The Long History of Feminist Legal Theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tracy A. Thomas
Author(s):  
Tracy A. Thomas

The conventional idea is that feminist legal theory began in the 1970s, in the second-wave feminist movement. However, the foundations of feminist legal theory were first conceptualized much earlier, in 1848, and developed over the next century and a half through distinct periods of thought. That development began with the establishment of the core theoretical precepts of gender and equality grounded in the comprehensive philosophy of the nineteenth-century’s first women’s rights movement ignited at Seneca Falls. Feminist legal theory was popularized and advanced by the political activism of the women’s suffrage movement, even as suffragists limited the feminist consensus to one based on women’s maternalism. Progressive feminism then expanded the theoretical framework of feminist theory in the early twentieth century, encapsulating ideas of global peace, market work, and sex rights of birth control. In the modern era, legal feminists gravitated back to pragmatic and concrete ideas of formal equality and the associated legalisms of equal rights and equal protection. Yet through each of these periods, the two common imperatives were to place women at the center of analysis and to recognize law as a fundamental agent of change.


Author(s):  
Meredith Johnson Harbach

This chapter surveys the field of feminist legal theory (FLT) as a discipline in conversation, and in some ways allied, with children’s rights. After briefly reviewing the development of feminist legal theory, the chapter explores relevant debates among feminists and then discusses several feminist legal critiques and methods of relevance to children’s rights. The chapter ends by considering ways in which feminist legal theory and children’s rights are in conversation and by exploring the potential for newer variants of feminist legal theory to suggest new directions in children’s rights strategies.


Figurationen ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-24
Author(s):  
Ngaire Naffine

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Falko Maxin

The mechanics of the "legal theory of evidence", which dominated German procedural law until the second half of the 19th century, was intended to render the truth of a circumstance to be proven calculable by means of legal rigour and arithmetic consistency. How can we explain in retrospect its seemingly abrupt replacement by the judge´s "free consideration of evidence" according to his subjective conviction as we know it today? Does this indicate something fundamental having changed in the nature and significance of the judge's knowledge of facts? Did a post-Kantian understanding of truth together with an altered conception of social knowledge play a role in this important process in the history of justice? By using the example of civil and criminal jurisdiction, this study examines these questions in its search for "legal truth" - and in doing so outlines a history of the theory of evidence in the 19th century.


Author(s):  
James Franklin

The history of the evaluation of uncertain evidence before the quantification of probability in 1654 is a mass of examples relevant to current debates. They deal with matters that in general are as unquantified now as ever – the degree to which evidence supports theory, the strength and justification of inductive inferences, the weight of testimony, the combination of pieces of uncertain evidence, the price of risk, the philosophical nature of chance, and the problem of acting in case of doubt. Concepts similar to modern “proof beyond reasonable doubt” were developed especially in the legal theory of evidence. Moral theology discussed “probabilism”, the doctrine that one could follow a probable opinion in ethics even if the opposite was more probable. Philosophers understood the difficult problem of induction. Legal discussion of “aleatory contracts” such as insurance and games of chance developed the framework in which the quantification of probability eventually took place.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Romina Carla Lerussi ◽  
Malena Costa

Resumen: Nuestra propuesta se inscribe en el campo de los feminismos jurídicos, área que surge en la década del setenta en la academia estadounidense bajo la denominación Feminist Jurisprudence, Feminist Legal Studies o Feminist Legal Theory. En América Latina y El Caribe este área es aún incipiente; encontramos en dicha región una gran cantidad de investigaciones no necesariamente situadas en términos del pensamiento jurídico/legal feminista, pero sí conectadas íntimamente con dicho campo y como parte de las denominadas perspectivas de género en el derecho. En el presente artículo desarrollamos algunas notas para abonar a la reflexión acerca de los feminismos jurídicos en la Argentina con proyección latinoamericana, fundamentalmente a partir de la década de 1990.


Hypatia ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 214-235
Author(s):  
L. Ryan Musgrave

This essay explores how early approaches in feminist aesthetics drew on concepts honed in the field of feminist legal theory, especially conceptions of oppression and equality. I argue that by importing these feminist legal concepts, many early feminist accounts of how art is political depended largely on a distinctly liberal version of politics. I offer a critique of liberal feminist aesthetics, indicating ways recent work in the field also turns toward critical feminist aesthetics as an alternative.


1997 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Jackson

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