricing practices which might infringe Article 102 or the Chapter II prohibition. Reference is made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

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