Two limits to the application of Rawls’s concepts of autonomy and the difference principle in contemporary philosophy of education

The concept of justice that Rawls discussed in his famous book “A Theory of Justice” has had a profound influence on contemporary political and moral philosophy, as well as, to some extent, philosophy of education. Many philosophers of education have applied or criticized Rawls’s concepts – above all the concepts of autonomy, the person, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle – which he developed as an essential part of his theory of justice. In this paper I will discuss very briefly only one of the problems that philosophers of education face when applying his concepts of the autonomous person and the difference principle. The essence of this problem is expressed in the question of whether or not to respect the limits of the applicability of these concepts set by Rawls himself.

Inequitable access to healthcare in Africa: reconceptualising the “accountability for reasonableness framework” to reflect indigenous principles

Background The “Accountability for Reasonableness” (A4R) framework has been widely adopted in working towards equity in health for sub-Saharan Africa (SAA). Its suitability for equitable health policy in Africa hinges, at least in part, on its considerable successes in the United States and it being among the most comprehensive ethical approaches in addressing inequitable access to healthcare. Yet, the conceptual match is yet to be examined between A4R and communal responsibility as a common fundamental ethic in SAA. Methodology A4R and its applications toward health equity in sub-Saharan Africa were conceptually examined by considering the WHO’s “3-by-5” and the REACT projects for their accounting for the communal responsibility ethic in pursuit of health equity. Results Some of the challenges that these projects encountered may be ascribed to an incongruity between the underpinning ethical principle of A4R and the communitarian ethical principle dominant in sub-Saharan Africa. These are respectively the fair equality of opportunity principle derived from John Rawls’ theory, and the African communal responsibility principle. Conclusion A health equity framework informed by the African communal responsibility principle should enhance suitability for SAA contexts, generating impetus from within Africa alongside the affordances of A4R.

Inequitable Access to Healthcare in Africa: Reconceptualising the “Accountability for Reasonableness Framework” to Reflect Indigenous Principles

BackgroundThe “Accountability for Reasonableness” (A4R) framework has been widely adopted in working towards equity in health for sub-Saharan Africa. Its suitability for equitable health policy in Africa hinges, at least in part, on its considerable successes in the United States and it being among the most comprehensive ethical approaches in current literature in addressing inequitable access to healthcare. Methodology/FindingThis article considers applications of A4R towards health equity in sub-Saharan Africa – including the WHO’s “3-by-5” and the REACT projects – and ascribes some of the challenges that these projects encountered to an incongruity between the underpinning ethical principle of A4R and the communitarian ethical principle dominant in sub-Saharan Africa. These are respectively the fair equality of opportunity principle derived from John Rawls’ theory, and the African communal responsibility principle. ConclusionA health equity framework informed by the latter, we contend, should be more suitable for African contexts, generating impetus from within Africa alongside the affordances of A4R.

The Social Injustice of Parental Imprisonment

Children of prisoners are often negatively affected by their parents’ incarceration, which raises issues of justice. A common view is that the many negative effects associated with parental imprisonment are unjust, simply because children of prisoners are impermissibly harmed or unjustly punished by their parents’ incarceration. We argue that proposals of this kind have problems with accounting for cases where it is intuitive that prison might create social injustices for children of prisoners. Therefore, we suggest that in addition to the question of whether children of prisoners are impermissibly harmed, we should ask whether the inequalities that these children endure because of their parent’s incarceration are objectionable from a social justice perspective. To answer this latter question, we examine the negative effects associated with parental imprisonment from the perspective of luck egalitarianism. We develop a luck egalitarian account that incorporates insights from the philosophy of childhood. On our account, children of prisoners might endure two different types of objectionable inequalities, since they are often deprived of resources that are important for ensuring fair equality of opportunity in adulthood, but also because they are likely to suffer inequalities in terms of childhood welfare. After defending this account, we explore its implications for policy.

The Indeterminacy of Rawls’s Principles for Gender Justice

Feminists disagree about whether or not Rawls’s account of free and equal citizenship is an emancipatory ideal for women, and whether or not the application of the two principles of justice would suffice to dismantle relationships of domination that affect women’s lives. This chapter argues that there is no clear and uncontroversial application of Rawls’s principles of justice that supports those feminists who give affirmative answers to these questions. Regarding the first principle, one unsettled question is whether it protects sexual and reproductive rights, including the right to abortion. Regarding the second principle, there is indeterminacy due to the need to balance the requirements of fair equality of opportunity with parental rights. Moreover, the difference principle’s focus on the maximization of income and wealth for the worst off makes room for policies that do this while still leaving some women exposed to the arbitrary power of others.