Justice in a Market Economy

The Difference ◽

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference

Analyse & Kritik ◽

10.1515/auk-2013-0103 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 35 (1) ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Samuel Freeman

Keyword(s):

Welfare State ◽

Distributive Justice ◽

John Rawls ◽

Social System ◽

Difference Principle ◽

State Capitalism ◽

System Property ◽

The Social ◽

The Difference ◽

AbstractJohn Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.

Private Law and Rawls’s Principles of Justice

10.1093/oso/9780190699260.003.0006 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Samuel Freeman

Keyword(s):

Economic Cooperation ◽

Public Law ◽

Private Law ◽

Productive Activity ◽

Difference Principle ◽

Principle Of Justice ◽

The Law ◽

The Difference ◽

This chapter discusses the application of Rawls’s principles of justice to private law, or the law of legal relationships between individuals, including the law of property, contracts, and torts. Some have argued that Rawls’s principles of justice apply only to public law—legislation affecting government’s relationships to individuals. This chapter contends that the first principle plays a crucial role in assessing and determining private law; moreover, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle are to be applied to the assessment of many rules of private law. The difference principle addresses the question of how a society is to fairly design and efficiently organize the institutions that make economic cooperation possible among free and equal persons actively engaged in productive activity. Certain core legal institutions, including property and economic contract, are necessary for economic cooperation and are among the institutions covered by the second principle of justice.

Rawls on Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle

10.1093/oso/9780190699260.003.0004 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Samuel Freeman

Keyword(s):

Welfare State ◽

Distributive Justice ◽

Equality Of Opportunity ◽

Economic Systems ◽

Difference Principle ◽

Reciprocity Principle ◽

State Capitalism ◽

The Difference ◽

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?

Liberalism and Distributive Justice

10.1093/oso/9780190699260.001.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Samuel Freeman

Keyword(s):

Distributive Justice ◽

John Rawls ◽

Western World ◽

Liberal Society ◽

Difference Principle ◽

The Social ◽

Wide Range ◽

The Difference ◽

Principles Of Justice ◽

Political Philosopher

This volume of essays addresses a wide range of issues in contemporary political philosophy, from the different branches of liberalism and their relation to capitalism, to the basic institutions of a liberal society that underwrite political and economic justice. Samuel Freeman is a leading political philosopher and one of the foremost authorities on the works of John Rawls. This volume contains nine of his essays on liberalism, Rawls, and distributive justice. Freeman organizes his chapters into a narrative arc: from liberalism as the dominant political and economic system in the Western world, to the laws governing interpersonal transactions in a liberal society, to the broad social and political structures that determine distributive justice. Freeman analyzes the primary differences between the classical and high liberal traditions; shows why libertarianism is not a liberal view; argues for the social rather than global bases of distributive justice; demonstrates why Rawls’s difference principle supports a property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism; and shows how Rawls’s liberal principles of justice and the difference principle are to be applied in both ideal and non-ideal circumstances, effectively responding to criticisms by Amartya Sen, G. A. Cohen, and others.

Rawls on Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199645121.013.2 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Samuel Freeman

Keyword(s):

Welfare State ◽

Distributive Justice ◽

Equality Of Opportunity ◽

Economic Systems ◽

Difference Principle ◽

Reciprocity Principle ◽

State Capitalism ◽

The Difference ◽

RELENDO RAWLS APÓS PIKETTY: justiça, desigualdade e democracia de cidadãos proprietários

Revista Políticas Públicas ◽

10.18764/2178-2865.v19n2p509-520 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 19 (2) ◽

pp. 509

Author(s):

Leandro Martins Zanitelli

Keyword(s):

