Litigating Sustainability – Towards a Taxonomy of Counter-Corporate Litigation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark B. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Litigation

Managerial Opportunism during Corporate Litigation

2005 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 2013-2041 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRUCE HASLEM
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Opportunism ◽  
Corporate Litigation

Federalism and Corporate Litigation

2003 ◽  
pp. 65-82
Author(s):  
Richard Buxbaum
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Litigation

Corporate litigation and executive turnover

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 268-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Aharony ◽  
Chelsea Liu ◽  
Alfred Yawson
Keyword(s):  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Corporate Litigation

Explaining Corporate Litigation Activity in an Integrated Framework of Interest Mobilization

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
ISAAC UNAH
Keyword(s):  
Integrated Framework ◽  
Corporate Litigation

Control of corporate litigation: The Malawi experience

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 1041-1048
Author(s):  
Matembo Nzunda
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Litigation

Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies

1988 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Engelmann ◽  
Bradford Cornell
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Corporate Litigation ◽  
The Cost

Some Reflections on the General Meeting's Power to Control Corporate Proceedings

2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 231-261
Author(s):  
Charles Zhen Qu
Keyword(s):  
Power Allocation ◽  
Current Model ◽  
General Meeting ◽  
Similar Question ◽  
Corporate Power ◽  
Corporate Litigation ◽  
Corporate Actions ◽  
Management Power ◽  
A Company

The jurisprudence on the power of the general meeting of a company to control corporate actions has been developed largely through the courts' interpretation of various versions of constitutional provisions on corporate power allocation, all of which can be traced back to the Companies Act 1862 (UK), Table A, reg. 55. This body of jurisprudence is likely to be resorted to when a need for resolving a similar question arises, regardless of how the power allocation provision is worded under the current model company constitution in the relevant jurisdiction. This article discusses two different schools of views on corporate power allocation. The mainstream view is that where the management power is vested in the directors, it is not a matter where the general meeting can intervene. However, the author feels that this view is doctrinally unsustainable. Instead, the author agrees with the view that the general meeting's power to make management, and hence corporate litigation, decisions is determined by the parties' intention manifested in the words in all forms of company regulations. This article also argues that regardless of how the relevant constitutional provision on division of corporate powers is worded, the general meeting has power to act where a board that is capable of making impartial decisions is unavailable.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document