scholarly journals Money, Banking, and Financial Markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 2049-2086 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Andolfatto ◽  
Aleksander Berentsen ◽  
Fernando M Martin
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Deposit Contracts ◽  
Liquidity Insurance ◽  
Meaningful Role

Abstract The fact that money, banking, and financial markets interact in important ways seems self-evident. The theoretical nature of this interaction, however, has not been fully explored. To this end, we integrate the Diamond (1997, Journal of Political Economy105, 928–956) model of banking and financial markets with the Lagos and Wright (2005, Journal of Political Economy113, 463–484) dynamic model of monetary exchange—a union that bears a framework in which fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium, where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable in government money, where the terms of bank deposit contracts are affected by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets, where banks are subject to runs, and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play, both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort. Among other things, the model provides a rationale for nominal deposit contracts combined with a central bank lender-of-last-resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.

scholarly journals Unanswered quibbles: George Selgin still gets it wrong with fractional reserve free banking

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Bagus ◽  
David Howden
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Real Income ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Credit Expansion ◽  
Investment Projects ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Monetary Equilibrium ◽  
El Sistema

In this article we reply to George Selgin’s counterarguments to our article «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin regards holding cash as saving while we focus on the real savings necessary to maintain investment projects. Real savings are unconsumed real income. Variations in real savings are not necessarily equal to variations in cash holdings. We show that a coordinated credit expansion in a fractional reserve free banking (FRFB) system is possible and that precautionary reserves consequently do not pose a necessary limit. We discuss various instances in which a FRFB system may expand credit without a prior increase in real savings. These facets all demonstrate why a fractional reserve banking system —even a free banking one— is inherently unstable, and incentivized to impose a stabilizing central bank. We find that at the root of our disagreements with Selgin lies a different approach to monetary theory. Selgin subscribes to the aggregative equation of exchange, which impedes him from seeing the microeconomic problems that the stabilization of «MV» by a FRFB system causes. Key words: Free banking, fractional reserve, monetary equilibrium, credit expansion, economic cycle. JEL Classification: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34. Resumen: En este artículo respondemos a George Selgin, que a su vez respondió a nuestro artículo «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin considera que los saldos de tesorería son ahorros, mientras nosotros nos fijamos en los ahorros reales necesarios para mantener proyectos de inversion. Ahorros reales son ingresos reales no consumidos. Variaciones en los ahorros reales no necesariamente coinciden con las variaciones en los saldos de tesoreria. Mostramos que una expansión crediticia coordinada es posible en un sistema bancario de reserva fraccionaria (FRFB) y que las reservas prudenciales no constituyen necesariamente un limite a la expansión co - ordinada. Discutimos varios escenarios en los que el sistema FRFB puede expandir los créditos sin un aumento previo en los ahorros reales. Todas estas facetas muestran que un sistema bancario de reservas fraccionarias —incluso uno de banca libre— es inherentemente inestable y produce incentivos para imponer un banco central estabilizador. Mostramos que el origen de nuestras diferencias con Selgin está en un enfoque diferente a la teoría monetaria. Selgin es partidario de la ecuación de intercambio que es muy agregada y que le impide ver los problemas microeconomicas que la estabilización de «MV» por parte del sistema FRFB produce. Palabras clave: Banca libre, reserva fraccionaria, equilibrio monetario, expansión crediticia, ciclo económico. Clasificación JEL: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34.

4. Fundamental Principles of Bank Supervision and the Lender of Last Resort—A Reconceptualization

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Cranston ◽  
Emilios Avgouleas ◽  
Kristin van Zweiten ◽  
Theodor van Sante ◽  
Christoper Hare
Keyword(s):  
Early Intervention ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
Public Agencies ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Bank Supervision ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
System P

This chapter examines the architecture and functions of bank supervision. Bank supervision is the process through which compliance with discussed prudential, conduct, and systemic regulations is safeguarded and enforced. It is normally exercised by public agencies that have the competence to approve the establishment and operation of credit institutions and monitor continuous compliance with the requisite regulatory framework. The same public bodies are also vested with remedial (early intervention) and enforcement powers in the event of a breach of any of the above. The chapter covers the fundamental principles of financial supervision; bank supervisors' accountability and judicial review; bankers' conduct, money laundering, and terrorist financing; and the central bank as the lender of last resort to the banking system.

scholarly journals The Uneasy Case for Fractional- Reserve Free Banking

2021 ◽  
pp. 143-196
Author(s):  
Ludwig van den Hauwe
Keyword(s):  
Business Cycle ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Monetary Reform ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Banking Business ◽  
The Business Cycle