Welfare State ◽

Fair Value ◽

Equality Of Opportunity ◽

Recent Analysis ◽

Difference Principle ◽

State Capitalism ◽

Wealth Concentration ◽

The Difference ◽

Resumo: Ao tratar do tipo de regime institucional mais propenso à realização dos princípios da justiça como equidade, Rawls (2001) apresenta três argumentos sobre a superioridade de uma democracia de cidadãos proprietários em relação ao capitalismo de bem-estar, um argumento sobre o valor equitativo das liberdades políticas, outro sobre a equitativa igualdade de oportunidades e um terceiro acerca do princípio da diferença. Em uma crítica a esses argumentos, O’Neill (2012) conclui que apenas o último deles é convincente. Este trabalho procura demonstrar como a análise recente de Piketty (2014) sobre a tendência ao acirramento da desigualdade em sociedades com baixo crescimento dá fôlego aos argumentos de Rawls quanto à superioridade de uma democracia de cidadãos proprietários no que se refere ao valor equitativo das liberdades políticas e à igualdade de oportunidades. O trabalho de Piketty também joga luz sobre a importância, no que concerne ao princípio da diferença, da distinção entre um regime que inclui políticas para prevenir a concentração da riqueza (a democracia de cidadãos proprietários) e outro preocupado exclusivamente com a desigualdade de renda (o capitalismo de bem-estar).Palavras-chave: Democracia de cidadãos proprietários, capitalismo de bem-estar, desigualdade, rawls, piketty.READING RAWLS AFTER PIKETTY: justice, inequality and property-owning democracyAbstract: When discussing the type of institutional regime most prone to realizing the principles of justice as fairness, Rawls (2001) presents three arguments about the superiority of a property-owning democracy over welfare-state capitalism, concerning, respectively, the fair value of political liberties, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. In a critique of those arguments, O’Neill (2012) states that only the last one, the argument of the difference principle, is convincing. This paper, tries to demonstrate how Piketty’s (2014) recent analysis of the tendency of increasing inequality in low-growth societies offers support to Rawls’s arguments favoring property-owning democracy in matters regarding the fair value of political liberties and fair equality of opportunity. Piketty’s work also stresses the importance, in what refers to the difference principle, of distinguishing between a regime encompassing policies to prevent the wealth concentration (property-owning democracy) and another one whose exclusive concern is to reduce income inequality (welfare-state capitalism).Key words: Property-owning democracy, welfare-state capitalism, inequality, Rawls, Piketty.

A SATISFACTORY MINIMUM CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE: RECONSIDERING RAWLS'S MAXIMIN ARGUMENT

Economics and Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0266267113000357 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 29 (3) ◽

pp. 349-369 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Alexander Kaufman

Keyword(s):

John Rawls ◽

Original Position ◽

Difference Principle ◽

Minimum Level ◽

Justice As Fairness ◽

Marginal Value ◽

Primary Goods ◽

Maximin Rule ◽

The Difference ◽

John Rawls argues that it is possible to describe a suitably defined initial situation from which to form reliable judgements about justice. In this initial situation, rational persons are deprived of information that is ‘irrelevant from the standpoint of justice’. It is rational, Rawls argues, for persons choosing principles of justice from this standpoint to be guided by the maximin rule. Critics, however, argue that (i) the maximin rule is not the appropriate decision rule for Rawls's choice position; (ii) the maximin argument relies upon an imprecise account of the satisfactory minimum to be secured under the maximin rule; or that (iii) Rawls relies upon unrealistic assumptions about diminishing marginal value. These critics, I will suggest, argue from a number of assumptions that are confused or false. The satisfactory minimum that choosers in the original position – employing the maximin rule – seek to achieve is not a minimum level of primary goods, nor is the satisfactory minimum sought under the maximin rule supplied by the difference principle. I will argue that the maximin argument is more robust than has generally been recognized and that this argument performs a number of important functions in clarifying the nature and implications of Rawls's argument for justice as fairness.

The Means to Social Justice: Accounting for Functional Capabilities in the Rawlsian Approach

Canadian Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0008423908081146 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 41 (4) ◽

pp. 1003-1021

Author(s):

Mark Blythe

Keyword(s):

