Earnings Management to Avoid Debt Covenant Violations and Future Performance

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Dyreng ◽  
Stephen A. Hillegeist ◽  
Fernando Penalva
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Debt Covenant ◽  
Covenant Violations

Accruals and Real Earnings Management around Debt Covenant Violations

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trevor W. Chamberlain ◽  
Umar R. Butt ◽  
Sudipto Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Debt Covenant ◽  
Covenant Violations

Earnings Management Response to Debt Covenant Violations and Debt Restructuring

2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 295-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bikki Jaggi ◽  
Picheng Lee
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Debt Restructuring ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
Debt Covenant ◽  
Financially Distressed ◽  
Covenant Violations

The study investigates whether the choice of income-increasing or income-decreasing discretionary accruals is related to the severity of financial distress and whether this choice is also influenced by the creditors' waivers of debt covenant violations. Financially distressed firms experiencing debt covenant violations and/or debt restructuring during the 1989–96 period are used to evaluate the management's choice of discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are calculated based on four different accrual models. The results show that managers of financial distressed firms use income-increasing discretionary accruals if they are able to obtain waivers for debt covenant violations, and use income-decreasing discretionary accruals if debt restructuring takes place or debts are renegotiated because waivers are denied. These findings thus provide support to the expectation that the choice of income-increasing or -decreasing discretionary accruals is influenced by the severity of financial distress. They also provide an explanation for divergence in the results of earlier studies on the use of income-increasing or -decreasing discretionary accruals by financially distressed firms.

Earnings management prior to private debt issuance

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-285
Author(s):  
Brandon Ater ◽  
Thomas Bowe Hansen
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Accounting Quality ◽  
Management Activity ◽  
Private Debt ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Debt Issuance ◽  
Private Lending ◽  
Debt Covenant ◽  
Covenant Violations

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which firms manage earnings prior to private debt issuance. Design/methodology/approach This is an empirical archival research paper using financial statement data and data related to private debt issuance. Findings The results indicate that, on average, firms engage in income-increasing earnings management in the period prior to a new private debt issuance. In addition, it was found that this income-increasing earnings management is limited to firms which have engaged in income-increasing earnings management to a greater extent in prior years. Research limitations/implications This paper provides insight into how managers’ balance competing incentives to use income-increasing earnings management to obtain more favorable lending terms, and to use income-decreasing earnings management to reduce the risk of a future debt covenant violation. The results indicate that firms’ incentive to use income-increasing earnings management dominates. However, reputational concerns significantly constrain firms’ earnings management decisions prior to private debt issuance. Originality/value The paper fills a notable void in the literature by investigating firms’ earnings management activity prior to private lending agreements, and thereby provides new insights into both the relation between private debt and accounting quality, and the literature investigating the use of earnings management to avoid debt covenant violations.

The Impact of Going Concern on Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from Vietnam

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Phung Anh Thu ◽  
Nguyen Vinh Khuong
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Viet Nam ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Debt Covenant

The investigation was conducted to contribute empirical evidence of the association between going concern and financial reporting quality of listed firms on the Vietnam stock market. Based on data from 279 companies listed on the HNX and HOSE exchanges in Vietnam for the period 2009-2015, the quantitative research. Results found that the relationship between the going concern and financial reporting quality of listed firms. Research results are significant for investors, regulators to the transparency of financial reporting information. Keywords Going concern, financial reporting quality, listed firms References Agrawal, K., & Chatterjee, C. (2015). Earnings management and financial distress: Evidence from India. Global Business Review, 16(5_suppl), 140S-154S.Bergstresser, D., & Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3), 511–529.Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 99–126.Charitou, A., Lambertides, N., & Trigeorgis, L. (2007a). Earnings behaviour of financially distressed firms: The role of institutional ownership. Abacus, 43(3), 271–296.Chen, Y., Chen, C., & Huang, S. (2010). An appraisal of financially distressed companies’ earnings management: Evidence from listed companies in China. Pacific Accounting Review, 22(1), 22–41Dechow, P., & Dichev, I. (2002). The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors. The Accounting Review, 77, 35-59.DeFond, M., & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17(1), 145–176.DeFond, M.L., & Park, C.W. (1997). Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23(2), 115–139.Dichev, I., & Skinner, D. (2004). Large sample evidence on the debt covenant hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(4), 1091–1123.Đinh Thị Thu T., Nguyễn Vĩnh K. (2016). Tác động của hành vi điều chỉnh thu nhập đến khả năng hoạt động liên tục trong kế toán: Nghiên cứu thực nghiệm cho các doanh nghiệp niêm yết tại Việt Nam, Tạp chí phát triển khoa học và công nghệ, Quí 3, tr.96-108.Đỗ Thị Vân Trang (2015). Các mô hình đánh giá chất lượng báo cáo tài chính, Tạp chí chứng khoán Việt Nam, 200, tr 18-21.Habib, A., Uddin Bhuiyan, B., & Islam, A. (2013). Financial distress, earnings management and market pricing of accruals during the global financial crisis. Managerial Finance, 39(2), 155-180.Jaggi, B., & Lee, P. (2002). Earnings management response to debt covenant violations and debt restructuring. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 17(4), 295–324.Kasznik, R., (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of accounting research, 37(1), pp.57-81.Lu, J. (1999). An empirical study of earnings management by loss-making listed Chinese companies. KuaijiYanjiu (Accounting Research), (9), 25–35.McNichols, M.F. and Stubben, S.R., (2008). Does earnings management affect firms’ investment decisions?. The accounting review, 83(6), pp.1571-1603.Selahudin, N.F., Zakaria, N.B., & Sanusi, Z.M. (2014). Remodelling the earnings management with the appear- ance of leverage, financial distress and free cash flow: Malaysia and Thailand evidences. Journal of Applied Sciences, 14(21), 2644–2661.Skinner, D.J., & Sloan, R. (2002). Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(2/3), 289–312.Sweeney, A.P., (1994). Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 17(3): 281-308.Trần Thị Thùy Linh, Mai Hoàng Hạnh (2015). Chất lượng báo cáo tài chính và kỳ hạn nợ ảnh hưởng đến hiệu quả hoạt động của doanh nghiệp Việt Nam, Tạp chí phát triển kinh tế, 10, tr.27-50.Trương Thị Thùy Dương (2017). Nâng cao chất lượng báo cáo tài chính công ty đại chúng, Tạp chí tài chính, 1(3), tr.55-56.Uwuigbe, Ranti, Bernard, (2015). Assessment of the effects of firm’s characteristics on earnings management of listed firms in Nigeria, Asian Economic and Financial Review,5(2):218-228.

