scholarly journals RAWLSNET: Altering Bayesian Networks to Encode Rawlsian Fair Equality of Opportunity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Liu ◽  
Zohair Shafi ◽  
William Fleisher ◽  
Tina Eliassi-Rad ◽  
Scott Alfeld
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Networks ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity

Fair Equality of Opportunity

1985 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 197-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry A. Alexander ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

Children’s Distributive Outcomes: Equality of Opportunity?

2020 ◽  
pp. 149-158
Author(s):  
Timothy Fowler ◽  
Timothy Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Children’S Wellbeing ◽  
The World ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Priority View

In this chapter, I consider the extent to which my account supports equality of opportunity, understood roughly in the Rawlsian sense known as FEO (Fair Equality of Opportunity). FEO seems inconsistent with the priority view defended in Section 2. However, I argue there are powerful reasons of justice to think that justice requires limiting the ability of parents to pass on economic advantages to their children. I show an argument for equalising opportunity flows from my account of children’s wellbeing. I argue that children’s social relations with one another are dependent upon FEO, and in particular that children interact with the world as agents. This means that their lives take the shape they do because of their own actions and abilities.

On the Contribution of Ex Ante Equality to Ex Post Fairness

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Hyams
Keyword(s):  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Equal Chance ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Number Of Authors

When distributing an indivisible harm or benefit between multiple individuals, all of whom have an equal claim to avoid the harm or receive the benefit, it is commonly thought that one should hold a lottery in order to give each claimant an equal chance of winning. Moreover, it is often said that, by holding a lottery, one makes the resultant outcome inequality between those who receive the harm or benefit and those who do not less unfair than it would otherwise have been. Versions of this view have been prominently endorsed by a number of authors, including Arneson, Broome, Diamond, Lang, Otsuka, Parfit, and Temkin. I argue that the view is mistaken. I note that the failure of the view has significant consequences for policy, including most importantly for how we should interpret the goal of fair equality of opportunity.

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