Earnings Management Response to Debt Covenant Violations and Debt Restructuring

2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 295-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bikki Jaggi ◽  
Picheng Lee

The study investigates whether the choice of income-increasing or income-decreasing discretionary accruals is related to the severity of financial distress and whether this choice is also influenced by the creditors' waivers of debt covenant violations. Financially distressed firms experiencing debt covenant violations and/or debt restructuring during the 1989–96 period are used to evaluate the management's choice of discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are calculated based on four different accrual models. The results show that managers of financial distressed firms use income-increasing discretionary accruals if they are able to obtain waivers for debt covenant violations, and use income-decreasing discretionary accruals if debt restructuring takes place or debts are renegotiated because waivers are denied. These findings thus provide support to the expectation that the choice of income-increasing or -decreasing discretionary accruals is influenced by the severity of financial distress. They also provide an explanation for divergence in the results of earlier studies on the use of income-increasing or -decreasing discretionary accruals by financially distressed firms.

2021 ◽  
pp. 097226292110109
Author(s):  
Karan Gandhi

Prior research exhibits contradictory evidence on earnings management practices, both accrual and real, undertaken by the firms in state of financial distress. This study uniquely examines the issue in the presence of earnings-increasing earnings management motivation- meeting earnings benchmark of avoiding losses. For examining the issue, this study analyzes large panel data of Indian public companies for the period 2000–2016. The findings indicate prevalence of earnings-decreasing real earnings management practices, that is, decrease in overproduction and increase in spending on discretionary expenses, in financially distressed firms despite there being motivation to increase earnings to avoid losses. No evidence of accrual earnings management practices has been observed in such firms.


2021 ◽  
pp. 231971452110393
Author(s):  
Debdas Rakshit ◽  
Chanchal Chatterjee ◽  
Ananya Paul

This paper investigates the relationship between earnings management and financial distress and considers whether this relationship varies based on the severity of financial distress and signs of discretionary accruals (a proxy for earnings management). For this purpose, multiple regression analysis has been employed on a sample of 192 financially distressed Indian firms during the period 2011–2018, counting to 1,272 firm-year observations. Discretionary accruals are estimated by the Modified Jones model and Raman and Shahrur (2008) model, while Altman’s Z-score and distance-to-default model are used to detect the degree of financial distress. The findings disclose that the low distressed firms are indulged in higher earnings management than high distressed firms. Also, the low distressed firms are engaged more in income-decreasing earnings management. However, the results are not consistent across both earnings management and distress measures. The findings have significant implications for investors and creditors. They need to be aware of this fact while evaluating creditworthiness of a firm since firms with even a low degree of financial distress can indulge in earnings management to camouflage their true financial condition.


Author(s):  
Emita W. Astami ◽  
Rusmin Rusmin

This study investigates the association between corporate governance and earnings management practices of Australian’s financially distressed firms. Based on a sample of 164 firm-year incorporating non-financial firmsexperiencing financial distress, the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model is used to measure discretionary accruals (the proxy for earnings management). Board of directors and audit committee characteristic variables are employed as the key predictor variables for measuring the effectiveness of corporate governance. This study finds that the companies are seeking to reduce their reported earnings to increase the likelihood of making a profit in the following year with the goal of avoiding bankruptcy;a larger number of directors on a board is less effective in detecting and constraining the practices of earnings management by managers of distressed firms; an active audit committee plays a positive role in detecting and reducing the probability of earnings management. The findings of this study have implications especially to regulators and corporate governance reformists that determine corporate governance rules. This is primarily in regard to the efforts made by listed companies in maintaining their sustainability through more emphases on the process for monitoring and selection of board of directors and audit committee members to reinforceeffectiveness in managerial performance evaluation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neerav Nagar ◽  
Kaustav Sen

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether financially distressed firms manipulate core or operating income through the misclassification of operating expenses as income-decreasing special items. Design/methodology/approach This sample comprises firms in the USA with data from 1989 to 2010. The authors used the methodology given in McVay (2006) and multiple regressions. Findings Managers of financially distressed firms are more likely to inflate core or operating income as compared to the healthy firms to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. They do so by misclassifying core or operating expenses as income-decreasing special items. Specifically, core expenses are shifted to income-decreasing special items like goodwill impairments, settlement costs, restructuring costs and write downs. Practical implications The paper sheds light on an important firm characteristic, financial distress that intensifies classification shifting – an earnings management tool which auditors, investors and regulators find tough to detect. The findings have implications for investors, as they fail to comprehend such shifting (McVay, 2006); analysts, who issue forecasts based on street earnings; lenders, as distressed firms may be concealing their true performance; and regulators, as the misclassification of income statement items is a violation of accounting principles. Originality/value The authors extend the literature on accruals and real earnings management by the financially troubled firms and present first evidence that the managers of such firms also manipulate core or operating income through classification shifting.


