Natural Selection as the Sum over all Histories

As evolution can be connected to the principle of least action, and if it is depicted in evolution-space versus time then it corresponds to the direction of ultimate causation. As an organism evolves and follows a path of proximate causation, if the vector is closely parallel to that of the Ultimate Causation then the changes will confer desirable attributes which will lead to further development. If, however, the variations do not occur in a direction close to that of the ultimate causation vector the evolved organism will quickly die out. Therefore Natural Selection may be viewed as similar to Feynman’s “sum over all histories”. This approach is compatible with both Neutral Theory and Selection, as it includes both positive and negative mutations and selection. Therefore, the principle of least action gives a direction, but not a purpose, to evolution.

Tort Law, Corrective Justice and the Problem of Autonomous-Machine-Caused Harm

Developments in artificial intelligence and robotics promise increased interaction between humans and autonomous machines, presenting novel risks of accidental harm to individuals and property.1 This essay situates the problem of autonomous-machine-caused harm within the doctrinal and theoretical framework of tort law, conceived of as a practice of corrective justice. The possibility of autonomous-machine-caused harm generates fresh doctrinal and theoretical issues for assigning tort liability. Due to machine-learning capabilities, harmful effects of autonomous machines may be untraceable to tortious actions of designers, manufacturers or users.2 As a result, traditional tort doctrine—framed by conditions of foreseeability and proximate causation—would not ground liability.3 Without recourse to compensation, faultless victims bear the accident costs of autonomous machines. This doctrinal outcome reflects possible incompatibility between tort’s theoretical structure of corrective justice and accidents involving autonomous machines. As a practice of corrective justice, tort liability draws a normative link between particular defendants and plaintiffs, as doers and sufferers of the same tortious harm, grounding defendants’ agent-specific obligations to repair the harm. Where accidents are caused by autonomous machines, the argument goes, the essential link between defendants and plaintiffs is severed; since resulting harm is not legally attributable to the human agency of designers, manufacturers or users, victims have no remedy in tort.

FACTORS MEDIATING ANT SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: INTERPLAY OF NEUROMODULATION AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

The main aim of this review was to show that proximate causation of insect social behavior involves complex interplay of cues and signals originating from both lower and higher levels of organization encountered in insect societies. We focused our review on context-dependence of neuromodulation of insect social behavior by specific neuroactive compounds including several biogenic amines (octopamine, serotonin, dopamine and tyramine), and classical amino acid neurotransmitters [γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA) and glutamate (Glu)]. We provided numerous examples of the role of these compounds in the mediation of affiliative social contacts, aggressive behavior, ontogeny of behavior (including behavioral reversion), and modifications of the reproductive status of the individual. We also discussed how brain contents of specific neuroactive compounds and the effects of their administration depend on individual properties of the tested insects, systematic group to which they belong, and external conditions defining their past and present physical and social environment.

Emotional Transfer in Human–Horse Interaction: New Perspectives on Equine Assisted Interventions

Equine assisted interventions (EAIs) include all therapeutic interventions aimed at improving human wellbeing through the involvement of horses. Due to the prominent emotional involvement traditionally characterizing their relation with humans, horses developed sophisticated communicative skills, which fostered their ability to respond to human emotional states. In this review, we hypothesize that the proximate causation of successful interventions could be human–animal mutual coordination, through which the subjects bodily and, most importantly, emotionally come into contact. We propose that detecting emotions of other individuals and developing the capacity to fine-tune one’s own emotional states accordingly (emotional transfer mechanism), could represent the key engine triggering the positive effects of EAIs. We provide a comprehensive analysis of horses’ socio-emotional competences according to recent literature and we propose a multidisciplinary approach to investigate this inter-specific match. By considering human and horse as a unique coupling system during the interaction, it would be possible to objectively measure the degree of coordination through the analysis of physiological variables of both human and animal. Merging the state of art on human–horse relationship with the application of novel methodologies, could help to improve standardized protocols for animal assisted interventions, with particular regard to the emotional states of subjects involved.

Population thinking vs. essentialism in biology and evolutionary economics

The standard perception of the dichotomy between population thinking and essentialism (typological thinking) in evolutionary economics descends from the golden age of the neo-Darwinian Synthesis. Over the last few decades the received view on population thinking has been seriously challenged in biology and its philosophy. First, the strong version of population thinking that banishes essentialism witnessed important tensions stemming from the ontological status of species. These tensions have been amplified by the demise of positivism and the rise of a new essentialism in philosophy of science. Second, the soft version that transforms the opposition between population thinking and essentialism to the dichotomy between ultimate and proximate causation has led to contradictory interpretations regarding the locus of ultimate causes. Taking stock of the previous discussion the paper addresses the limits to population thinking in the socio-economic realm. The upshot is that without denying the important achievements made by the application of population thinking in sub-disciplines like industrial dynamics and economic anthropology, the idea to generalize these applications into the whole socio-economic realm is problematic. The aforementioned achievements cannot come to grips with the structural aspects of capitalism, its different periods (e.g. the contemporary finance-led capitalism) and its geographical varieties. The resulting gap points to the importance of structural analysis (essentialism) and evolutionary political economy. The latter is distinguished from the rest of evolutionary economics by its project to go beyond the surface of economic phenomena and to critically analyze their underlying social structures

The study of culture and evolution across disciplines

A source of continued tension within the evolutionary human behavioural / social sciences, as well as between these fields and the traditional social sciences, is how to conceptualise ‘culture’ in its various manifestations and guises. One of the earliest criticisms of E O Wilson’s sociobiology project was the focus on presumed genetically evolved behavioural universals, and lack of attention to cultural diversity and cultural (as opposed to genetic) history. As sociobiology split into different fields during the 1980s, each developed their own approaches and assumptions. Human behavioural ecologists employed the ‘phenotypic gambit’, assuming that culture is a proximate means by which natural selection generates currently-adaptive behavioural strategies. Evolutionary psychologists distinguished between transmitted and evoked culture, the former involving the social transmission of information, the latter involving the triggering of genetically-prespecified behaviours in response to different environmental cues (typically ancestral cues, such that behaviour may no longer be currently adaptive). Evoked culture has been the focus of most research in evolutionary psychology. Cognitive anthropologists have a similar notion of ‘cultural attraction’, where universal aspects of cognition evoke predictable responses due to individual learning. Finally, cultural evolution (or gene-culture coevolution) approaches stress the causal role of transmitted culture. Here, human cognition is assumed to be relatively domain-general and content-free, with genetic evolution having shaped social learning processes to allow the rapid spread of locally adaptive knowledge (although occasionally allowing the spread of maladaptive behaviour, due to the partial decoupling of genetic and cultural evolution). All the while, the traditional social sciences have remained steadfastly unwilling to accept that evolutionary approaches to human behaviour have any merit or relevance, and indeed have abandoned the scientific method in favour of more politically motivated interpretive methods. Most curiously, the social sciences have abandoned the concept of culture, as they define it. I will discuss all of these approaches in terms of (i) the extent to which they give causal weight to genetic inheritance, individual learning and social learning, and how these process interact; (ii) their assumptions about the domain-specificity of human cognition; (iii) ultimate-proximate causation; (iv) specific debates over language evolution, cooperation and the demographic transition; and (v) prospects for reconciliation and integration of these tensions across the evolutionary human sciences and the social sciences more broadly.