Since a few decades several sub-disciplines within economics have witnessed a reorientation towards institutional analysis. This development has in particular also affected the fields of macroeconomics and monetary theory where it has led to several proposals for far-reaching financial and monetary reform. One of the more successful of these proposals advocates a fractional-reserve free banking system, that is, a system with no central bank, but with permission for the banks to operate with a fractional reserve. This article exposes several conceptual flaws in this proposal. In particular several claims of the fractional-reserve free bankers with respect to the purported working characteristics of this system are criticized from the perspective of economic theory. In particular, the claim that a fractional-reserve free banking system would lead to the disappearance of the business cycle is recognized as false. Furthermore an invisible-hand analysis is performed, reinforcing the conclusion that fractional-reserve free banking is incompatible with the ethical and juridical principles underlying a free society. Key words: monetary and banking regimes, comparative institutional analysis, fractional-reserve free banking, business cycle, invisible hand. Clasificación JEL: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34 Resumen: Desde hace algunas décadas varias subdisciplinas de la economía se ven reorientadas hacia el análisis institucional. Este desarrollo ha afectado más específicamente también a los campos de la macroeconomía y la teoría monetaria donde ha llevado a varias propuestas de reformas financieras y monetarias de gran alcance. Una de las propuestas más exitosas aboga por una banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, o sea un sistema sin banco central en el cual, sin embargo, los bancos puedan operar con una reserva fraccionaria. Este artículo comenta varios defectos conceptuales de dicha propuesta. Más específicamente, varias alegaciones de los banqueros de la banca libre con reserva fraccionaria relativas a las supuestas características operativas de este sistema se critican partiendo de la teoría económica. Más en particular, se denuncia como errónea la alegación de que una banca libre con reserva fraccionaria llevaría a la desaparición del ciclo económico. Además, se realiza un análisis de mano invisible lo cual refuerza la conclusión que la banca libre con reserva fraccionaria es incompatible con los principios éticos y jurídicos propios de una sociedad libre. Palabras clave: banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, ciclo económico, mano invisible.

The classical monetary theory on bank liquidity and finance

2019 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 692-709
Author(s):  
Laurent Le Maux
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Great Recession ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Banking System ◽  
John Stuart Mill ◽  
Market Discipline ◽  
Monetary Theory ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Real Estate Markets ◽  
The Great Recession

Abstract This article investigates the classical monetary theory on bank liquidity and finance and especially the contribution of Thomas Tooke, John Stuart Mill and John Fullarton at the light of the debate on the Great Recession. These authors show how financial markets and banking system may collapse altogether after a rise of values in certain classes of securities or real estate markets. And they come to the view that competition between commercial banks creates the appearance of market discipline, while the expectation of scarcity in some specific markets leads to a speculative process, which in turn destabilizes the banking system and triggers the need for the lender of last resort.

scholarly journals Credit expansion, the prisoner’s dilemma and free banking as mechanism design

2021 ◽  
pp. 133-174
Author(s):  
Ludwig M.P. van den Hauwe
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Implicit Assumption ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Game Theoretic

Despite the distinctive character of the Austrian approach to «microfoundations for macroeconomics», the literature on free banking contains a number of arguments which make use of game-theoretic concepts and models such as the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma model. While there can be no general a priori presumption against the possible usefulness of game-theoretic concepts for Austrian theorizing, in the context of the debate on free banking such concepts and models have been used with varying degrees of perspicacity. One example which is elaborated in the paper is concerned with the interaction configuration between independent banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system, which has sometimes been modeled as a One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This conceptualization does not provide a sufficient argument for the in-concert overexpansion thesis, nor for the thesis that fractional-reserve free banking will tend to lead to the establishment of a central bank. The author drops the implicit assumption that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the outcome matrix and the utility matrix. When it is acknowledged that banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system need not necessarily adopt a «myopic», self-regarding perspective but may recognize the long-run harmony of interests between the banking sector and society at large, a different conceptualization and a different matrix representation emerge. Key words: Economic Mechanism Design; Business Cycle Theory; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Free Banking. JEL codes: D01, E31, E32, E42, E52, E58, E66, G18, K39. Resumen: A pesar del carácter distintivo del enfoque austríaco de las «microfundaciones para la macroeconomía», la literatura sobre la banca libre contiene algunos argumentos que recurren a los conceptos y modelos de la teoría de juegos tales como el conocido modelo Dilema del Prisionero. A pesar de que no puede existir una presunción a priori sobre la posible utilidad de conceptos de la teoría de juegos para las teorías austríacas, en el contexto del debate sobre la banca libre tales conceptos y modelos han sido manejados con distintos grados de perspicacia. Un ejemplo elaborado en el documento comenta la configuración de interacción entre los bancos independientes en un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, que a veces ha sido modelado como un juego de Dilema del Prisionero One-Shot. Esta conceptualización no ofrece suficientes argumentos para la tesis de la sobreexpansión in-concert, ni para la tesis de que un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria tendería a la creación de un banco central. El autor abandona la asunción implícita de que existe una correspondencia de uno a uno entre la matriz de resultado y la matriz de utilidad. Al reconocerse que los bancos en un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria no deben adoptar necesariamente una perspectiva «miope» y egoísta, pero pueden reconocer la armonía de intereses a largo plazo entre el sector bancario y la sociedad en general, surgen una conceptualización y representación de la matriz distintas. Palabras clave: Diseño de mecanismo económico; Teoría del ciclo económico; Dilema del Prisionero; Banca libre. Códigos JEL: D01, E31, E32, E42, E52, E58, E66, G18, K39.