Author(s):  
Phung Anh Thu ◽  
Nguyen Vinh Khuong

The investigation was conducted to contribute empirical evidence of the association between going concern and financial reporting quality of listed firms on the Vietnam stock market. Based on data from 279 companies listed on the HNX and HOSE exchanges in Vietnam for the period 2009-2015, the quantitative research. Results found that the relationship between the going concern and financial reporting quality of listed firms. Research results are significant for investors, regulators to the transparency of financial reporting information. Keywords Going concern, financial reporting quality, listed firms References Agrawal, K., & Chatterjee, C. (2015). Earnings management and financial distress: Evidence from India. Global Business Review, 16(5_suppl), 140S-154S.Bergstresser, D., & Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3), 511–529.Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 99–126.Charitou, A., Lambertides, N., & Trigeorgis, L. (2007a). Earnings behaviour of financially distressed firms: The role of institutional ownership. Abacus, 43(3), 271–296.Chen, Y., Chen, C., & Huang, S. (2010). An appraisal of financially distressed companies’ earnings management: Evidence from listed companies in China. Pacific Accounting Review, 22(1), 22–41Dechow, P., & Dichev, I. (2002). The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors. The Accounting Review, 77, 35-59.DeFond, M., & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17(1), 145–176.DeFond, M.L., & Park, C.W. (1997). Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23(2), 115–139.Dichev, I., & Skinner, D. (2004). Large sample evidence on the debt covenant hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(4), 1091–1123.Đinh Thị Thu T., Nguyễn Vĩnh K. (2016). Tác động của hành vi điều chỉnh thu nhập đến khả năng hoạt động liên tục trong kế toán: Nghiên cứu thực nghiệm cho các doanh nghiệp niêm yết tại Việt Nam, Tạp chí phát triển khoa học và công nghệ, Quí 3, tr.96-108.Đỗ Thị Vân Trang (2015). Các mô hình đánh giá chất lượng báo cáo tài chính, Tạp chí chứng khoán Việt Nam, 200, tr 18-21.Habib, A., Uddin Bhuiyan, B., & Islam, A. (2013). Financial distress, earnings management and market pricing of accruals during the global financial crisis. Managerial Finance, 39(2), 155-180.Jaggi, B., & Lee, P. (2002). Earnings management response to debt covenant violations and debt restructuring. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 17(4), 295–324.Kasznik, R., (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of accounting research, 37(1), pp.57-81.Lu, J. (1999). An empirical study of earnings management by loss-making listed Chinese companies. KuaijiYanjiu (Accounting Research), (9), 25–35.McNichols, M.F. and Stubben, S.R., (2008). Does earnings management affect firms’ investment decisions?. The accounting review, 83(6), pp.1571-1603.Selahudin, N.F., Zakaria, N.B., & Sanusi, Z.M. (2014). Remodelling the earnings management with the appear- ance of leverage, financial distress and free cash flow: Malaysia and Thailand evidences. Journal of Applied Sciences, 14(21), 2644–2661.Skinner, D.J., & Sloan, R. (2002). Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(2/3), 289–312.Sweeney, A.P., (1994). Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 17(3): 281-308.Trần Thị Thùy Linh, Mai Hoàng Hạnh (2015). Chất lượng báo cáo tài chính và kỳ hạn nợ ảnh hưởng đến hiệu quả hoạt động của doanh nghiệp Việt Nam, Tạp chí phát triển kinh tế, 10, tr.27-50.Trương Thị Thùy Dương (2017). Nâng cao chất lượng báo cáo tài chính công ty đại chúng, Tạp chí tài chính, 1(3), tr.55-56.Uwuigbe, Ranti, Bernard, (2015). Assessment of the effects of firm’s characteristics on earnings management of listed firms in Nigeria, Asian Economic and Financial Review,5(2):218-228.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (19) ◽  
pp. 11124
Author(s):  
Jun Hyeok Choi ◽  
Saerona Kim ◽  
Dong-Hoon Yang ◽  
Kwanghee Cho

This study aimed to test how corporate social responsibility (CSR) can affect the impact of corporate financial distress on earnings management. Based on the existing literature, distressed firms tend to hide their financial crises through earnings manipulation. However, as CSR can positively affect companies in terms of performance, risk reduction, and market response, the better a firm’s CSR is the less managers will attempt earnings management even if they experience temporary distress. Consistent with the literature, test results using Korean-listed companies show that distress increased earnings management, and we confirmed that CSR weakened the positive effect of distress on earnings management. After testing each of the CSR subcategories, significant results were found mainly on environmental performance, reflecting the globally increasing interest in environmental issues. This study contributes to the literature on distress and earnings management, which rarely considers CSR as a moderating factor.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michella Maria Virgine Prayogo ◽  
Yie Ke Feliana ◽  
Aurelia Carina Christanti Sutanto

