Proximate Causation in Legal HIstoriography

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Stern
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 107-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Magee ◽  
Roger Nesbit


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 20160145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas J. Futuyma

Evolutionary theory has been extended almost continually since the evolutionary synthesis (ES), but except for the much greater importance afforded genetic drift, the principal tenets of the ES have been strongly supported. Adaptations are attributable to the sorting of genetic variation by natural selection, which remains the only known cause of increase in fitness. Mutations are not adaptively directed, but as principal authors of the ES recognized, the material (structural) bases of biochemistry and development affect the variety of phenotypic variations that arise by mutation and recombination. Against this historical background, I analyse major propositions in the movement for an ‘extended evolutionary synthesis’. ‘Niche construction' is a new label for a wide variety of well-known phenomena, many of which have been extensively studied, but (as with every topic in evolutionary biology) some aspects may have been understudied. There is no reason to consider it a neglected ‘process’ of evolution. The proposition that phenotypic plasticity may engender new adaptive phenotypes that are later genetically assimilated or accommodated is theoretically plausible; it may be most likely when the new phenotype is not truly novel, but is instead a slight extension of a reaction norm already shaped by natural selection in similar environments. However, evolution in new environments often compensates for maladaptive plastic phenotypic responses. The union of population genetic theory with mechanistic understanding of developmental processes enables more complete understanding by joining ultimate and proximate causation; but the latter does not replace or invalidate the former. Newly discovered molecular phenomena have been easily accommodated in the past by elaborating orthodox evolutionary theory, and it appears that the same holds today for phenomena such as epigenetic inheritance. In several of these areas, empirical evidence is needed to evaluate enthusiastic speculation. Evolutionary theory will continue to be extended, but there is no sign that it requires emendation.



Animals ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1030
Author(s):  
Chiara Scopa ◽  
Laura Contalbrigo ◽  
Alberto Greco ◽  
Antonio Lanatà ◽  
Enzo Pasquale Scilingo ◽  
...  

Equine assisted interventions (EAIs) include all therapeutic interventions aimed at improving human wellbeing through the involvement of horses. Due to the prominent emotional involvement traditionally characterizing their relation with humans, horses developed sophisticated communicative skills, which fostered their ability to respond to human emotional states. In this review, we hypothesize that the proximate causation of successful interventions could be human–animal mutual coordination, through which the subjects bodily and, most importantly, emotionally come into contact. We propose that detecting emotions of other individuals and developing the capacity to fine-tune one’s own emotional states accordingly (emotional transfer mechanism), could represent the key engine triggering the positive effects of EAIs. We provide a comprehensive analysis of horses’ socio-emotional competences according to recent literature and we propose a multidisciplinary approach to investigate this inter-specific match. By considering human and horse as a unique coupling system during the interaction, it would be possible to objectively measure the degree of coordination through the analysis of physiological variables of both human and animal. Merging the state of art on human–horse relationship with the application of novel methodologies, could help to improve standardized protocols for animal assisted interventions, with particular regard to the emotional states of subjects involved.



2001 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geert Keil

Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged "causal gap", it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. On the account of singular causation, the onset of belief or desire may perfectly well cause an action, although no of mental antecedent is ever a causally sufficient condition for a specific kind of action to occur.



Author(s):  
Pinchas Huberman

Developments in artificial intelligence and robotics promise increased interaction between humans and autonomous machines, presenting novel risks of accidental harm to individuals and property.1 This essay situates the problem of autonomous-machine-caused harm within the doctrinal and theoretical framework of tort law, conceived of as a practice of corrective justice. The possibility of autonomous-machine-caused harm generates fresh doctrinal and theoretical issues for assigning tort liability. Due to machine-learning capabilities, harmful effects of autonomous machines may be untraceable to tortious actions of designers, manufacturers or users.2 As a result, traditional tort doctrine—framed by conditions of foreseeability and proximate causation—would not ground liability.3 Without recourse to compensation, faultless victims bear the accident costs of autonomous machines. This doctrinal outcome reflects possible incompatibility between tort’s theoretical structure of corrective justice and accidents involving autonomous machines. As a practice of corrective justice, tort liability draws a normative link between particular defendants and plaintiffs, as doers and sufferers of the same tortious harm, grounding defendants’ agent-specific obligations to repair the harm. Where accidents are caused by autonomous machines, the argument goes, the essential link between defendants and plaintiffs is severed; since resulting harm is not legally attributable to the human agency of designers, manufacturers or users, victims have no remedy in tort.



2005 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Lowry ◽  
Philip Rawlings


2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 239-240
Keyword(s):  


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