Liquidity Insurance vs. Credit Provision: Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tumer Kapan ◽  
Camelia Minoiu
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Atish R. Ghosh ◽  
Jonathan D. Ostry ◽  
Mahvash S. Qureshi

This concluding chapter argues that the policy makers' vade mecum laid out in the previous chapter raises broader issues for the global monetary system. Notwithstanding the fact that some of the emerging markets may have liberalized their capital accounts prematurely, it questions whether emerging markets have further to gain from opening up, or indeed whether they would not be better off retaining restrictions on at least the riskiest forms of foreign liabilities and transactions. This is particularly pertinent since most of these countries do not enjoy the liquidity insurance provided by swap facilities let alone the reserve currency status. They are forced to self-insure through reserve accumulation, which is costly both to the country and to the international monetary system. Alternative forms of insurance could arguably yield favorable benefit–cost trade-offs, particularly if they result in a safer mix of flows that makes economies less prone to risks from changes in global push factors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 2049-2086 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Andolfatto ◽  
Aleksander Berentsen ◽  
Fernando M Martin

Abstract The fact that money, banking, and financial markets interact in important ways seems self-evident. The theoretical nature of this interaction, however, has not been fully explored. To this end, we integrate the Diamond (1997, Journal of Political Economy105, 928–956) model of banking and financial markets with the Lagos and Wright (2005, Journal of Political Economy113, 463–484) dynamic model of monetary exchange—a union that bears a framework in which fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium, where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable in government money, where the terms of bank deposit contracts are affected by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets, where banks are subject to runs, and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play, both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort. Among other things, the model provides a rationale for nominal deposit contracts combined with a central bank lender-of-last-resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.


2016 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tadanobu Nemoto ◽  
Yoshiaki Ogura ◽  
Wako Watanabe
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viral Acharya ◽  
Heitor Almeida ◽  
Filippo Ippolito ◽  
Ander Perez

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viral Acharya ◽  
Heitor Almeida ◽  
Filippo Ippolito ◽  
Ander Perez

2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugenio Proto

Abstract Banks supply liquidity to insure individuals against possible short-term consumption shocks. The higher this level of illiquidity insurance the lower the investments in long run assets, and the higher the risk of a bank run generated by a real negative shock. If individuals are sufficiently risk averse, competitive banks trade off liquidity insurance for portfolio risk. High growth expectations, typical of emerging economies, increase the optimal liquidity supply even when this increases the risk of a bank run. On the contrary, deposit contracts offered when economic performances are very uncertain (like in less developed economies), and where output fluctuations are milder (like in developed economies), are less exposed to the risk of a bank run. In this setting, a bail-out in case of crisis is ex-ante Pareto efficient even if it always increases the risk of crisis.


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