scholarly journals Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights

Author(s):  
Eric Claeys
Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall

Earlier chapters of this book found that the Hobbesian hypothesis is false; the Lockean proviso is unfulfilled; contemporary states and property rights systems fail to meet the standard that social contract and natural property rights theories require for their justification. This chapter assesses the implications of those findings for the two theories. Section 1 argues that, whether contractarians accept or reject these findings, they need to clarify their argument to remove equivocation. Section 2 invites efforts to refute this book’s empirical findings. Section 3 discusses a response open only to property rights theorists: concede this book’s empirical findings and blame government failure. Section 4 considers the argument that this book misidentifies the state of nature. Section 5 considers a “bracketing strategy,” which admits that observed stateless societies fit the definition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not the relevant forms of statelessness today. Section 6 discusses the implications of accepting both the truth and relevance of the book’s findings, concluding that the best response is to fulfil the Lockean proviso by taking action to improve the lives of disadvantaged people.


Noûs ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samual C. Wheeler III

1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Ehman

For classical liberals, natural property rights are the moral foundation of the market and of individual freedom. They determine the initial position from which persons legitimately make contracts and assess the validity of collective action. Since they establish the initial conditions of legitimate agreements, they cannot be dependent upon agreements. Persons possess these rights apart from social institutions. Natural rights typically not only prohibit interference with a person's body and mind but also forbid interference with a person's appropriation of unowned natural resources and with his freedom to do as he chooses with the products that he makes from them, so long as he does not infringe upon the equal rights of others. These rights prescribe, as Locke put it, that persons be free “to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit … without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man”.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 323-335
Author(s):  
David Miller

This article examines A. J. Simmons’ Lockean theory of territorial rights and defends the superiority of the rival nationalist theory that he rejects. It begins by arguing that all philosophical accounts of territory need to be supplemented by nonideal theory to address real-world territorial conflicts. Turning to the Lockean theory, it points out that if territorial rights are to emerge from individual property rights in land, such rights must be robust. But on Simmons’ account, individuals only have natural property rights in material things involved in their ongoing purposive activities. Thus, a state founded on such rights would be vulnerable to having neglected parts of its territory expropriated by outsiders. It might also have to downsize in response to population increases elsewhere. Nationalist theories base territorial rights on the collective occupation and transformation of land by groups with shared identities. Three charges against such theories are rebutted: (1) The idea of cohesive national cultures is a myth, in the face of internal cultural diversity. (2) Despite their appeal to history, nationalist theories privilege current possessors of land at the expense of the dispossessed. (3) Such theories cannot solve the problem of ‘trapped minorities’ who don’t share the national identity of the majority.


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