Analysts’ reactions to firms’ real activities management

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 589-612
Author(s):  
Joonho Lee ◽  
Sung Gon Chung
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Accounting Earnings ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Accounting Earnings Management ◽  
Operating Activities

Purpose Firms’ real activities management (RAM) can have a more detrimental effect on firms’ future performance than accrual earnings management. This paper aims to examine whether analysts, who play an important role as information intermediaries, understand the negative effect of RAM on firms’ future performance and respond to it accordingly. Design/methodology/approach The authors investigate whether analysts lower their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations of the firms with RAM. The authors measure RAM by examining firms’ abnormal decreases in discretionary expenses, abnormal increases in production and abnormal decreases in cash flow from operations following prior literature. Findings The authors find that after controlling for earnings surprises and other important firm characteristics, analysts lower their forecasts of future annual earnings and stock recommendations of the firms that show signs of RAM. Research limitations/implications First, as in other RAM studies, the results in this study are subject to measurement errors inherent in the estimation of RAM (i.e. abnormal production costs, abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenditures). Second, we include only firm-year observations that barely make positive income in our samples following the previous study. This sample selection criterion helps increase the power of the test by examining the “suspect firms group,” which are more likely to engage in earnings management. However, one can challenge that our findings on the association between RAM and analysts’ reactions could be only case-specific and cannot be generalized. Practical implications This study contributes to the literature on earnings management and especially on RAM. Specifically, none of the previous studies clearly examines whether analysts understand the negative impact of RAM on firms’ future performance and respond accordingly, although there are studies showing the negative association between RAM and firms’ future operating performance and studies showing the negative association between analysts following and RAM. Thus, filling the gap, this study provides a specific reason for the negative association between the analyst following and real earnings management presented in previous studies. Social implications The findings will be of interest to regulators, who are concerned about the potential negative consequences in which tighter accounting standards can result. For example, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) theoretically demonstrate that tighter accounting standards can prompt more RAM instead of accounting earnings management. The study provides important evidence supporting that such suboptimal operating activities are closely watched by analysts and are potentially penalized by the market. If the market is able to detect RAM and allocate fewer resources to the firms that engage in it, then the concerns associated with the substitution effect between accrual-based earnings management and RAM can be diminished. Originality/value Prior research suggests that tighter accounting regulations (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) prompt more RAM than accounting earnings management. The study provides evidence supporting that such suboptimal operating activities are closely watched by analysts and are potentially penalized by the market.

The Impact of Financial Covenants in Private Loan Contracts on Classification Shifting

2019 ◽  
Vol 65 (8) ◽  
pp. 3637-3653 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yun Fan ◽  
Wayne B. Thomas ◽  
Xiaoou Yu
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Management Technique ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Special Items ◽  
Classification Shifting ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
Debt Covenant ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Covenant Violations ◽  
Private Loan

This study examines whether firms with private loan contracts that contain debt covenants based on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) are more likely to misclassify core expenses as special items (i.e., classification shift). Misclassifying core expenses as income-decreasing special items allows the firm to increase EBITDA and thereby potentially avoid debt covenant violations. Consistent with our expectation, firms misclassify core expenses as special items when at least one EBITDA-related financial covenant is close to being violated. In addition, classification shifting is more prominent when financially distressed firms are close to violating at least one EBITDA-related covenant. Whereas prior research on classification shifting focuses primarily on equity market incentives (e.g., meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts), our study extends this research to private loan contracts to highlight that creditors also affect classification shifting. Classification shifting appears to be an additional earnings management technique used by managers to avoid debt covenant violations. This paper was accepted by Shivaram Rajgopal, accounting.

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