scholarly journals Spatial Differentiation and Market Power in Input Procurement: Evidence from a Structural Model of the Corn Market

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinho Jung ◽  
Juan Sesmero ◽  
Ralph Siebert
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Spatial Differentiation

A Structural Estimation of Spatial Differentiation and Market Power in Input Procurement

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinho Jung ◽  
Juan Sesmero ◽  
Ralph Siebert
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Structural Estimation ◽  
Spatial Differentiation

scholarly journals Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (7) ◽  
pp. 1659-1701 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Crawford ◽  
Nicola Pavanini ◽  
Fabiano Schivardi
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Imperfect Competition ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Credit Supply ◽  
Lines Of Credit ◽  
Credit Demand ◽  
Firm Default

We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing, and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of demand for credit and default. Our counterfactual experiments show that while increases in adverse selection increase prices and defaults on average, reducing credit supply, banks’ market power can mitigate these negative effects. (JEL D22, D82, G21, G32, L13, L25)

Competition Tests with a Non-Structural Model: the Panzar–Rosse Method Applied to Germany’s Savings Banks

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Horst Gischer ◽  
Mike Stiele
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Monopolistic Competition ◽  
Empirical Models ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Annual Data ◽  
Empirical Application ◽  
Savings Banks ◽  
Banking Market ◽  
Revenue Functions

Abstract In this paper we adopt the Panzar-Rosse approach to assess the competitive conditions in the German banking market for the period from 1993 to 2002.We suggest several improvements to the empirical application of the approach and show that frequently used empirical models that apply price rather than revenue functions lead to biased results. Using disaggregated annual data from more than 400 savings banks (Sparkassen) the empirical findings indicate monopolistic competition, the cases of monopoly and perfect competition are strongly rejected. Furthermore, small banks seem to enjoy even more market power than larger institutions.

A Structural Model of the Analysis of Retail Market Power: The Case of Fluid Milk

2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vardges Hovhannisyan ◽  
Brian W. Gould
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Fluid Milk

Spatial differentiation and price discrimination in the cement industry: evidence from a structural model

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan H. Miller ◽  
Matthew Osborne
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Spatial Differentiation ◽  
Cement Industry

What affects bank market power in the euro area? A country-level structural model approach

2021 ◽  
pp. 102443
Author(s):  
Paolo Coccorese ◽  
Claudia Girardone ◽  
Sherrill Shaffer
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Model Approach

scholarly journals Estimating Platform Market Power in Two-Sided Markets with an Application to Magazine Advertising

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-67
Author(s):  
Minjae Song
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
The Other ◽  
Two Sided Markets

In two-sided markets, two groups of agents interact through platforms. Because agents’ decision to join a platform is affected by the presence of agents on the other side, their interactions create indirect network externalities and make platforms’ strategies different from those of firms in one-sided markets. In this paper, I use a structural model to show that platforms may take a loss on one side of the market to make a profit on the other side and that platform mergers may benefit some agents by lowering prices or attracting more agents on the other side of the market. (JEL D62, G34, L82, M37)

scholarly journals Assessing Market Structure in Iranian Banking Sector Based on the Multiproduct Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Kamran Mahmodpour ◽  
Mohammad Nabi Shahiki Tash ◽  
Mohammad Hassan Fotros
Keyword(s):  
Cost Saving ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economies Of Scope ◽  
Market Penetration ◽  
Primary Level ◽  
Basic Services ◽  
Bank Concentration

This article’s first aim is to find, the primary level of poly-product in Iranian banking section that causes the layout of the market between the banks become lower and bank concentration higher. To do that we use, the instance of Omni-product banks which is one of the most common approach developed by Penza & Rosse (1987). The first strand is related to bank cost function; and the other one to earnings multiproduct approach.In evaluating this experience-based examination and defining the effects of Omni-production on market penetration, we have applied a structural model to estimate demands on deposit services with study’s result like banks presenting traditional services such as loans and ATM cards. Additionally same modern facilities like brokerage services and capital bonds are of further market power versus those with only basic services. The economies of scope degree is sized via cost saving in scale of percentage which is produced through added figures of fruitful activities in comparison with only individual yield of product. Thus, so as to empirically distinguish economies of scope in poly-product banks, no.1 level of our investigation include modeling and speculating the function of bank’s cost.

scholarly journals Sequential Markets, Market Power, and Arbitrage

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (7) ◽  
pp. 1921-1957 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koichiro Ito ◽  
Mar Reguant
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Imperfect Competition ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Firm Behavior ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Price Premium ◽  
Model Predictions ◽  
Price Differences

We develop a framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and restricted entry in arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using microdata from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In the presence of market power, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, reducing consumer costs but increasing deadweight loss. (JEL D42, D43, L12, L13, L94, Q41)

scholarly journals What Affects Bank Market Power in the Euro Area? A Structural Model Approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Coccorese ◽  
Claudia Girardone ◽  
Sherrill Shaffer
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Model Approach
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