John Rawls ◽

Equality Of Opportunity ◽

Original Position ◽

Martha Nussbaum ◽

Amartya Sen ◽

Functional Capabilities ◽

Social Goods ◽

Principles Of Justice ◽

Capacités Fonctionnelles

Abstract. In developing his theory “Justice as Fairness,” John Rawls imagined a hypothetical initial situation designed to yield principles of justice to regulate society's main institutions, or what he called the “basic structure.” The positing of citizens as fully capable in this hypothetical “original position” allowed Rawls to consider advantage in terms of the primary social goods (all-purpose means) a citizen held. Rawls reasoned that the representatives of free and equal citizens would design principles of justice that yield equal liberties and “a fair equality of opportunity,” while ensuring that permissible inequalities are those which “contribute effectively to the benefit of the least-advantaged” citizens (2001: 64). This essay considers two criticisms of the Rawlsian approach to distributive justice made by capability theorists (principally, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum). Sen's criticism is that primary social goods will not be equally usable by citizens because of variances in functional capabilities. Extending Sen's criticism, Nussbaum argues that disadvantaged citizens are not represented in the selection of the principles of justice, and this is problematic for a theory that emphasizes a fair equality of opportunity, especially for society's least advantaged members. This paper argues that the Rawlsian approach can successfully respond to and accommodate these concerns. The main ideas are as follows: (1) The representatives in “the original position” are to represent the known range of citizen capability rather than the normal range. (2) Rawls's two principles of justice would still be chosen, but these would be preceded by a lexically prior principle of basic citizen capabilities, which Rawls characterized as the “two moral powers” (rationality and reasonableness). (3) The desirability of other functional capabilities (those which enable persons to use primary social goods to realize their ends) and their development are to be publicly debated.Résumé. En développant sa théorie dans «La justice comme équité» John Rawls a imaginé une situation initiale hypothétique, conçue de telle sorte qu'elle produise des principes de justice régissant les principales institutions de la société, ou ce qu'il a appelé «la structure de base». Le positionnement des citoyens comme jouissant de toutes leurs capacités dans cette «position originelle» hypothétique a permis à Rawls de considérer la notion d'avantage en termes de biens sociaux primaires (moyens adéquats à tous les buts) détenus par le citoyen ou la citoyenne. Rawls maintenait alors que les représentants de citoyens égaux et libres concevraient des principes de justice produisant des libertés égales et une «juste égalité des chances», et ceci tout en s'assurant que les inégalités permises soient celles qui «bénéficient efficacement aux [citoyens] les moins avantagés» (2001 : 64). Cet article considère deux critiques faites à l'approche Rawlsienne de la justice distributive par les théoriciens des capacités (notamment Amartya Sen et Martha Nussbaum). La critique de Sen objecte que les biens sociaux primaires ne seront pas une égalité utilisable par les citoyens à cause des variations de leurs capacités fonctionnelles. Poursuivant la critique de Sen, Nussbaum montre que les citoyens désavantagés ne sont pas représentés lors de la sélection des principes de justice, ce qui est est problématique pour une théorie qui met l'accent sur une juste égalité des chances, en particulier pour les membres les plus défavorisés de la société. Le présent article soutient que l'approche Rawlsienne peut répondre avec succès à ces objections et s'en accommoder. Les idées principales suivantes seront développées : (1) les représentants dans la position originelle sont censés représenter l'éventail connu des capacités des citoyens plutôt que l'éventail normal; (2) les deux principes de justice de Rawls seraient toujours choisis, mais ceux-ci seraient alors précédés par un principe, lexicalement prioritaire, de capacités de base des citoyens, principe que Rawls a caractérisé comme les deux pouvoirs moraux (rationnel et raisonnable) (3) La désirabilité des autres capacités fonctionnelles (celles qui donnent aux personnes la possibilité d'user de biens sociaux primaires afin de réaliser leurs fins) et leur développement sont des questions qui doivent être débattues publiquement.

The Difference Principle, Equality of Opportunity, and Cosmopolitan Justice

Journal of Moral Philosophy ◽

10.1177/1740468105058158 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 2 (3) ◽

pp. 333-351 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Gillian Brock

Keyword(s):

Equality Of Opportunity ◽

Difference Principle ◽

The Difference ◽

Principles Of Justice ◽

The Ideal

AbstractWhat kinds of principles of justice should a cosmopolitan support? In recent years some have argued that a cosmopolitan should endorse a Global Difference Principle. It has also been suggested that a cosmopolitan should support a Principle of Global Equality of Opportunity. In this paper I examine how compelling these two suggestions are. I argue against a Global Difference Principle, but for an alternative Needs-Based Minimum Floor Principle (where these are not co-extensive, as I explain). Though I support a negative version of the Global Equality of Opportunity Principle, I argue that a more positive version of the ideal remains elusive.

The Original Position in José Saramago's Blindness

The Review of Politics ◽

10.1017/s0034670507000769 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 69 (3) ◽

pp. 447-463 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Michael Keren

Keyword(s):

Early Modern ◽

Social Contract ◽

John Rawls ◽

Normative Theory ◽

Original Position ◽

Theory Of Justice ◽

Modern Age ◽

Following the tradition of social contract theories of the early modern age, John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, renewed the notion of the “original position,” that is, a set of behavioral assumptions from which general principles of justice are deduced. José Saramago's novel Blindness enriches Rawls's normative theory by adding behavioral assumptions that help clarify some of the problems raised by the theory's critics and enhance its application to social and political settings.