scholarly journals The Future of Money and the Central Bank Digital Currency Dilemma

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 9697
Author(s):  
Carlos Viñuela ◽  
Juan Sapena ◽  
Gonzalo Wandosell
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Bank Deposits ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Financial Framework ◽  
Low Levels ◽  
Reserve Banking

In this paper we set out a three-pillar monetary-financial framework to (i) analyze, categorize and compare past, current and emerging means of payment; to (ii) capture their creation and destruction processes through sectoral balance sheet dynamics; and to (iii) identify the inherent risks to the current monetary-financial system, also known as the fractional reserve banking system. These risks, which stem from sudden shifts in money demand and supply, are as follows: (I) risk of a cashless society; (II) risk of structural bank disintermediation; (III) risk of systemic bank runs; (IV) risk of currency substitution; and (V) risk of economic and financial bubbles. This framework will guide the assessment of the central bank digital currencies (CBDC), which are considered as the next step in monetary evolution. We will analyze two large groups of CBDC proposals: (i) proposals aimed at complementing cash and bank deposits; and (ii) proposals aimed at replacing all bank deposits with CBDCs. We find that once CBDCs are issued in both sets of proposals, there is always a trade-off between low levels of (I), (IV), (V), risks and high levels of (II) risk. This trade-off could also be defined as the CBDC dilemma, which states that in most CBDC proposals it is impossible to have both of the following at the same time: (1) low levels of (I), (IV) and (V) risks; and (2) low levels of (II) risk. Finally, we suggest that further research on CBDCs should focus on the second group of proposals on a phase-in basis in order to also mitigate the structural bank disintermediation risk and hence to overcome the CBDC dilemma.

scholarly journals Central Bank Policy in Times of Turbulence on Financial Markets

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-18
Author(s):  
M. Zharikov
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Financial Failure ◽  
The Us

This article is devoted to a central bank’s response to a financial crisis based on a case study of the US Federal Reserve’s handling of the financial crisis in 2008–2010. This article will also be focusing on the intense phase of the financial crisis. It is focusing primarily on the lender of last resort function of a central bank. The article concludes with the most significant issues about the aftermath and the recovery, as well as lessons to deal with financial failure during the coronavirus and its aftermath.

scholarly journals The European central bank and the us federal reserve as lender of last resort

2014 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hansjörg Herr
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Shadow Banking ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Us

Without a lender of last resort financial stability is not possible and systemic financial crises get out of control. During and after the Great Recession the US Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) took on the role of lender of last resort in a comprehensive way. The Fed stabilised the financial system, including the shadow banking system. However, the chance to fundamentally restructure the financial system was not used. The ECB was confronted with sovereign debt crises and an incomplete integration of the European Monetary Union (EMU). It followed a kind of ?muddling through? to keep the Euro area together. In the EMU not only a fundamental restructuring of the financial system is needed but also a deeper economic and political integration. The Fed and the ECB both were the most important institutions to avoid repetition of the 1930s.

scholarly journals Free banking, the real-balance effect, and Walras’ Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 241-258
Author(s):  
Ludwig van den Hauwe
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Real Balance ◽  
The Real ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Monetary Systems ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Erroneous Interpretation

The author of this article draws special attention to two particular claims of the free bankers concerning the supposed working characteristics of a fractional-reserve free banking system which may strike the reader as questionable. The first of these relates to the alleged absence of a real-balance effect under free banking. The second relates to the free bankers’ reference to Walras’ Law as providing a rationale for the free banking system’s «offsetting» actions when confronted with changes in the public’s demand to hold bank liabilities. This rationale is defective since it is based on an erroneous interpretation of Walras’ Law. The author’s conclusion does not imply that it is not at all possible, from a rational viewpoint, to make a plausible case for this variant of free banking, only that the argument should be freed from certain questionable tenets. Key words: Free banking, monetary systems, real-balance effects, Walras’ Law. JEL Classification: E0; E32; E42; E5; E51; E52. Resumen: El autor de esta nota llama la atención sobre dos alegaciones particulares relativas a las supuestas características operativas de una banca libre con reserva fraccionaria que podrían resultar cuestionables al lector. La primera se refiere a la supuesta ausencia de efectos de saldo real en la banca libre. El segundo guarda relación con la referencia de los teóricos de la banca libre con reserva fraccionaria a la Ley de Walras que constituiría la base lógica de las acciones «de compensación» de la banca libre al enfrentarse a cambios en la demanda de medios fiduciarios por parte del público. Esta base lógica es defectuosa puesto que parte de una interpretación errónea de la Ley de Walras. La conclusión del autor no implica que no sea posible en absoluto, desde un punto de vista racional, elaborar una argumentación plausible para esta variante de la banca libre, sino que la argumentación debe estar libre de determinados argumentos cuestionables. Palabras clave: Banca libre, sistemas monetarios, efectos de saldo real, Ley de Walras. Clasificación JEL: E0; E32; E42; E5; E51; E52.

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