scholarly journals Dynamic Legislative Bargaining

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hülya Eraslan ◽  
Kirill S. Evdokimov ◽  
Jan Zapal
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Dynamic Legislative Bargaining

Lobbying dynamics

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P Baron
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Unequal Distribution ◽  
Markov Perfect ◽  
Dynamic Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Natural Dynamic

Many if not most government policies, regulations, and laws continue in effect unless changed by the legislature, providing a natural dynamic to the political process. Lobbying is a ubiquitous component of that process and can affect both proposal making and voting. This paper characterizes Markov perfect equilibria of a dynamic legislative bargaining model with stable policies and durable coalitions despite lobbying. Interest groups aligned with challenges to the incumbent coalition have a greater willingness to pay than have the defending interest groups, but the defenders have a legislative incumbency advantage in needing to counter-lobby fewer legislators than the challengers lobby. If legislators are sufficiently patient, equilibria exist such that the defenders of the incumbent coalition are successful. More than a minimal majority may be lobbied by the challengers, and coalitions can be surplus. Lobbying can increase proposal power, resulting in a more unequal distribution within a coalition.

Legislative Bargaining with Teams

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony J. Bradfield ◽  
John H. Kagel
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining

Gains Versus Costs in Legislative Bargaining

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nels Christiansen ◽  
Tanushree Jhunjhunwala ◽  
John H. Kagel
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining

Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly recognition

2018 ◽  
Vol 163 ◽  
pp. 102-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mustafa Yildirim
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining

Negotiating under Political Uncertainty: National Elections and the Dynamics of International Co-operation

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 315-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mareike Kleine ◽  
Clement Minaudier
Keyword(s):  
International Negotiations ◽  
Informational Efficiency ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Political Uncertainty ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Run Up ◽  
Uncertain Outcomes ◽  
Level 2 ◽  
The Eu

This article explores if (and how) national elections affect the chances of concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature about the informational efficiency of elections, it examines how political uncertainty in the run-up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Using the case of decision making in the European Union (EU), it finds that (1) pending national elections significantly reduce the chances of reaching an agreement at the international level (2) this effect is strongest during close elections with uncertain outcomes and (3) the effect is particularly pronounced in the case of elections in larger member states. The findings highlight the fruitfulness of further research on the dynamics between national and international politics. The article has positive and normative implications for the literature on two-level games, international negotiations and legislative bargaining in the EU.

scholarly journals Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules

2015 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 1076-1088 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon X. Eguia ◽  
Kenneth A. Shepsle
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Bargaining
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