Some cases of financial fraud invite inquiries about the effectiveness of corporategovernance mechanism in financial distress companies. This study empiricallyexamines whether the financial distress moderate the impact of corporate governancemechanism to earnings management. The sample of this study is manufacturingcompanies listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange for period 2010 -2012. Discretionaryaccruals are used as a proxy for earnings management, while financially distressed andnon-distressed firms are identified based on Altman Z-score test. Corporate governancemechanism is measured by four characteristics of the audit committee, i.e. size (totalnumber of audit committee members), independence (audit committee composition),activity(frequency of audit committee meeting), and expertise (the number of auditcommittee have finance or accounting background).This study finds that (1) financialdistress does not moderate the impact of total members of audit committee to earningsmanagement; (2) financial distress does not moderate the impact of frequency of auditcommittee meeting to earnings management; (3) financial distress does not moderatethe impact of audit committee composition to earnings management; (4)financialdistress moderates the impact of audit committee finance/accounting knowledge toearnings management. These results suggestthat the effectiveness corporate governanceis low, and finance/accounting literacy of audit committee should be alert.Beberapa kasus manipulasi keuangan pada perusahaan yang mengalami kesulitankeuangan mengundang pertanyaan terkait efektifitas mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan.Penelitian ini secara empiris menguji apakah kondisi kesulitan keuangan dapatmemoderasi pengaruh mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan terhadap manajemen laba.Sampel dari penelitian ini adalah perusahaan sektor manufaktur yang terdaftar di BursaEfek Indonesia periode 2010-2012.Discretionary accruals digunakan sebagai proksiuntuk manajemen laba, sedangkan kondisi kesulitan keuangan diidentifikasimenggunakan uji Altman Z-score. Mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan diukur dengan 4karakteristik komite audit, yaitu ukuran (jumlah anggota komite audit), independensi(komposisi komite audit), aktivitas (frekuensi pertemuan komite audit), dan keahlian(jumlah anggota komite audit yang memiliki latar belakang keuangan atau akuntansi).Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa (1) kondisi kesulitan keuangan tidak memoderasipengaruh jumlah anggota komite audit terhadap manajemen laba; (2) kondisi kesulitankeuangan tidak memoderasi pengaruh frekuensi pertemuan komite audit terhadapmanajemen laba; (3) kondisi kesulitan keuangan tidak memoderasi pengaruh komposisikomite audit terhadap manajemen laba; (4) kondisi kesulitan keuangan memoderasi pengaruh jumlah anggota komite audit yang memiliki latar belakang keuangan atauakuntansi terhadap manajemen laba. Hasil ini menunjukkan bahwa efektifitas tatakelola perusahaan masih rendah dan anggota komite audit yang memiliki latar belakangkeuangan atau akuntansi harus mewaspadainya.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2110511
Author(s):  
Jiao Jing ◽  
Kenneth Leung ◽  
Jeffrey Ng ◽  
Janus Jian Zhang

Throughout their business life cycle, firms may experience financial distress. Successful emergence from such distress is important to their multiple stakeholders. Using a sample of publicly listed firms in China that emerged from Special Treatment (an indicator of delisting risk), we focus on the key actions such firms take prior to emergence, namely, fixing the core of the business and earnings management. We examine how these actions are associated with sustainable emergence, which we define as emergence from Special Treatment without reentry in the next 5 years. Consistent with the expectation that shortcut fixes to problems do not yield a long-term solution, we find that repairing the core of the business by improving operating efficiency is positively associated with sustainable emergence, whereas earnings management is negatively associated with it. We also find that the positive (negative) association between fixing the core (earnings management) and sustainable emergence is pronounced only for state-owned enterprises. Our article adds to the limited literature that examines issues related to distressed firms’ sustainable turnaround.


2019 ◽  
Vol 65 (8) ◽  
pp. 3637-3653 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yun Fan ◽  
Wayne B. Thomas ◽  
Xiaoou Yu

This study examines whether firms with private loan contracts that contain debt covenants based on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) are more likely to misclassify core expenses as special items (i.e., classification shift). Misclassifying core expenses as income-decreasing special items allows the firm to increase EBITDA and thereby potentially avoid debt covenant violations. Consistent with our expectation, firms misclassify core expenses as special items when at least one EBITDA-related financial covenant is close to being violated. In addition, classification shifting is more prominent when financially distressed firms are close to violating at least one EBITDA-related covenant. Whereas prior research on classification shifting focuses primarily on equity market incentives (e.g., meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts), our study extends this research to private loan contracts to highlight that creditors also affect classification shifting. Classification shifting appears to be an additional earnings management technique used by managers to avoid debt covenant violations. This paper was accepted by Shivaram Rajgopal, accounting.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (18) ◽  
pp. 10156
Author(s):  
Iman Harymawan ◽  
Fajar Kristanto Gautama Putra ◽  
Bayu Arie Fianto ◽  
Wan Adibah Wan Ismail

This study examines the relationship between financial distress and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. We hypothesize that financially distressed firms are tempted to enhance ESG disclosure as it provides higher performance in terms of financial and market perspectives. ESG disclosure needs substantial resources, which financially distressed firms may not be able to provide. In Indonesian settings, we find that financially distressed firms have lower ESG disclosure quality than non-distressed firms. Our results are robust due to lagged variable, Heckman’s two stages, and coarsened exact matching regression showing consistent results. Furthermore, our results are consistent with three years of rolling windows of financial distress and all sections of ESG reporting, except the general information section. This study extends the scope of prior studies by focusing on firms’ eagerness to provide higher quality ESG disclosure, particularly distressed firms.


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